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Introduction

The civil rights revolution of the 1960's produced a fundamental
change in the attitudes of American businessmen toward Negro employment. Prior to the racial unrest of the sixties employers at their worst
had practiced blatant racial discrimination against blacks. At their best,
businessmen had been color blind, requiring that blacks conform to all
the qualifications traditionally demanded of whites. However, after the
civil rights revolution elements of the business community embraced the
idea of "affirmative action," which meant that employers not only gave
blacks equal opportunity but took positive steps to see that blacks were
recruited, hired, and promoted. The affirmative action programs did not
significantly reduce the level of black unemployment and underemployment. But whatever its lack of impact on black economic problems, business acceptance of affirmative action marked a radical departure from
traditional employment practice. Affirmative action was the result of a
long and complex process in which businessmen altered their personnel
policies in order to maintain the most satisfactory relationship with their
changing socioeconomic environment.
Through their protests, American Negroes were able to bring about
increased government pressure for black employment. The combination
of black and government demands changed the attitudes of the white
public, which in turn created the setting in which the business community
could alter its traditional discriminatory practices. As a result of black
activism society as a whole came to accept employment discrimination as
a social problem, and therefore business attempts to eliminate unfair
employment practices became socially responsible activity. A thread of
corporate social responsibility runs throughout American business history,
but it was not until the late 1960's that the business community could
count employment integration in its census of good deeds.
While it took a social revolution to get employers to accept their
responsibility t'o hire blacks, that acceptance did not permit the business
3
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community to rest easily on its laurels. Black employment after the late
sixties frequently embodied affirmative action which required the employer to extend more of an effort to employ blacks than he did to employ
whites. Affirmative action meant additional costs for hiring sometimes less
qualified blacks and ran counter to the two most fundamental values of
the American businessman. The extra expense violated the Capitalist
Ethic, which mandated minimizing costs to maximize profits, and the
selecting of less qualified blacks over more qualified whites violated the
American Creed of equal opportunity. Although affirmative action was
the most socially responsible course of action in the lates sixties, it left
the business community confused and divided because such social responsibility flew in the face of society's most cherished traditional values.
Thus, in the twenty-five years after World War II businessmen went
through three major stages of personnel policy in order to conform to
changing social forces. Initially in the forties and early fifties, they refused to apply the American Creed to blacks because they feared the costs
of white opposition to black workers. During the late fifties and early
sixties, employers hired qualified blacks for production jobs and token
blacks for white-collar work. In this way they could exploit the manpower
pool while conforming to both the American Creed and the Capitalist
Ethic. Most employers refused to move beyond this state of ideological
equilibrium, but some of the nation's most important firms adopted policies of affirmative action in the postriot period of the late sixties. These
firms once more violated the American Creed, but this time for, not against
blacks. They justified their action on the basis of the need for a calm and
stable society. Although they were willing to accept some of the short-run
costs of affirmative action, it quickly became apparent that voluntary business action was not going to solve the black employment problem, and the
business community began to call for increased government assistance
either to make affirmative action profitable or to relieve the business community of the responsibility of solving black unemployment.
The fact that businessmen were followers rather than leaders in the
process of changing attitudes toward Negro employment in no way reduces the importance of these changes to the economic status of blacks.
After a detailed exploration of the relationship between economic growth
and employment opportunities for minorities, Dale L. Hiestand concluded
that changes in employment patterns were "primarily determined by what
are usually called noneconomic variables. These would include the impact
of social changes, such as the decrease in racial prejudice and discrimination .... " 1 Altered business attitudes led, in turn, to changes in the Negro's
economic situation. After 1945, income (whether in terms of real, money,
wage-earner, or family income) increased more or less steadily. However,
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relative to white income, Negroes made little, if any, measurable gain.2 In
occupations, as in income, Negroes steadily moved upward after 1945.
Unlike relative income, however, the relative occupational position of
blacks did improve, particularly in the skilled trades and lower level whitecollar work.3 No analyst has explained why Negroes improved their relative occupational positions but did not also improve their relative incomes.
The answer may lie in the fact that most of the breakthroughs into new
jobs after 1945 were of much greater symbolic than numerical value. Employers placed blacks on jobs they had never held before, but the shortage
of qualified black applicants plus the inability or unwillingness of indusiry
to train Negro applicants minimized the economic impact of the changes
in hiring policy.
Critics often labeled postwar Negro employment breakthroughs as
"tokenism." One or two isolated Negroes in a firm may have been tokens
in the eyes of the black community, but to the employer they frequently ·
appeared bigger than life, and more numerous. The introduction of blacks
into an all-white work force usually marked a major turning point in an
employer's attitude toward minority hiring. The success of even a token
Negro robbed the employer of his basic arguments against employing
blacks. His work force did not walk out at the sight of a black face. His
customers did not take their business elsewhere. Successful integration in
one department set the stage for integration in other departments. Successful integration in one firm provided a model for other companies to
follow. Although second steps and third steps frequently had to wait for
some form of external pressure, "tokenism" was a necessary first step in
the integration of business.
This study explores the reasons businessmen took steps toward equal
employment, how their changing attitudes affected their employment practices, and how their changing personnel policies affected their attitudes
toward Negro employment. To some extent I treat the "business community" as a single entity and in doing so I lump together big business
and small business, privately owned and publicly owned firms, retail,
manufacturing and service industries, unionized and unorganized companies, and firms in diverse geographic locations. Where data permit I
try to distinguish differences among the various kinds of business organizations, but where such distinctions are not possible I believe that generalizing to the "business community" is still both useful and legitimate.
Despite the important differences among companies there is a "business
community" whose general attitudes toward employing blacks can be examined. Obviously at any one point in history there were companies, even
large numbers of companies, which did not agree with what I term the
business attitude of that particular time. Nevertheless, broad reading in
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the general and business press, as well as investigation in private sources,
does indicate that there is a mood, or spirit, which reflects business thinking at a given time. I will examine how and why that mood has changed
since World War IL
The question then arises, did the public expressions of businessmen
accurately reflect their real attitudes? Public expressions of belief are
voluntary. Businessmen had little reason to lie except if they believed that
public profession of a particular set of values would enhance their positions. Unless we assume that all businessmen were chronic and compul sive liars, their printed comments refleckd either their own views or thf
views they felt the public expected. My confidence in the legitimacy of
public sources has been bolstered by the lack of conflict between public
statements and their comments in private conversations. I have found no
major discrepancies between the thousands of confidential interviews
which the American Friends Service Committee held with businessmen
over the last twenty-five years and the public remarks which many of the
same individuals made. Further, in my own experience with businessmen,
both in private interviews and at several conferences (where I was not
known as a research interviewer) I discovered businessmen generally said
the same thing in private as in public, although in more picturesque
language.
If we accept the proposition that public expression accurately reflected the attitudes of the business community, the question remains, did
business attitudes reflect actual business practice? From the businessman's
point of view the answer was yes. From the black community's point of
view the answer was no. When employing his first black worker the businessman frequently labored mightily and brought forth a token. He was
proud of his action, and to the businessman it represented meaningful
implementation of his new racial policy. To the black community which
expected solutions to broad economic problems tokenism was a "shuck."
But whether they had hired one black worker or a hundred, by the late
1960's most businessmen would probably have professed agreement with
Arjay Miller, the president of the Ford Motor Company, who said in 1965,
"In today's society the advancement of brotherhood is part of the business
of business." Miller went on to claim that American business "had entered
an era of entirely new dimensions in its relationships and responsibilities
toward communities, the society, and government. " 4 I will attempt to explain why and how the business community came to accept Negro employment as a legitimate manifestation of social responsibility in the twentyfive years after World War II.

1
The Concept of Social Responsibility

Two distinct but intertwined forces shaped businessmen's attitudes
toward employing Negroes after the end of World War II. First, employers
viewed Negro workers from an economic perspective. As a source of manpower, blacks offered employers a large pool of workers willing to labor
for artificially low wages. However, black wages were low, at least in part,
because businessmen feared Negro employees would be an economic liability. The business community believed blacks in nontraditional jobs
would produce unrest among white employees and a drop in sales to white
customers. Thus the businessman had to weigh the benefits of cheap labor
against the potential costs from white opposition. According to classical
economic theory the businessman would make the decision designed to
bring maximum profit. To the extent that he made decisions rationally
based on profit maximization, the businessman was adhering to the
Capitalist Ethic.
The American Creed is the second force which influenced employer
decisions to hire blacks. The creed is best summed up in the words of the
Declaration of Independence, "all men are created equal" and have the
unalienable rights of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Although, as Gunnar Myrdal has noted, Americans have consistently
slighted the ideal of equal opportunity in practice, they have nevertheless
institutionalized it as part of the capitalist mythology of rags to riches. 1
Despite the eighteenth century origins of the American Creed, it was
not until after World War II that it was widely applied to Negro employment. The postwar period was one of transition in which public demands
for equal employment began to compete seriously with public objections to
black employment. The shift in broad social attitudes reduced the potential cost of employing blacks and meant that businessmen could adhere
to both the Capitalist Ethic and the American Creed. The favorable public
reaction to equal employment opportunity for blacks marked the transformation of Negro employment into a form of social responsibility.
7
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Like many such catch-phrases the hotly debated and somewhat
amorphous words "social responsibility" had no precise definition. Most
users of the term agreed that socially responsible action by a firm included
a concern for the good of society rather than an exclusive concentration
on profit maximization. While socially responsible action might, in fact,
benefit the company, immediate monetary gain was not its prime purpose.
One corporate president said he made socially responsible decisions "not
with expediency alone in mind, but with a real effort to judge rightness
and wrongness. . . . "2
Although the employment of blacks did not become a common manifestation of corporate public interest until the post-World War II period,
the idea that businessmen had a responsibility to society has deep historical
roots. Until the end of the nineteenth century, religious laws theoretically
took precedence over economic laws. The church iin the middle ages limited the prices and profits of businessmen with the concept of the "just
price. " 3 In preindustrial America the Protestant businessman was no less
obliged to temper his search for profits with moderation and concern for
the commonweal. In 1639 the city of Boston fined merchant Robert
Keayne eighty pounds and admonished him "in the name of the Church
for selling his wares at excessive rates, to the dishonor of God's name, the
offense of the General Court, and the public scandal of the country." 4 The
growth of American cities decreased the control of the church over the
activities of businessmen, while at the same time the development of capitalist economic theory gave business a philosophical rationale for its new
freedom. The rise of industrialism not only freed businessmen from governmental interference in pricing, but also gave them a freer hand to deal
with their employees. As the factory system replaced earlier methods of
manufacture, the traditional protection of rthe apprentice codes ceased to
have any real meaning. Members of the white working class joined black
slaves as victims of unbridled economic exploitation.
In the early days of American industrialization employers made some
attempts to control the damaging effects of the factory system. Businessmen had successfully thrown off the restraining medieval yoke of the just
price, but not all employers were yet willing to treat labor as a commodity
subject to the vicissitudes of the open market and the dubious protection
of Mr. Smith's invisible hand. The textile mill operators of Massachusetts
were among the earliest business practitioners of social responsibility toward employees. The "Waltham System," in which mill owners erected
dormitories and kept close watch on the manners and morals of their
female operatives, is frequently cited as an early example of socially responsible employers' concern for the well-being of their employees, 5
although even here there is some question as to whether the boarding
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school environments at Waltham and Lowell were not due more to the
manpower needs of the companies and the cultural background of the
workers than to the charity of the owners. 6 This concern for employee
welfare did not last long. The fierce competition of the postbellum period
combined with social Darwinism to produce an age of industrialists who
were less concerned with a fair return to consumers and employees, and
more concerned with maximum return to investors.
The concept of social responsibility, which had its sources in the
religious domination of preindustrial society, virtually disappeared from
business thought during the Gilded Age. Late nineteenth-century industrialists used the laissez-faire theories developed a hundred years before by
Adam Smith to free themselves from any obligations to society. Instead
they developed the rationale that unhampered capitalists operating in a
free market would create the most perfect possible world. Inherent in this
philosophy was the belief that businessmen could solve all of society's ills.
Although in its purest form the laissez-faire philosophy did not require the
businessman to do anything but single-mindedly pursue profit, it contained the germ of the belief that when social problems arose, business,
rather than government, should solve them. These closely related, if somewhat contradictory, philosophical solutions to social problems would reappear regularly during the twentieth century. On the one hand they
prompted the business community to oppose any intervention into social
problems, and on the other they led businessmen to claim that only they,
and not the government, could alleviate social ills.
By the end of the nineteenth century most industrial leaders accepted
the idea that competition would ultimately produce the best society, and
they completely disassociated their businesses from the specific problems
of the country. With social controls on business lessened, and in the absence of effective legal or voluntary restraint, businessmen felt free to
administer their enterprises as they saw fit. William H . Vanderbilt exemplified the divorce of business from society when he informed a newsman that the New York Central Railroad was run not "for the benefit of
the dear public," but for the profit of the stockholders. 7 Andrew Carnegie
took a similarly isolated view of his business when he told the Stanley
Investigating Committee, "I was in business to make money. I was not a
philanthropist at all. " 8 Of course, like other Gilded Age moguls, Carnegie
was a philanthropist. However, the captains of industry fulfilled their
social responsibility with charity and considered their business affairs to be
personal matters beyond either the concern or control of society.
Had more Gilded Age employers shared Andrew Carnegie's "gospel
of wealth" and returned their personal fortunes to the people from whom
the money had come, perhaps businessmen could have forestalled the
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anti-big-business aspects of the Progressive Movement. However, the brash
statements of contempt for the public welfare and the brasher actions of
the robber barons contributed to the rise of Progressivism. During the
Progressive Era pressure from the consuming public, from organized labor,
and from industrial leaders who wanted to rationalize the economic order
forced the business community to become more concerned with the needs
of the public. 9 It was a long step from the "public be damned" attitude of
the Gilded Age moguls to the placating observation during the Progressive
Era of Theodore N . Vail, president of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, that "we feel our obligations to the general public as
strongly as to our investing public, or to our own personal interests. " 10
Vail's willingness to concede that business had to judge its actions according to their impact on society as well as to their effects on profits was not a
repudiation of the Capitalist Ethic. The antibusiness attitude of the Progressive Era had impressed upon business the necessity of recognizing that
long-run profit depended upon public acceptance of business actions and
that public acceptance would come only when the people believed business
was acting in the public interest. Consequently businessmen began to
emphasize the supposed social benefits of capitalism and social concern of
capitalists.
Business participation in World War I removed any lingering doubts
in the mind of most of the public about the benign nature of American
enterprise. For a decade, from the end of World War I until the crash,
businessmen retained their positive public image. The 1920's were no less
a period of business dominance than the 1890's. Taking their cue from the
Progressive period, businessmen in the 1920's integrated their economic
philosophy with a positive attitude toward the general welfare. As business
historian Morrell Heald has pointed out, "The spirit of boosterism and
'service' which Sinclair Lewis satirized in Babbitt filled innumerable business speeches and articles. It was seen, by men who took it seriously, as
evidence of a growing sense of responsibility on the part of those best
qualified to provide leadership for a permanently prosperous America." 11
Business paternalism toward employees and toward the community depended upon substantial profits and widespread public acceptance of business good intentions. The depression brought an end to both profits and
good will. Despite the pressures of the depression, which tended to focus
all business energy on mere survival, some corporate leaders retained a
callous remnant of their sense of social responsibility. John B. Nicholes of
the Oklahoma Gas Utilities Company devised a plan which would have
provided the unemployed with five-gallon cans of restaurant table scraps
in return for chopping wood. 12
As World War I had rescued business from the bad press of the Pro-
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gressive Era, so World War II refurbished the depression-tarnished business image. 13 With the war came recovery. War contracts once more allowed business to earn high profits and praise for acting in a socially
responsible manner. National mobilization created a unity of purpose
which tended to obscure the profound changes the New Deal had caused
in the relationship of business with the government and with the consuming public. Under Franklin D. Roosevelt, the government had usurped
the role of industry as protector of the American way of life. During the
twenties the business community had shouldered the responsibility of
taking care of the unfortunate. Through welfare capitalism and widespread support of private charity efforts such as the community chest
movement, private enterprise kept the wolves of want from the citizen's
door. When, during the depression, businessmen were unable to keep the
wolves from the factory gates, employers were forced to concede the protection of the public welfare to federal legislation. 14
While the war dominated the scene businessmen could work toward
the common goal of victory and recoup some prestige they had lost during
the 1930's. However, with the end of World War II the business community had to come to grips with the legacy of the New Deal. The people
had come to look toward governmental leaders, not business leaders, when
they wanted something done. The business community had suffered a
sharp, and apparently permanent, drop in status. During the thirties business had made a feeble attempt to counter its weakened image through a
campaign to inform the people both of its good deeds and of the benefits
of the American economic system. 15 Yet, despite their favorable war experience, businessmen continued to feel unappreciated in the postwar
period, and the business community launched a second propaganda drive
to convince the public that business had the nation's best interest at
heart. The "sell-America" campaign of the early 1950's used magazine
advertisements, movies, car cards, and flyers to inform the American
people that the economic system of free market capitalism was the solution to all the country's problems. This quixotic crusade in public indoctrination was partly a response to the Cold War, but it was also an attempt
by businessmen to assure the people (and perhaps each other) that capitalism was a socially responsible economic system. 16
The sell-America campaign went through two phases. During the
first phase the business community reverted to Gilded Age arguments and
tried to deny that it had any specific obligations to the general welfare
while at the same time insisting that capitalism would benefit both workers
and consumers. The business community explained, through the use of
textbook homilies on the merits of the free market, that everybody would
profit if each sector of the economy stuck strictly to its own proper sphere
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of activity. However, the first phase failed to persuade the public that
selfishness was good for the country, and it failed to persuade the first
Republican administration in twenty years to roll back the economic reforms instituted by the New Deal.
Unsuccessful at convincing the public that the invisible hand of the
free market kept a sufficient check on the reins of free enterprise, businessmen tried to demonstrate that the visible hand of business was doing
something besides lifting the consumer's wallet. The second phase of the
sell-America campaign soft-peddled strict laissez faire and emphasized the
business community's commitment to improving the quality of American
life. When they discovered the country would not accept a return to the
unfettered days of the Gilded Age, a small but articulate number of businessmen and business commentators joined with the Eisenhower administration to try to recreate the climate of the 1920's by espousing increased
business social responsibility. 17 The pressure for business to adopt the new
approach grew slowly but steadily until the mid-1960's, when employers
faced constant and unrelenting demands from the popular and business
press to conform to the new norm.
Although opposition voices in the business community continued to
make themselves heard well into the 1960's, the concept of the socially
concerned businessman became so acceptable that even the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States, a conservative organization of small and
medium-sized companies, financed major studies of social problems. 18 By
1968 Esquire magazine believed so many businessmen wished to be known
as socially responsible that it began to cash in on the social concern movement. Esquire sent the nation's top five hundred corporations an advertising prospectus which asked, "Can you answer these questions? What is
the purpose of your business besides making money? How is your company
involved in making this a better world? Of course you can!" answered the
magazine to its own rhetorical questions. "Your corporation is probably
very much involved in the solution of social problems. " 19
There is no way of ascertaining either the depth or the quality of the
business community's acceptance of the concept of social responsibility.
The response to Esquire' s advertising prospectus was not overwhelming,
but the vast majority of the firms that did answer the magazine's appeal
expressed agreement with its assumptions. Yet, two surveys conducted in
the late 1960's discovered that while businessmen did feel a concern for
the problems of society, they were more worried about business problems
and less worried about social issues than the population at large. A 1967
National Industrial Conference Board survey asked executives what national problems they felt were urgent enough to warrant company time
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and money to solve. Very few of the more than one thousand businessmen
who replied listed social problems. Businessmen worried most about economic problems directly related to their firms .20 The fact that this spontaneous listing of national problems placed business difficulties ahead of
social concerns was perhaps indicative of the understandably dominant
role of the Capitalist Ethic in business thought. However, when faced with
a list of fourteen specific social problems, well over half of the same businessmen said their companies would take the initiative to correct the
problems.21
PERCENTAGE OF BUSINESSMEN WHO SAID THEIR COMPANIES
WOULD ACT TO SOLVE SOCIAL PROBLEMS

Issue
Improvement and expansion of local school facilities
Improvement of local school curriculum
Problems associated with school drop-outs
Improvement of work / career opportunities for minority groups
Retraining of workers ren dered unemployed by automation
Construction or im provement of medical facilities
Medical care for the aged
Provision fo r or improveme nt of low income housing
More and better cultural facilities and activities
Purification and improvement of water supply
Reduction and control of air pollution
Improvement of urban and interurban transportatio n
Development of community recreational faci l ities
Improveme nt of law enforcement at local levels

All Respondents
55.6
48.5
53.9
69.2
72.6
62.1
35.9
31.3
59.1
68.3
73.5
60.4
55.6
61.4

While most businessmen, in 1967, did not consider social problems
high on their list of priorities, 95 percent of them did indicate a willingness
to become involved in solving such problems. Even if the businessmen's
support for action in the socioeconomic sphere was only public posturing
for a national survey, it indicated that businessmen assumed that society
expected them to be concerned with the common good.
The following year, in 1968, another survey, done for the National
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, found that 86 percent of a national cross section of employers felt an obligation to make a strong effort
to provide employment for minorities. Nevertheless, when asked to rate
the seriousness of a long list of social problems, in 90 percent of the cases
the businessmen rated them as less serious than did a general sample of
the population. 22
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PROBLEMS IN THEIR CITIES RATED "VERY SERIOUS" BY
EMPLOYERS AND BY THE GENERAL SAMPLE
Employers
Problems Rated
Control of crime ........... .. ... ..... .. .......... .. .. .... ... .. .. .. .......... ......... .. ...
64
Unemployment ....... ........... ........ ............ ..... ............... ... .................. .
21
Air pollution ... ....... ....... .... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ........ .... ........................ .. ....... ..
26
Race relations
........................ ... .. ... .. ........ .. ... .......... ... .
46
Providing quality education .........................
.. ........... ..
35
Finding tax funds for municipal services
................. .
41
Traffic and highways
.................. .. .. ..
31
Preventing violence and other civil disorder
50
Lack of recreation facilities .. ............ ..
11
Corruption of public officials .. .. .. ............................................. ..
9
100 percent equals

... ..... .................

434

General

71

36
33
52
45
42
27
55
31
19
1,953

Both studies indicate awareness and concern on the part of the business community, although the second survey supports the proposition that
businessmen were followers rather than leaders in sensitivity to social
problems. Together, the two surveys indicate that by the late 1960's both
management and the public expected business to be active in the field of
social responsibility, although the studies are certainly no measure of how
many businessmen actually were.
Growing public demand for business social involvement in the 1960's
conflicted with the traditional view that businessmen should be hardheaded realists who did not confuse the needs of society with the rights of
the stockholders. Thus businessmen were faced with what business scholar
Thomas A. Petit has called "a moral crisis. " 23 On the one hand their business ideology told them they should ignore extraneous demands on their
time, effort, and money. On the other hand, the real demands of law,
customs, and morals pressured them to act in a publicly beneficial manner,
even at the expense of profit maximization. Petit argues that because businessmen found it "easier to accommodate ideology to the operational ethic
of social responsibility than to remake the world to fit the ideology of the
profit ethic," they changed their ideology rather than their operational
ethics. 24 In other words, employers preferred to alter their practices and
reinterpret their values rather than maintain socially unacceptable traditional practices merely to conform to ideological orthodoxy.
What Petit calls a moral crisis is merely another name for the tension
between the laissez-faire belief that social problems should not even exist
in a perfect capitalist state and the business community's belief that it
could best solve those problems. Businessmen were thus torn between
wanting to do nothing about social problems and wanting to make sure
that they did whatever was done. This ideological paradox gave rise to
several conflicting schools of business thought on social responsibility dur-
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ing the 1960's. The most conservative employers were those who defended
the values of what Richard Eells has called "the traditional corporation. " 25
Managers of traditional corporations emulated the corporate leaders of
the Gilded Age. They divorced philanthropy from business, pursuing the
former as private citizens and the latter as pragmatic capitalists concerned
primarily with maximizing profits. The traditional businessman was morally certain that the "corporation has no moral obligation nor social responsibility for any kind of joint management of a nation's resources." 26
Or, as Business Week editorially noted in 1967, "It is not the business of
any corporate management to run a public welfare establishment. Efficient
production of goods and services is the name of the business game. " 27 The
extent of tradition.al management's social concern was succinctly stated
by H . L. Hunt, the Texas oil tycoon and patron of right-wing thinkers,
when he said, "The most philanthropic thing a man can do is to provide
gainful employment to as many people as possible. " 28
The laissez-faire philosophy of traditional businessmen precluded not
only business social responsibility but also governmental action to alleviate
social misery. Traditionalists viewed "intellectuals, 'do-gooders,' and reformers" as "naive about human nature and many of the reforms they
propose are doomed as impractical by the self-interest of individuals." 29
Although opposition to welfare legislation was particularly strong in the
immediate postwar period, it continued to appear in the writings of extremely conservative businessmen and right-wing ideologues well into the
1960's. However, by the time of the civil rights revolution even many traditional executives had begun to take a more conciliatory attitude toward
governmental action. For example, in 1968 the president of a major midwestern company which manufactured heavy equipment took the traditional position when he explained that his primary obligation was to use
company resources so as to insure maximum profits for shareholders.
While he declined to accept business responsibility for social welfare, he
did point out that high profits meant high taxes and taxes enabled the
government to attend to the welfare of its citizens. 30
Theodore Levitt has been the most articulate spokesman of the "neotraditionalist" doctrine that the business of government is welfare. The
neotraditionalists continued to reject business social responsibility but
broke with pure laissez-faire by conceding the right of governments to
intervene in social problems. In a widely discussed article that appeared in
the Harvard Business Review, Levitt vigorously opposed any eleemosynary
activities by business. He warned against the potential fascism that might
arise from powerful corporations controlling programs outside of their
traditional areas of competence. However, Levitt argued that there were
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social problems which existed despite the benefits of free market capitalism, and he called upon businessmen "to accept the fact that the state can
be a powerful auxiliary to the attainment of the good life. " 31
The acceptance by neotraditionalist businessmen of government welfare activity may have been an attempt to reconcile their moral dilemma.
If it is true, as one scholar has said, that the business "rol~ sets certain
norms which tell the businessman it is wrong to assume diffuse moral responsibilities," and at the same time society demands that "individuals
should be guided by 'social conscience' as well as by private conscience,"
then businessmen could assuage their consciences by shifting the burden
of welfare activity from the private to the public sector. 32
A few large corporations claimed they simply ignored the short-run
demands of the Capitalist Ethic and acted in the public interest with
virtually no thought of corporate gain. When IBM announced it would
build a cable manufacturing plant in the New York City slum of BedfordStuyvesant, president Thomas Watson said he did not think the operation
would realize a profit in the near future. IBM built the plant, said Watson,
because, "a very large company has a responsibility to society as well as to
its employees and stockholders.'' 33 Most corporations, however, were not
willing to disassociate themselves so completely from the traditional
entrepreneurial goal of profits, and some companies sought to solve the
dilemma by pursuing socially responsible goals while at the same time
turning a profit. Even the severest critics of business involvement in public welfare conceded the propriety of action which showed immediate economic return. In his otherwise all-out attack on social responsibility,
Theodore Levitt hedged by saying, "Corporate welfare makes good sense
if it makes good economic sense-and not infrequently it does. " 34 Showing a profit resolved the moral crisis because it was the perfect laissez-faire
solution-solving social problems through profit-making activity.
Although at least one prominent businessman claimed that the selfinterest argument was a mailed glove over the velvet fist of humanitarianism, most businessmen seemed unaware of their basically unselfish motivation. 35 For example, Herbert D. Doan, president of Dow Chemical Company, told a group of college newspaper editors that Dow was concerned
with "how we can make a buck at social change." 36 Doan's mercenary
approach to social problems was echoed by other leading corporate heads.
R. V. Hansberger, president of Boise-Cascade, told a meeting that government had failed "utterly with the monstrous problems of our new urban
society and is turning to business for help . .. . There need be no compromise of the profit incentive when business turns its attention to the rifts its
technology has provided in society," said Hansberger. ·Even though he ad-
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mitted that many social problems were the result of business, Hansberger
promised "leadership responsible to a new image, to the total needs of
society, and in the enormous and profitable markets represented by those
needs. Society has no other place to go. " 37
Statements about the profitability of social responsibility led some
critics to accuse American businessmen of attempting to exploit social
problems for corporate gain. 38 Indeed businessmen were trying to do precisely that. While the critics objected to corporations profiting from curing
the ills they had caused, businessmen and politicians believed only industry
could cure the problems and only profits could tempt them to do so. 39 As
one public administrator put it, "Frankly, we must bribe business into the
slums." 40

Businessmen whose firms could not take direct economic advantage
of the growing demand for business involvement, or who did not wish to
appear exploitative, used the philosophy of Charles E. Wilson, president
of General Motors, to justify their acts of public concern. Wilson found
it difficult to distinguish between his own company and the nation as a
whole and in 1953 told a Senate committee, "for years I thought what was
good for our country was good for General Motors and vice versa. " 41 The
idea that a firm would benefit from improvements to society at large was
valid, but as Fortune pointed out in 1968 socially responsible acts by business "will presumably benefit not only the corporation that originally
shelled out for those good works, but other corporations too, including
competitors that poured all their resources into mere profit maximization. " 42 Businessmen re-cognized the obvious validity of Fortune's observation and frequently felt compelled to demonstrate that their corporate
good deeds would have some kind of immediate benefit for the company.
John D. Harper, president of the Aluminum Company of America, believed that acting in the public interest would result in both monetary and
nonmonetary gain. Harper told the National Association of Manufacturers, "If you reduce delinquency, crime and illiteracy you reduce your
own corporate tax load, and you convert welfare cases into productive
workers. You may even pick up some new customers in the bargain!" He
went on to explain that a company could not only make more money but
also gain prestige from taking the needs of the community into account.
Harper claimed that business support for an orchestra or theater group
would help in recruiting professional employees, and could "result in enhancing our reputation as advertising can never do. " 43
However, many business proponents of corporate concern contended
that it was enough that social responsibility made for a better society. In
the long run a better society would mean better business for everyone.
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Henry Ford II told Ford Motor Company shareholders that company
executives participated in welfare activities partly for citizenship reasons"business and industry have an obligation to serve the nation in times of
crisis"-but more importantly because "whatever seriously threatens the
stability or progress of the country and its cities, also threatens the growth
of its economy and your company. Prudent and constructive company
efforts to help overcome the urban crisis are demanded not only by your
company's obligation as a corporate citizen but by your management's
duty to safeguard your investment." 44 Donald J. Gaudion, president of
Ritter-Pfaudler, told his stockholders much the same thing, but in somewhat more explicit terms: "I have long been convinced that whether we
like it or not, corporate management can no longer remain uninvolved. If
we do we will find that extremists are taking over and we will be trying to
do business either with fascism on the right or anarchy on the left." 45
Firms which engaged in public interest activities, whether for profits,
for prestige, or for the long-run good of society, usually had one thing in
common-high visibility. The companies which acted first were those in
the public eye, either because of their size or because of the nature of their
product or service. "Immature" corporations with fewer than one hundred
employees were not active in "public service,'' presumably because they
were still trying to obtain a minimum level of profit and growth. However,
once a firm had grown to one hundred employees, other goals began to
play a more important role in the corporate teleology, and the company
was much more likely to become involved with the public interest.46 Not
all mature corporations were concerned with the needs of the public nor
did all immature businesses ignore social responsibility, but the mature
corporation was more frequently the pioneer in social welfare action. 47
In firms with more than one hundred employees social responsibility
was not correlated to sheer size. Large and highly visible firms felt the
winds of change earlier and more strongly than their smaller colleagues,
but whether a company moved with first breezes or held fast in the teeth
of a hurricane depended less on size than on the temperament of the
firm's chief executive. Men who owned the companies they managed
found it easier to take a strong stand on matters of corporate involvement
than professional managers. Social activism, however, was not limited to
companies run by their owners. A dedicated and powerful executive,
whether he were an owner or a hired manager, set and enforced policy according to his own values. Ultimately the chief executive's beliefs about
the proper role of business in society determined how the firm expressed
its concern for the common good.
Richard Eells has proposed four goals beyond profit maximization
which influence business decisions. First, most businessmen want to be
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leaders. That is, they want to be recognized by their colleagues as pace
setters in all areas of corporate activity. They want to dominate not by
power or by influence, but by reputation. Second, Eells says businessmen
seek integrity, that is, an honest, ethical, and responsible business career.
Although many business critics would claim that this goal is most widely
honored in the breach, businessmen frequently use moral arguments to
explain company policy. Third, businessmen seek amity. They want to be
loved-or at least liked. Businessmen want the same kind of acceptance
and approval for their firms that they seek in their personal lives. Moreover, businessmen recognize that community acceptance is essential for a
favorable relationship with the local government and work force . Finally,
Eells lists power and influence as a real, if unstated, goal of corporate
executives.48
Businessmen who took socially responsible action during the years
after World War II almost invariably justified their activity with one of
the four goals discussed by Eells. The most important goal appears to have
been power and influence. When the capitalist system did not automatically
correct its own failings, businessmen wanted to be sure they, not government, were in charge of the remedial activity. The top-level managers
who made company policy enjoyed positions of leadership and power
within the firm . Most of them quite naturally believed that businessmen
should have power, not only in the firm , but in society as well. Businessmen's sense of personal and corporate power led many of them to oppose
legislative solutions to social problems. After 1945 most businessmen
opposed legislation because they believed business could initiate voluntary
action to solve social problems and at the same time prevent the drift of
power from the private to the public sector.49
Although the public did not always agree, businessmen widely assumed that they had the ability to lead the nation in the attack on social
ills.so At the same time the business community feared that its power to
lead the crusade against social problems was being usurped by the government. In 1960 Keith Davis, a spokesman for the business point of view,
said that business had the power to solve social problems51 and warned that
unless businessmen exercised their power they would lose it. 52 The business
community widely accepted the logic behind this "iron law of responsibility." Time and time again businessmen called upon each other to exercise
their natural leadership and power. In 1967, Arjay Miller, the president of
the Ford Motor Company, told a University of Illinois audience that the
"efforts to meet the society's most pressing needs will move ahead regardless of what business does." Thus he noted, "Business has only two choices,
to become an unwilling participant in policies and programs it had no
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hand in developing, or join sensibly and purposefully in helping to map
out sound courses of action. " 53
The belief among businessmen that they were the natural leaders of
society led easily to a "gospel of wealth" mentality.54 After World War II
the gospel of wealth, or as it has been called more recently, the "public
trustee theory," was practically never propounded in its unadulterated
classical form . No businessmen claimed they had a God-given right (as did
George F. Baer) or a special obligation (as did Andrew Carnegie) to decide what was best for society. Businessmen no longer relied on their monetary success to prove the religious worth of their ideas-at least not explicitly- although Meade Johnson , president of the firm bearing his name,
came very close when in 1959 he said, "A free society rewards socially
desirable institutions by permitting them to survive and grow." 55 The feelings of paternalism that were almost inevitably associated with wealth
and power were reborn into the postwar world in a much milder form.
During the 1950's and 1960's businessmen acted more from a sense of
personal commitment than from a belief in the divinely inspired obligations
of the wealthy.
The morality which inspired some businessmen to pioneer in areas of
social responsibility in postwar America was more than the code of business which Eells referred to as integrity. 56 Standard business ethics require
fair and honest dealing with competitors, suppliers, and customers. Morality demands adherence to a set of usually religious values stricter than
simple honesty. Morality is a code of conduct accepted by a businessman
as a guide to total conduct, not just to his actions as a corporation executive.57 Thus the morally motivated businessman is concerned not only
with his corporate dealings, but also with the impact of corporate policy
on society and is looking back to the preindustrial society when religious
laws governed business practice. In 1968 George Champion, chairman of
Chase Manhattan Bank, asked, "Isn't it time somebody stood up and said
business should participate because it's the right thing to do-the humanitarian, the moral, the Christian-like thing to do?" 58 Champion was not
alone in wanting to keep Christ in commerce. In an emotional response to
Theodore Levitt's call for a return to classical capitalist ideology, F. S.
Connell, executive vice president of A. 0 . Smith Corporation, accused
businessmen who operated exclusively for profit of being "bloodsuckers."
"I believe," continued Connell, "that we must have responsible, God-fearing, hard-headed businessmanship. . . . The fact-not theorem-that
faces us now is that we have too much forgotten God, and our responsibilities as His people. "59
Businessmen who engaged in social welfare activity out of religious
scruples placed themselves outside of the accepted capitalist frame of
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reference. Traditionalist business critics of the Christian theory of public
concern called it "startlingly naive" and said it "ignores some of the basic
and fundamental realities of historical development and of the contemporary institutional setting in which business enterprise operates. " 60
Most businessmen shrugged off religiously based pleas for action, but
those few reached by religious considerations were frequently pioneers in
initiating socially responsible programs.
Religiously motivated employers frequently led the business community in demonstrating concern for social responsibility because they
found it more difficult to reconcile the contradictions between the economic demands of the Capitalist Ethic and the moral appeal of social
responsibility. Like all men, businessmen sought to achieve a condition in
which their actions were consistent with their values. Faced with a situation in which their expressed values were in conflict with their business
policies, employers had a choice of three methods by which to bring their
value-action systems into harmony. They could change their actions, they
could change their values, or they could rationalize the discrepancy. Whenever circumstances allowed, businessmen almost invariably chose to rationalize. Rationalization permitted them to keep their traditional ideals and
to main_tain their established methods of operation, while at the same time
explaining away any incongruity. However, where a businessman suffered
from an acute case of cognitive dissonance, that is, where the inconsistency
between values and actions was too strong to be explained away by sophistical excuses, he had to adopt the more extreme solution of changing either
his actions or his values. Businessmen with a powerful commitment to
personal values would tend to change their actions even in the face of
opposition from their colleagues, customers, or employees. Employers who
placed less importance on ideology than on minimizing friction with their
cultural environment would change their values to conform to the actions
society forced on them.
The healthy economic climate of the 1950's and 1960's encouraged
businessmen to respond positively to the growing public demand for
corporate involvement. As Eli Goldston, chairman of the board of Eastern
Gas Associates, told a corporate audience at the Harvard Business School,
"Almost anybody can show a reasonable profit in today's growing economy; the challenge is to combine the second ingredient, social benefit to
society, and to achieve these while making a profit. " 61 The Eisenhower,
Kennedy, and Johnson years were good ones for business, and management could afford to conform to the public's new expectations. The im~
portance of the social mood in determining business social responsibility
was illustrated by the comments of ALCOA president John D. Harper when
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he observed, "Business is involved right up to the neckline in hundreds of
public problems, and the public- that is to say, our customers, our neighbors, our employees and our stockholders [and he might have added, our
colleagues] -expect us to accept the responsibility of helping to solve
these problems. " 62
In the final analysis, businessmen became more socially responsible
after World War II in direct response to the demands of government and
the public. Legally businessmen had to become more responsible, particularly in the field of fair employment, but, equally important, businessmen
sought what Eells called "amity," that is, respect from the community. The
vice president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Robert N.
Hilkert, put it frankly when he said, "social responsibility is 'in' and business 'in-groups' are composed of men who are deeply concerned about
social responsibility. . . . Modern business knows that society expects
business to be socially responsible and business today recognizes the importance, yes, the necessity, of being responsible to society's expectations. " 63

2
Integration and Legislation: FEPC

The business community's first postwar encounter with the problem of
employing Negroes came as a result of the drive to permanently legalize
the wartime ban on discrimination in employment during the years 1945 to
1948. While a few businessmen supported permanent fair employment
practice legislation, most opposed it. Apart from hard-core conservatives
who suspected FEPC was part of a communist plot, most businessmen recognized the inconsistency of their position and attempted to rationalize
their opposition to a law that had proven successful in practice and with
whose aims they agreed. Thus, right from the start of the postwar period,
businessmen experienced the problem of reconciling the Capitalist Ethic
and the American Creed.
Since an FEPC law would apply equally to all and therefore eliminate
employment policy differences based upon personal values, anti-FEPC
employers could not hide behind the Capitalist Ethic by claiming that they
would be punished in the market place for integrating their work forces.
Instead, while giving lip service to th e American Creed, businessmen rose
above the relatively mundane argument that fair employment practice
would give an advantage to competitors who did not employ Negroes, to
more rarefied discussions of freedom of association and freedom from
government coercion.
Business aversion to a permanent fair employment practice act probably stemmed in part from a desire to roll back the regulatory encroachments made by government during the depression and the war. Employers
saw the battle over FEPC as a symbol of postwar power. If they could stop
equal employment legislation, then perhaps they could recoup other elements of their erstwhile status. The business community had made some
concessions to the unusual demands of the war, but for the most part they
had limited blacks to semiskilled positions. The end of the war meant the
end of emergency conditions, and the business community hoped to be
23
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able to stop the momentum fair employment forces had generated during
the war.
Blacks, even more than most Americans, faced a bleak employment
picture on the eve of World War II. World War I had blocked the flow
of immigrant labor to American industry and at the same time had stimulated greater production. Employers had met the new manpower needs by
recruiting Negroes from the agricultural S0uth . Industrial prosperity and
exclusionary immigration laws sustained the demand for black workers
through the twenties. But the labor surplus that accompanied the great
depression allowed employers to become more selective, and as a result
they frequently substituted white workers for Negroes, wiping out earlier
gains. 1
The outbreak of World War II did not appreciably lessen the suffering
of Negro workers. Despite the manpower shortage created by the draft
and by high levels of wartime production, employers were reluctant to use
black labor. Pressure from the black community compelled President
Roosevelt to issue Executive Order 8802 on June 25, 1941 , which created
the nation's first Fair Empl oyment Practice Cc mmittee2 and government
pressure through the FEPC combined with the tighten ing labor market to
force more employment of Negro labor. But, while industry employed
more Negroes, black occupational distribution did not significantly improve. Most of the movem ent, for both male ,:\nd female black workers
between 1940 and 1944, was from the far m to the factory, not upward
within the factory. 3
Negroes found jobs primarily in the war-reiated basic manufacturing
industries which held government contracts and were therefore subject to
FEPC supervision. 4 Widespread growth of bl ack empl oyment in basic
industries improved the economic position of Negroes, but the low quality
of the jobs indicated employer reluctance to break traditional segregated
patterns. Although there were large percentage increases of blacks in skilled
and white collar jobs during the war, the actual numbers were so small as
to be meaningless. 5 At the beginning of the war employers limited newly
hired Negroes to unpleasant tasks with low status, such as janitorial and
service work, or work with noxious and unpl easant material , such as that
in foundries and paint rooms. 6 As th e manpower shortage increased, however, Negroes began to find jobs as semiskilled operatives in manfacturing plants . The wartime economic expansion opened up large numbers of
more desirable (higher paying) jobs to white workers. The upward mobility
of the white work force opened semiskilled, skilled, and even some whitecollar positions that could be filled by blacks without seriously altering the
basically discriminatory makeup of the occupational distribution.7
Nothing more clearly illustrated the inherent racism in the economic
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system than the extravagant praise lavished on firms which made even
minimal attempts to upgrade black workers. The Governor's Interracial
Commission of Minnesota noted that only a lack of resources prevented it
from compiling an "honor roll of every war industry in Minnesota that has
upgraded any Negro worker," but it did feel compelled to "record the
names of some of the larger corporations . . . that are now not only
employing ten or more Negroes but offering positions above that of janitorial work and unskilled labor to the properly qualified." 8 Even though
companies were required by government contracts to practice fair employment, and even though only one firm in Mirnesota had a single Negro in a
position higher than semiskilled production work, the commission praised
the advances in Negro employment being made by Minnesota employers.
Most of the first breakthroughs for blc1cks occurred in plants specifically created to meet military needs. Once the war-production industries
set the pattern of employing blacks, other firms followed when they could
no longer find white workers. 9 War indu st ries may have hired Negroes
first because they suffered the severest manpower shortages, but war industries were also the only businesses covered by Executive Order 8802.
While actual impact of FEPC is impossible to measure , we do know
that the thirty-one companies involveJ in FEPC hearings during the war
sharply increased their rate of hiring Negroes. In 1942 almost all of those
companies had a smaller percentage of Negro employees than th e average
for all firms reporting to the War Manpower Commission, but by the beginning of 1944 all of them employed a greater than average percentage
of black workers. Most of the increases were in semiskilled production
work. The number of skilled workers remained almost unchanged, and the
reports did not even bother to mention the number of Negro white-collar
and professional employees. 10
The shortage of labor and the fair employment practice requirements
established the broad trend of increased black employment. Utilization of
Negro workers in any given industry, however, depended on the policy of
the individual employer. A few companies, like Ford at its River Rouge
works, had a history of hiring black production workers and even some
black skilled workers, 11 but most employers hired Negroes for production
work for the first time during World War II. Firms which did not have a
tradition of employing any Negroes at all hired them in larger numbers and
promoted them more quickly than companies with some history of hiring
blacks. Apparently employers found it more difficult to break the habit
of only hiring Negroes for menial occupations than to start off the employment of Negroes on an equal basis. 12
The industries which most readily assimilated new black workers were
those that produced products unique to the war economy, such as tanks ,
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warships, and guns, and those which could expand the use of Negroes in
such traditional black areas as the foundry. For example, in rubber production, the percentage of Negro employees rose from 3.3 in 1942 to 9.5
in January, 1945, 13 but there was virtually no improvement in the kinds
of jobs available. An industrial relations director recalled that when his
firm attempted to install black workers in an all-white department of an
Akron tire plant, "within minutes every machine in the department was
silen1. The personnel man led the Negroes out, the machines were turned
on, and that department remained lily-white." 14
There were many war industries which neither set up new plants nor
hired large numbers of new employees in the hot, dirty jobs traditionally
reserved for black workers. Despite FEPC, opposition from white workers
was frequently strong enough in these plants to prevent or severely limit
the number of black employees. Opposition to hiring Negroes was sometimes so intense that companies went to the expense of recruiting and
transporting unskilled, untrained whites from distant parts of the nation
rather than hire the trained Negroes in their own communities. 15 On a
number of occasions when employers contemplated hiring Negro women,
their white women employees exerted considerable pressure to prevent such
a move. The white women feared that industrial employment of Negro
women would dry up the supply of domestic labor, or at least drive up the
wages for household service. In some communities middle-class housewives
believed there were secret "Eleanor Clubs," named after President Roosevelt's wife, subversively undermining the American way by persuading
Negro women to leave their service jobs and seek work in industry. 16
Usually, however, employees opposed black workers because they were
black, not because of the impact their employment would have on the
labor market. During the war black workers did not economically threaten
white workers, but white workers protested the employment of Negroes
nevertheless. When the pressures of technological change, labor shortage,
and government supervision forced the automobile industry to upgrade
its Negro employees, the companies experienced a series of strikes. Unlike
the rubber tire plant mentioned above, however, the automobile companies
stood firm, and Negroes moved into production jobs. 17
The aircraft industry was an important exception to the generalization
that new rapidly expanding war production industries led in the hiring of
Negroes, but it was the exception that proved an important aspect of the
rule-Negroes only got low status jobs. Not only did the aircraft industry
employ an unusually large number of skilled workers, but it was also a
glamor industry which used the appeal of its prcduct to attract the highest
quality workers. The aircraft manufacturers considered Negroes inferior
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workers and feared the blacks would prevent the companies from securing
the highly skilled whites they needed. 18 In 1941 North American Aviation
officials said Negroes "will be considered only as janitors." Vultee was
scarcely more progressive. Its management told investigators, "We may at
a later date be in a position to add some colored people in minor capacities
such as porters and cleaners." 19 However, many northern aircraft plants
abandoned some aspects of their discriminatory employment practices as
the war progressed, the manpower pool grew smaller, and federal pressure
increased.20
FEPC played at least an indirect role in practically all breakthroughs
in Negro employment. The wartime FEPC required government contractors
to recruit, hire, train, and upgrade workers "without regard to their race,
creed, color or national origin." Moreover, circumstantial evidence that
indicated an employer sought data that could be used to discriminate
counted against the company in a hearing. Thus, while it was not technically improper for a company to ask the racial, religious, or national background of a job applicant, such questions were thought to "create favorable
conditions" for discrim'ination, and to "lend support to the conviction that
discrimination exists." 21 The same held true for the absence or near-absence
of minority workers in any given plant.
FEPC operated under the assumption that personnel techniques that
singled out Negroes, such as requesting racial identity on application forms,
would be used against the black applicant. But under its "color-blind"
interpretation of equal employment, FEPC was unwilling to support any
personnel policy which distinguished between blacks and whites, even if it
benefited blacks. The commission unquestioningly accepted the philosophy
of the American Creed. The ideal of FEPC, which would remain the ideal
of fair employment forces until 1963, held that all workers, white or black,
were to be judged purely on their objective merits. Executive Order 8802
declared it the "duty of employers and of labor organizations . . . to
provide for the full and equitable participation of all workers in defense
industries, without discrimination because of race, creed, color, or national
origin."22 FEPC interpreted this provision quite literally. Some employers
attempted to hire Negro workers at a rate that reflected the percentage of
Negroes in the labor pool area, but FEPC forbade such activity because the
quota system worked "to the disadvantage of individuals in both minority
and majority groups by permitting considerations of race rather than those
of qualifications and availability to operate." 23 The commission admitted
that such quotas did occasionally benefit Negroes, but in its zeal to be
democratically color-blind FEPC ruled that the executive order prohibited
"discrimination against white as well as against colored employees." 24
During the 1960's a more sophisticated understanding of black employ-
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ment problems led the government to alter its disapproval of gathering
racial background data and of the use of benign quotas. However, most
other guidelines developed by FEPC stood the test of time. 25
The war markedly improved the Negro employment picture, but as
the manager of a North Carolina cigarette plant said, "During the war we
did things we wouldn't do normally." 26 Wartime events did not necessarily
have a lasting impact on the attitudes and activities of the business community. Americans accepted emergency measures, from rationing and bond
purchases to fair employment practice, because they were temporary. The
end of the war would mean no more brown-outs in the home and no more
"brown-ins" on the job.
The end of the war presented no problem to those employers who had
hired blacks on strictly pragmatic grounds. They needed workers in order
to produce. Blacks were the only workers available, so they hired blacks.
Once the war was over and they could once again indulge their preference
for white employees, they quickly slipped back into traclitional employment patterns. Southerners in particular had never considered the American Creed applicable to blacks and eagerly welcomed the return to normal.
Northern employers, however, had frequently based their prewar rejection of black workers on assumptions that blacks would do poor work
and prompt employee unrest. In other words, the northern businessman
discriminated against blacks on economic grounds. As with their southern
colleagues, northern employers hired blacks because of pressures generated
by the wartime emergency. However, the end of the emergency did not
restore the status quo ante bellum in the North because black workers had
proven their ability not only to master the technicalities of factory work,
but had also proven their ability to operate in the industrial social environment. Thus, it was more difficult for the northern employer to continue to
justify discrimination under the aegis of the Capitalist Ethic. By proving
that blacks could be successfully employed, the war had opened the way
for equal employment forces to exploit the idea of fair play contained in
the American Creed. Julius Thomas, director of the industrial relations
department of the National Urban League observed, "It will not be easy to
tell the average Negro youngster that he will not find employment in this
or that vocation after the war. He will promptly reply that his father or
mother held that job in a local war plant in 1944."27
The status of the postwar economy was the dominant factor in determining the direction of Negro employment. Immediately after 1945 blacks
were more afraid of losing jobs because of the economic slowdown involved in the transition from a wartime to a peacetime economy than because of a reversion to prewar hiring patterns. To counter the expected
layoffs of blacks, some manpower experts suggested that employers grant
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Negroes adjusted seniority, or that they racially balance any layoffs they
were forced to make. 28 But a system of proportional layoffs would not
only have protected black workers in newly acquired jobs, it would have
also threatened union seniority rights and the accumulated seniority of returning veterans. The business community would not consider an attack on
anything so fundamental as seniority rights.
The Negro workers' position looked particularly perilous because they
had made their greatest gains in those industries that would suffer the most
during reconversion. "Nothing but another war would revive production in
ammunitions, explosives and firearms, aircraft, and shipbuilding to their
wartime levels," noted two students of the labor market. "Consequently, the
Negro worker will be subjected to the hazards of finding employment in new
industry and will have the additional difficulties of transferring his warlearned skills or of obtaining retraining." 29 Under the best circumstances
economists expected severe layoffs of blacks in almost all industries, if not
as the result of reconversion or of a general recession, then as the result of
displacement by returning veterans. 3 Fearing that extensive Negro unemployment would contribute to a recession, create a dangerously dependent group of people, and possibly lead to race riots, such as those that
followed the end of World War I, concerned economists called for extensive
federal control of the labor market through full employment legislation, a
peacetime FEPC, federal control of industry location, and a fully coordinated United States Employment Service to encourage labor mobility. 31
Reconversion had the expected detrimental effect on black employees
in war industries. In several Connecticut war plants, for example, black
workers had constituted between 8 and 25 percent of the work force during
the war. By 1948 the number of Negro employees had fallen to less than IO
percent in the plant with the most black workers and to less than 3 percent
in the plant with the fewest. 32 However, the negative impact of reconversion on black employment was mitigated by the continued expansion of the
economy. Domestic consumption maintained production at a level high
enough to allow consumer-oriented industries to absorb the black workers
who had lost their jobs in war production plants. In the spring of 1947 the
occupational distribution of employed Negroes was unchanged from the
war period, indicating that black workers had not lost the;,_ .. a• Jme
advances. 33
The continuing manpower demand meant that economic conditions
were conducive to a movement for a permanent peacetime FEPC, but there
was strong political opposition. Congress killed President Truman's attempts to extend Executive Order 8802 into the postwar era and continued
to oppose the idea of a federal FEPC during the late 1940's. 34 However,
several states and cities passed fair employment legislation prior to 1950.35
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In 1945 New York consolidated and extended several previously existing
antidiscrimination statutes in the Ives-Quinn Act, which was the nation's
first FEPC law. Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico,
Oregon, Rhode Island, and Washington followed New York's lead and
passed antidiscrimination laws during the late 1940's.
Businessmen who supported FEPC legislation in the late 1940's were,
for the most part, strong believers in the American Creed who were nevertheless cautious about hiring blacks because they feared such a policy
would put them at a competitive disadvantage. Despite arguments that
hiring blacks would be good for the economy, 36 FEPC supporters had no
illusions about their fellow employers and believed that only legal coercion
could convince their competitors to engage in fair employment practices.37
The American Friends Service Committee clearly recognized the inability
of businessmen to live up to the American Creed and at the same time
remain true to the Capitalist Ethic. AFSC consistently argued that legislation would strengthen the hand of those employers who wanted to act
"democratically" but were afraid to do so. 38
Many businessmen wanted an FEPC law because it would relieve them
of having to weigh the relative merits of the American Creed and the
Capitalist Ethic. Without a law, no matter what the democratically disposed employer did, he lived in a state of cognitive disequilibrium. Either
he sacrificed profits for equal opportunity or vice versa. The owner of a
national chain of women's specialty shops who had been forced by community pressure to stop hiring blacks in a southern location said that more
than half of the employers he knew wanted to desegregate but were afraid
to. He felt that the lack of fair employment legislation gave "undue advantage to the relatively few hate mongers," who could cause enough trouble
"to discourage even the most stouthearted believer in democratic employment practices." 39
By the same logic the New York City West Side Association of Commerce opposed state FEPC legislation. The New Yorkers did not oppose
fair employment. Quite the contrary, they believed that racial and religious
discrimination should be declared unconstitutional. However, unless an
equal obligation were placed on all employers in the nation, the west side
businessmen warned that the state would lose business to areas unencumbered by compulsory adherence to the American Creed. 40
Despite the increase in business support for FEPC in the postwar years,
the majority of businessmen opposed such legislation. However, northern
businessmen could not oppose FEPC on the grounds that equal opportunity
did not apply to blacks, and so they opposed FEPC legislation because it
would constitute an infringement on their managerial freedom. 41 The right
of the employer to choose his workers was fundamental. Thus, northern
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businessmen opposed a requirement to do what they all said they were
already doing ( or at least in favor of doing) because it was a dangerous
encroachment on their liberty. The various drives for state and federal
fair employment permitted discriminatory businessmen to unite in opposition to Negro employment while maintaining a facade of propriety. Instead
of confronting the fundamental issue of employing Negroes, the business
community attacked the less embarrassing problem of government interference with their personnel policies.
Obviously those hiring policies which business was so staunchly defending were less than perfect examples of the American Creed in action.
William R. Thomas, a member of Ford's industrial relations planning department, was unique only because he articulated the racist assumptions
which stood just behind the shining shield of managerial prerogatives which
so many discriminatory businessmen carried. Thomas voiced concern
that FEPC legislation would disrupt informal work groups. He believed
efficient work groups depended on good informal social relationships,
which in turn depended upon ethnic compatibility. Thomas claimed that
disruption of ethnic homogeneity among work groups would lead to unnecessary disruption of production. He was not, however, so callous as to
deny blacks any role in his operation. Thomas pointed out that "Negroes
associate themselves with porter jobs; Irish with police positions; Poles with
heavy construction work; and Greeks with food services."42
Small businessmen, ever sensitive to their precarious position in the
economy, and highly protective of what they considered their essential
rights, objected strongly to the idea that they might have to hire those
whom they did not like. F. A. Virkus, a spokesman for the Conference of
American Small Business Organizations, complained, "Already it is difficult enough for small business to succeed financially, in the face of taxation, shortage of venture capital, government regulation, unionization with
its accompanying rigidity of wage scales, material shortage, and a host of
other plagues," and he was not sure small business could bear the additional burden of nondiscriminatory hiring. Virkus claimed that the right to
hire and fire was the cornerstone of small business management and that
any regulation of that right by the state was a blow to "the economic
foundations of our country." 43
Virkus' comments were typical of the antigovemment position taken
by many conservative opponents of FEPC. Conservative businessmen clearly
saw equal employment legislation in the broader context of the battle between free enterprise (the very soul of the Capitalist Ethic) and collectivist
totalitarianism. 44 Donald R. Richberg, who had promoted business interests
during the NRA days of the New Deal, was the most widely quoted antiFEPC theoretician. According to Richberg, "discrimination in the choice of
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companions is the very essence of social liberty [and] discrimination in the
choice of business associates is the very essence of economic liberty." Thus
a fair employment practice law deprived the employer of his economic
liberty and deprived his employees of their social liberty, thereby destroying
freedom of association and liberty of contract. 45
The belief that FEPC threatened basic American freedoms fitted well
into the mood of the business community during the Truman administration. That was the period of the "sell America" campaign which emphasized
the automatic, self-correcting virtues of the free enterprise system. Profits
depended on efficiency. Efficiency assumed a rational utilization of manpower, and the rational utilization of manpower precluded racial discrimination. According to the true believer of the Capitalist Ethic the system
structurally prevented unfair employment policies. Said one spokesman for
the business community, "American businessmen are, for the most part,
honest and fair in their deali ngs with others. They are universall y free from
prejudice and they do not practice oppression upon their employees. The y
would not be successful if they did those things." 46 The very idea that
there might be a flaw in the perfect jewel of capitalism aroused the ire of
conservative employers like the speaker at a nation al small businessmen's
meeting. "The battle line is drawn," he warned , "statism against freed om,
dictatorship against democracy, communism against Americanism, paganism against Christianity."47
The superpatriotic, "sell America" type of rh etoric which marked
many of the attacks on FEPC legislation was derived in part from the intense anticommunism which accompani ed the beginnings of the Cold War.
It followed logically th at if antidiscrimin ation legislati on were an infringement of economic freedom , and if infringements of economic freedom were
a dangerous blow at the free enterprise system, then F E PC must be a communist plot since communists were the people most anxious to destroy the
American economy. Referring to the FEPC referendum which California
voters defeated in 194 7, one FEPC opponent told a Senate committee,
"Communists, fellow travelers, parlor pinks, left wingers and radicals of all
hues were its protagonists and FEPC propaganda emanated from those
sources." 48 But even hard-line anticomm unist conservatives were unwilling
to simply discard the idea of racial accord. Using a tim e-honored southern
rationale, they stood the American Creed on its head by arguing that Negro
workers were not unhappy with their situ ation and that FEPC legislation was
"part of the Communist strategy to disrupt and disorganize the United States
by causing friction between the colored and white races while pretending
to be devoted to equalizing them." 49
Discriminatory businessmen preferred to attack FEPC legislation rather
than to attack the idea of employment integration. Few of them would
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publicly admit that they did not want to employ Negroes, so they had to
reconcile their supposed opposition to discrimination with their opposition
to legislation which would outlaw discrimination. As businessmen steeped
in the conventional wisdom of the free enterprise system, employers righteously attacked encroachments of the state, but as moral men and as believers in the American Creed they had to demonstrate that FEPC would
cause more harm than good, that it was the wrong way to achieve the
right end. By predicting that an antidiscrimination law would increase race
hatred, antiintegrationists could excuse their unwillingness to live up to
the letter of the American Creed in order to conform to its broader spirit.
The representative of several large southern industries made this point by
quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, the 1896 Supreme Court decision which had
upheld segregation: "Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts,
or to abolish distinctions based upon physical differences and the attempt
to do so can only result in accentuating the difficulties . . . ." 50 In New
York, the state Chamber of Commerce feared an antidiscrimination law
would "attract an undesirable element from outside the State and it might
give rise to burning resentment leading to possible race riots, pogroms and
other evils." 51
Racist businessmen predicted an anti-Negro backlash because they
shared the widely held belief that discrimination was an instinctive response to racial differences which could not be eliminated by law. In a
folksy "common sense" discussion of FEPC, George H. Fisher, the chairman
of the labor committee of the American Society of Industrial Engineers,
explained that "unlike some of our modern well-educated theorists," practical old-time personnel men were "scientists enough not to try to force
elements toge,ther which were naturally antagonistic ... just as a farmer
separates a horse and a mule when they refuse to pull together." 52 Fisher's
view of race relations left room for cooperation only when it occurred
"naturally." He made his peace with the American Creed by endorsing
equal employment when it sprang spontaneously from the heart of the
white worker.
Most businessmen, however, did not see pseudoscientific barriers to
racial cooperation. They believed that a slow, patient evolutionary process
of education and moral persuasion could eliminate discrimination but that
legislation could not. Proper moral behavior, said the businessmen, was a
matter between a man and his God, and it was up to the churches to
instruct and enforce ethical activity. One business spokesman charged that
church support for fair employment practice legislation was "nothing less
than a confession of the bankruptcy of their own spiritual and moral
leadership." 53
By emphasizing that economic integration would come only when
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education and persuasion had changed the hearts of the people, "moderate"
businessmen were placing their confidence in the basically democratic instincts of the American people. Thus, they believed the ideal of the American Creed would triumph where force would fail. Pointing to a few isolated
breakthroughs in Negro hiring as proof that progress was being made,
Ralph Van Nostrand of the M erchants and Manufacturers Association of
California contended that "good community public relation s, ed ucation
and understanding are doing in a voluntary way, what the policeman's club
cannot accomplish."54
FEPC supporters relied heavily on the fundamental argument that the
legislation was merely a legal implementation of a widely accepted idealit was part of the American Creed. But because most business opposition
focused on the law's presumed violations of managerial prerogatives, much
of the FEPC propaganda was defensive. The most effective argument
pointed to the success of the New York State law, which was not only the
first but also the strongest state antidiscrimination statute. 55 The New
York experience confirmed predictions that neither FEPC nor Negro job
seekers would harass th e business community.
Proponents of FEPC laws implicitly conceded the argument that an
FEPC limited the employer's freedom to run his business the way he saw
fit. They countered along three lines. First, FEPC was only one of many
laws which society needed to insure proper behavior, and it was the nature
of laws to restrict the freedom of some to insure the freedom of others.
Second, supporters of the legislation carefully explained that the employer
could still apply all his traditional standards in aU areas except race and
religion. 56 Finally, pro-FEPC forces contended that the laws were not designed to alter basic attitudes, but rather to proscribe specific kinds of
activity. They were aimed not at prejudice but at discrimination. 57 On the
other hand the supporters pointed out that "forced" integration could
change people's attitudes by demonstrating the inaccuracy of the presumptions which underlay their discrimin atory beh avior. 58 But when pressed to
the wall FEPC proponents had to concede, as did one businessman, "in the
final analysis , perhaps the strongest arguments in favor of FEPC are neither
economic nor political, but moral." 59 In an age when religious values were
generally banished from the business world, this was a weak reed upon
which to rest an entire movement.

3
Business Counterattacks:
Voluntarism and Breakthroughs

During the early I 950's, growing public acceptance of black employees
combined with the business opposition to FEPC legislation to produce
some token steps toward equal employment opportunity. The breakthroughs of the Eisenhower era indicate an increasing compatibility between the demands of the American Creed and the Capitalist Ethic. The
chance of a successful local FEPC law was directly proportional to public
acceptance of Negro employees. Thus, as the businessman's social environment demanded a more rigorous application of the American Creed
to black workers, it also reduced the potential cost of hiring Negroes. At
the same time the businessman might be able to reap public acclaim by
giving a few symbolic jobs to blacks and forestall government intervention
in his personnel policies.
Businessmen who had fundamental ideological objections to FEPC
legislation, and who were not merely erecting respectable facades over
their own racism, sought to demonstrate their genuine commitment to
equal employment opportunity in the immediate postwar years by forming
voluntary organizations to further the principles of fair employment.
The idea of community voluntary race-relations committees had first
become widespread during the war. After the Detroit race riot of 1943
more than two hundred and sixty cities set up race relations committees.
While most of the committees supported FEPC legislation, at the same
time they urged businessmen to adopt voluntary fair employment codes.
Critics claimed there was a contradiction in the committees' position, and
feared that the voluntary codes would serve no fun ction except to take
'_'government off the spot, inhibit pressure for adequate legislation and
replace an enforceable legislative device by a pious hope." 1
The wartime voluntary action groups were not notably successful in
bringing about any degree of fair employment beyond that required by
Executive Order 8802, which had established the wartime FEPC. Because
35
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the voluntary committees were created as emergency war measures, their
members frequently lacked a long-range commitment to the problems of
the black American. A particularly nasty example was the Fair Employment Practice Forum in an Ohio city which was headed by the president
of the city's industrial association, a man who blamed most of the city's
race troubles on the municipal administration during the depression which
"treated the niggers so well that they came here in droves." 2 This illstarred experiment in voluntary fair employment activity collapsed when
the group's black representative from the state employment service married his white secretary. The director felt that such an act was more than
he or any other member of the group could swallow and accounted for
the city's continuing reluctance to do anything about employment discrimination.
The movement to establish voluntary fair employment practice committees reemerged after the war. Frightened by the growing trend toward
municipal and state FEPC laws and confident that the public mood had
softened sufficiently to minimize negative economic effects, a number of
state and local chambers of• commerce began to discuss elaborate voluntary equal employment plans. The first, and most widely publicized, voluntary fair employment plan emerged in Cleveland, Ohio in 1949. Municipal
FEPC legislation was pending before the city council. Although the city
council had defeated an FEPC ordinance in 1947, the legislation seemed
sure of passage in 1948 until the chamber of commerce suggested a voluntary plan in place of the legal requirements. 3 Clifford F. Hood, president of American Steel and Wire Co., and Elmer L. Lindseth, president
of the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co., led Cleveland business opposition to FEPC. Lindseth, who was also president of the chamber of commerce, admitted that Cleveland employers discriminated against Negroes,
but argued that a voluntary plan would reduce discrimination more than
legislation. 4
The city council agreed to suspend action for ninety days while the
newly formed Cleveland Committee on Employment Practices attempted
to tackle the problem of discrimination. The chamber of commerce financed the committee, which consisted of sixteen members. The chamber
appointed eight business members, and Cleveland's mayor, Thomas Burke,
named eight others to represent unions and minority groups. 5 Under
chairman William L. Ong, assistant to the president of American Steel
and Wire, the committee launched an intensive advertising (or, as they
called it, "public education") campaign to persuade employers to voluntarily hire Negroes. The committee mailed information pamphlets and
requests for cooperation to 8,200 businessmen. One hundred and fifty, or
fewer than 2 percent, responded favorably.
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In addition to contacting employers the committee attempted to convince the public that voluntary fair employment was a viable alternative
to FEPC. The advertising agency of Fuller & Smith & Ross, which itself
had voluntarily begun to employ blacks, donated its services to prepare
car cards, posters, spot announcements, and speeches to carry the message
to the people of Cleveland. The committee spent more than thirty thousand dollars in its fifteen-month public education campaign.6
The voluntary plan failed to break down the barriers to black employment. Favorable coverage of committee efforts in the business press
consisted almost exclusively of case studies and examples, a sure sign that
the program was failing to place large numbers of Negroes in new jobs. 7
As a result of the campaign some individual firms did begin to hire
Negroes in white-collar and professional jobs, but high visibility jobs in
high visibility firms (especially in banks and department stores) remained
closed to blacks. Supporters of the voluntary plan claimed that the educational campaign had broken down racial barriers and that a significant
number of Cleveland businesses had revised recruiting, placement, and
promotion procedures to eliminate racial bias. Critics welcomed any
change in attitudes that may have occurred as a result of the advertising
but pointed to the lack of actual job progress as proof of failure. 8
Originally intended as a way to stop FEPC, the voluntary plan actually
prepared the Cleveland business community to accept FEPC legislation. In
January 1950, when the city council again considered an FEPC ordinance,
the chamber of commerce reluctantly supported the move. Support was
not unconditional, however. Despite a year and a half of "plenty of good
will but practically no jobs," 9 the chamber of commerce initially opposed
the legislation, but when it became clear that the ordinance would pass in
any event, the chamber had second thoughts. Since it was no longer in a
position to block FEPC through suggestions of voluntary action, the chamber sought to soften the objectionable sections of the proposed ordinance.
Businessmen feared the punitive aspects of the ordinance. They believed
the commission might be antibusiness and that unscrupulous lawyers
would use the ordinance to get new cases. To meet these objections the
council gave businessmen one-third of the seats on the fifteen-man commission which would administer the ordinance. They declared that only
principals, not lawyers, could file complaints and required two sets of conciliation hearings before any punitive legal action could be taken against
an employer. 10 One newspaper accurately assessed the situation when it
commented, "This ordinance is not just government regulating business,
but it's business helping to regulate itself. " 11
The Cleveland voluntary equal employment plan demonstrated business reluctance to accept the idea of equal employment except under
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pressure, and its ability to mold to its own ends those pressures it could
not avoid. The voluntary nature of the Cleveland program, legitimized by
the formal support of the chamber of commerce and some key business
leaders, allowed businessmen to meet new community standards for fair
employment with a minimum of action. By expressing support for the
voluntary program businessmen demonstrated their allegiance to the
values of the American Creed. By taking small symbolic steps such as
removing racial designations from job application forms and help-wanted
newspaper advertisements they could demonstrate their social responsibility without significantly altering their traditional employment patterns
and risking possible white disapproval.
The failure of the voluntary plan to place significant numbers of
Negroes in nontraditional jobs made it difficult for the business community to oppose the FEPC ordinance. Having tried and failed to solve
the discrimination problem themselves, the logic of their position compelled businessmen to accept legislation. Moreover, the successful voluntary integration that took place in a few firms reduced the fears other
businessmen had about hiring blacks. The successfully integrated firms
served as models for those companies forced to integrate by the ordinance.12 But the business community accepted the ordinance itself only
reluctantly and then only after a successful attempt to modify the legislation to make it more acceptable to the business community and to give
businessmen a dominant voice in the administration of the code.
Despite its failure to prevent a municipal FEPC, the Cleveland plan
prompted the lllinois State Chamber of Commerce to launch the biggest
and most successful anti-FEPC voluntary fair employment plan. There was
some precedent for business-government cooperation for equal employment in Illinois. During World War II the Chicago Mayor's Committee on
Race Relations appointed a subcommittee composed of the presidents of
sixteen of the city's most important businesses. These chief executives
conducted a survey of ninety-four Chicago companies which employed a
total of 50,000 Negroes to determine company experience with black
workers. The subcommittee concluded that integration could take place
successfully in Chicago plants and that Negro workers could perform as
competently as white workers. 13
The mayor's committee gave blacks new job opportunities, but it
certainly did not give them equal job opportunities. While virtually all
Chicago businesses employed black workers in some capacity by the end
of the war, significant gains were limited to semiskilled production positions and to some unskilled office jobs. 14
Postwar equal employment activity by the Chicago business com-
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munity appears to have been minimal. A staff member of the Chicago
Association of Commerce and Industry claimed that the association regularly held conferences on fair employment practice, but if this was true,
the meetings do not seem to have made much of an impact on the business
community, or on the association itse!f. 15 The president of the association
expressed a biased attitude toward Jews, and the organization did not
have any black workers on its staff. 16
Concern with the fair employment problem surfaced again in late
1949, when , for the second time, the lower house of the Illinois state
legislature passed an antidiscrimination bill. The Association of Commerce and Industry set up an informal committee on fair employment
practice. The committee tried to persuade employers who were sympathetic to the idea of increased Negro employment to act on their principles. The casual nature of this effort cannot be overemphasized, and it
appears to have had little impact. Chicago businessmen who were widely
known as leaders in the field of Negro employment refused to become
deeply involved in the association's activities, and even their superficial
participation aroused the suspicion of more conservative employers. 17
The lllinois State Chamber of Commerce took the threat of FEPC
much more seriously than the Chicago Association of Commerce and
Industry. Unlike the desultory city group, the state chamber of commerce
launched a major voluntary equal employment campaign to head off an
FEPC bill that was given a good chance of passage in 1951. The state
chamber of commerce knew of the Cleveland experience, but felt it could
succeed where the Ohio city had failed . The Illinois chamber believed that
the Cleveland plan had placed too much emphasis on educating the public
on the problems of Negro employment (thus contributing to the passage
of the FEPC ordinance) and not enough on convincing the business community to hire more blacks. 18
A special seventy-five man committee of the Illinois chamber of commerce conducted a state-wide survey of business integration practices and
attitudes. Questioning three hundred top executives, the committee discovered that strong opposition to Negro employment was limited in the
state, and that objections were strongest in the south. Of the firms contacted, 57 percent employed no Negroes at all, and of the 43 percent which
did hire black workers more than 80 percent barred them from all but
unskilled jobs. Despite this overwhelming record of discrimination, 70
percent of the employers indicated support for the chamber's voluntary
equal employment opportunity program. 19 The businessmen probably recognized that a voluntary gesture of acceptance of the ideal of equal employment might forestall legislation which would require them actually
to hire blacks.
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The chamber of commerce voluntary program called for a series of
regional conferences for top executives and personnel men. Training
schools to instruct lower-level personnel men in the attitudes and techniques of employment integration were to follow. The chamber planned
to set up a counseling service to assist companies experiencing difficulties
in the integration process and, with the help of outside groups, hoped to
locate and place black workers. In conjunction with the counseling program the chamber planned to set up a clearinghouse to circulate experiences with employment integration. 20
The piece de resistance of the program was to be a movie demonstrating the value of integrated employment and countering all the common objections to hiring Negroes. The original script for this film called
for the chief executive of the fictional company to admit that he had not
been forceful enough in expressing his support of equal employment opportunity when he discovered that his personnel department had regularly
been turning away Negroes and Jews. In the final version the company
president merely corrected his staff without admitting any responsibility.
This cut was made because one of the employers financing the venture
objected to the implication that the company president might have been in
some way responsible for discrimination. The man in question was the
chairman of the board of one of Chicago's most important firms, and an
immovable hard-liner in his own refusal to give customer-contact jobs to
Negroes in his company. 21 The executive's position was not hypocritical
because the. chamber of commerce was not actually trying to implement
an equal opportunity program. The chamber wanted to get more but not
necessarily better jobs for Negroes. The film-makers deliberately shied
away from any discussion of the existing lack of opportunity for blacks
and refused to deal with the implications of the American Creed for employment practices. Instead the film took a very narrow Capitalist Ethic
focus, emphasizing the economic benefits of using the entire pool of available labor. 22
The Illinois State Chamber of Commerce achieved its primary goal.
In 1951 the state senate again refused to pass the FEPC bill. But because
the threat continued (the state lower house passed an FEPC bill every other
year until 1961 when the law was finally enacted) the chamber of commerce continued its program in at least a moderately active form until
1954.
Although the Illinois State Chamber of Commerce chose to ignore
the implications of its integration activity for overall values, other business supporters of voluntary fair employment practices faced the demands
of the American Creed more squarely. Throughout the early 1950's businessmen argued that voluntarism and education would end discrimination
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while preserving the individual flexibility necessary for maximum profitability. 23 In 1954, the governing board of the National Association of
Manufacturers adopted the following official policy: "Freedom of opportunity for every individual to work at an available job for which he is
qualified is an objective of the American way of life. Employment of individuals and their assignments to jobs should be determined by matching
the individual's skills and qualifications with the requirement<; of available
positions. These objectives can best be achieved through voluntary methods. " 24 States such as Wisconsin that passed FEPC laws without enforcement provisions seemingly bowed to the irresistible logic of the voluntary
compliance argument. In 1952 an Indianapolis businessman told a television audience that compulsory legislation was "the easy way out. If we
can just get someone else to take over our responsibilities. That does not
build strong people, neither does it build a strong nation." 25 Even in states
which had an enforceable FEPC, the tide of business cooperation and voluntary action flowed strongly. In the mid-fifties, New York businessmen,
who had lived with an antidiscrimination law for more than a decade,
banded together to encourage each other to live up to the spirit of the
law. 26
The voluntary integration programs of the early 1950's were a clear
expression of business ambiguity toward equal employment opportunity.
They were an attempt to comply with the spirit of the American Creed
without living up to the practical requirements embodied in an equal employment policy. Most businessmen did not want to hire Negroes, or were
afraid to do so. Yet pressure from fair employment legislation, or the
threat of such legislation, and the growing number of successful pioneer
employers meant that businessmen who had previously ignored the question of employing Negroes had to come to some conscious decision about
what they would do.
The voluntary plans were designed to relieve pressure on the business
community, not to solve the problem of employment discrimination. Thus
the business response to FEPC reflected the anti-Negro feelings that still
permeated the business community in the 1950's. In the more liberal areas
of the Northeast and the Midwest employers frequently accepted the
abstract ideal of fair employment, but even in states with FEPC laws, employment of Negroes in nontraditional jobs was token at best. For example, immediately after the war, the liberal New York papers, the
Herald-Tribune, the Times, the Post, the Eagle, and PM, each had one
token black reporter. The conservative papers had none, and only the
communist Daily Worker had a significant number of black staff members. 27 In 1948, when 125 white editors were asked if they would hire
Negroes for their professional staffs, only 20 bothered to answer and 14
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said they would not. 28 The six who said they would hire Negroes may very
well have been like the New York Post city editor who told a job-seeking
Negro, "Oh yes, we expect to employ a Negro any day now, but it will be
either Walter White or W. E. B. DuBois. " 29
A 1951 survey of Negro employment practices in Connecticut, which
like New York had an FEPC, disclosed a systematic pattern of discrimination. Employers hired a few nonwhites in professional and white-collar
jobs, but on the whole they relegated Negroes to semiskilled and unskilled
positions. Most employers merely ignored FEPC, although businessmen in
one Connecticut city actively opposed it with an educational campaign
that taught managers how to legally circumvent the equal employment
law. Businessmen there also circulated a letter which warned employers
against cooperating with investigators who were trying to discover the
effect of the law on black employment. 30
Reluctance to hire blacks was also reflected in a survey of minority
employment practices in the San Francisco Bay Area in 1949. More than
40 percent of the employers who mentioned Negroes as a minority group
said they would not hire them, or would prefer not to hire them for any
job, and fewer than 20 percent said they would use Negroes in whitecollar positions. 31 Another survey of San Francisco in 1955 indicated that
business attitudes toward employing blacks had not changed much in six
years. More than a quarter of one hundred employers questioned did not
even claim to have a fair employment policy. Of the remaining 75 percent
only 12 percent actually had some sort of formal nondiscrimination policy.
The others had merely responded affirmatively when asked if they favored
an integrated work force. Needless to say, actual employment of Negroes
was considerably below even these rather unimpressive expressions of
good will. 32
Even at the end of the 1950's many employers remained reluctant to
extend themselves on behalf of black employment. A questionnaire survey
by the Minnesota Advisory Commission to the U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights in 1960 disclosed not only severe underutilization of the black labor
force, but a strong disinclination on the part of employers to take even
pro forma steps to express their support of fair employment. Of 922 firms
that responded, only 582 answered the question that asked what they had
done to assure fair employment. Of these, almost half admitted they had
done nothing. 33
The growing willingness of firms to extend equal opportunity to blacks
was clearly a function of the changing social and political environment.
Business sensitivity to the American Creed was dependent upon continuing
external pressure. For the business community as a whole demands for
employment integration increased steadily after World War II. Employer
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response in the isolated cases where pressure slackened demonstrated the
superficiality of business commitment to the American Creed.
Illinois Bell Telephone practiced just such equal employment opportunism in its treatment of black clerical workers in Chicago. In the
late forties and early fifties, during the peak of the Illinois FEPC drives,
Illinois Bell began hiring black clerical workers in its Loop accounting
department, and by 1951 Bell employed Negroes in most of its downtown
Chicago offices. 34 However, in 1952 Illinois Bell began transferring its
downtown operations to suburban locations. Over a period of seven years
outlying offices took over almost all the work done downtown. Each time
an office closed the company transferred its Negro workers to one of the
remaining downtown offices (which were closer to their homes) while
the whites moved to the new location. At the same time, Illinois Bell
almost stopped hiring any new Negro employees. Even after the independent union which represented the clerical workers complained, the
company did no more than install a token number of black workers in its
suburban branches.35 Unlike retail outlets which were dependent on
walk-in customers and had to hire blacks to attract a growing black population, the telephone company was able to follow the white population to
the suburbs and leave its black employees behind in the central city.
In 1952, a National Urban League survey of thirty industrial cities
disclosed widespread discrimination against Negroes in skilled and whitecollar occupations. Discrimination occurred despite the manpower demands of the Korean War, and despite the antidiscrimination clause in the
government contracts which many of the offending companies held. The
report noted that southern employers were particularly blatant in their
discriminatory practices.36 Whereas many northern employers appeared
willing to employ a minimum number of Negroes in professional, managerial, and skilled occupations, southern managers maintained a much
more rigid stance. In the Upper South Negroes managed to keep the better
positions they had gained during the war, but in areas of the Deep South
postwar formalization of employment policy and job standards actually
led to a decrease in the number of black workers.37 Southern businesses
continued widespread discrimination against blacks well into the 1960's,
although instances of token Negro employment did begin to appear in
individual firms in some areas. 3s
Despite general business reluctance to remove the ceiling on Negro
jobs during the 1950's, there were some employers who pioneered in
placing blacks in nontraditional positions. The changing employment policies of retail store owners are particularly interesting because retail
merchants were extremely sensitive to alterations in the public mood. They
were highly vulnerable to protests from both the black and white com-
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munities and had to be sure the balance had tipped in favor of equal
employment before they began hiring blacks. Moreover, the reaction of
stores' low-paid, status-conscious, white-collar sales people was an excellent barometer of how sincerely the white publ,ic had accepted the
American Creed.
Some isolated Negroes held retail sales positions before the war, but,
with rare exceptions, only in stores with predominantly black clientele. G.
Fox of Hartford, Connecticut, was apparently the first major department
store to employ Negroes in white-collar and professional positions. G.
Fox started to treat black and white employees equally in 1942, and promoted black workers to sales, clerical, and other nontraditional jobs. In
1945, Fox placed a Negro in a management position on its personnel
staff. 39
The G. Fox policy, although a major breakthrough in both the nature
and number of jobs given to blacks, was not immediately followed by other
northeastern department stores. Even after the passage of the New York
State Fair Employment Practice Act in 1945 department store owners in
New York City refused to hire blacks in other than stock and service jobs.
In early 1946 there were few if any blacks in store jobs which required
them to meet the public. However, by the spring of 1947, nine of the
fifteen largest New York stores had at least one black sales person, and
one had fifteen.40 A study done that year indicated that the public completely accepted the black sales help.41
Breakthroughs in Negro retail employment were made in a number
of northern cities in the years 1947-48. Besides New York, stores in
Boston 42 and Minneapolis 43 began to hire blacks in response to FEPC laws,
pressure from civil rights groups, or a combination of both. Philadelphia
stores also hired their first black sales help in the late 1940's. Immediately
after the war Philadelphia store owners had rebuffed attempts by the
American Friends Service Committee to persuade them to hire black sales
personnel. The manager of one of the largest Market Street department
stores told an AFSC interviewer in January, 1946, that he would not employ
a Negro unless all stores moved together. He feared a single pioneer would
lose business to nonintegrating stores. 44 His position was fairly typical. He
accepted the ideal of the American Creed, but the practical constraints of
the Capitalist Ethic prevented Negro employment. One personnel director
explained that progress would come slowly, and although she did not expect to see such a revolution in her lifetime, eventually Negroes would
hold every kind of job. Fearful gradualism marked most Philadelphia
merchants but perhaps none more so than the president of a large department store. After demurring for the usual reasons of customer and employee reaction, the store executive explained that the problem would be
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solved only through "amalgamization," which he felt would take centuries.45
Employer fears of customer and employee reaction to black workers
were reenforced when one of the largest of the Philadelphia stores unexpectedly found itself pioneering in Negro employment. In an advertisement for sales help the store had neglected to include the usual "whites
only" designation . One thousand two hundred people applied for the advertised positions. One-third of the applicants were black, and the store
personnel department rejected them out of hand. The rejected applicants
made their feelings known in the black community, and the store suddenly
found itself under extreme pressure to hire Negroes in nontraditional jobs.
To placate the black community the store agreed to employ Negro sales
people, only to discover that its white workers began to object. The store
backed down in the face of employee opposition, and the black workers
were not hired.46
Throughout 1946 and 1947 a coalition of Philadelphia civil rights
groups made a concerted effort to persuade store officials to open up
their hiring practices. Although the employers expressed sympathy for the
movement, particularly when the efforts were of the gentle Quaker
variety, they adamantly refused to move until the city passed an FEPC
ordinance in March, 1948. Subsequently the stores, whose managers had
predicted no substantial progress for generations, peacefully and successfully integrated their white-collar positions. 47
Despite the successful integration of the department stores in New
York, Boston, and Philadelphia, store managers elsewhere were sure their
cities, their customers, or their employees could not be counted upon to
agree to the hiring of blacks. Although Philadelphia stores hired Negro
sales people in 1948, as late as 1954 only one store in Chester, Pennsylvania,
a small city with a large black population less than ten miles from Philadelphia, had a black sales person. Moreover, although she was a college
graduate with professional social work experience, she worked in a secondrate store. 48 The same kind of discrimination existed in Wilmington, Delaware, barely twenty-five miles from Philadelphia. In 1949, a store owner
who had a strong personal commitment to the American Creed promoted
a stockgirl to a sales position, but opposition from white employees forced
her to request a transfer back to stock work. When she subsequently attempted to help on the sales floor during peak periods, customers complained and the employer stopped even that token gesture toward employment integration. It was not until 1953 that Wilmington public opinion
had mellowed enough to permit a store to use a black stock girl in sales
during peak periods without incident. 49
In the South blacks held nontraditional retail positions in a number
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of isolated instances. Southern employers most likely to hire black sales
people operated their own small stores which did not cater to an exclusive
class of customers. These employers broke with the traditional southern
pattern of employment discrimination because they worked closely with
their employees and came to regard them as individuals. Once the formal
employer-employee barriers were down it was easy for the southern shopkeepers to fall into the paternalistic acceptance of blacks which remained
as a legacy of the antebellum period. Ironically, this attitudinal anachronism provided, in isolated cases, an alternative route to equal opportunity
outside of the American Creed. During World War II, for example, the
owner of a Greensboro, North Carolina clothing store had hired a Negro
janitor. By 1955, the black man had become a salesman on a par with the
store's white personnel. Despite the fact he had not finished grammar
school, and reportedly spoke English very poorly, he got along with his coworkers and was popular with customers. When asked if he employed
Negroes at any of his other stores, the owner replied, "It has never occurred to me. This boy came to me twelve years ago and showed so much
ambition and aptitude that I let him grow as fast as I could. " 50
Any guilt feelings businessmen may have harbored as a result of their
unwillingness to live up to the American Creed usually surfaced only after
their consciences had been pricked in the pocketbook. Businessmen integrated their work forces most easily when there was minimum conflict between the American Creed and the Capitalist Ethic. When the public expected (or at least accepted) equal employment, and either blacks or the
government demanded it, and there was sound economic reason for hiring
blacks, then firms would fall into line quickly. Just such a situation
emerged among downtown Chicago stores between 1950 and 1953.
During World War II some Chicago stores employed Negroes in nontraditional jobs, but still in a service rather than in a white-collar capacity.
A department store manager found that wartime wage controls prevented
him from getting eighteen-year-old, size-sixteen blondes for his store restaurant. Only older white women or Negroes would work for the government-controlled low wages he was forced to pay, and the owner found
younger blacks superior to older whites. The store manager did not extend his favorable experience with Negro waitresses to other areas of his
firm, however. 51 With the exception of one high-quality women's store
which hired "medium brown" women for service positions, no other major
downtown store in Chicago employed any black workers in a nonmenial
capacity prior to 1950. 52
The drive for an Illinois FEPC and the shift of whites to the suburbs
prompted Chicago retail employers to reassess their discriminatory policies
in the immediate postwar years. Retail merchants in Chicago played a
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major role in the fight against an Illinois FEPC. Both the city and the state
merchants' associations lobbied effectively against equal employment opportunity legislation. At the same time they faced increased demands to
hire Negroes from black and white civil rights groups, and from their own
lobbyists. In 1950, one of the retailers' legislative representatives compensated for his opposition to FEPC by pressuring the store owners to proceed
with employment integration voluntarily. The lobbyist had agreed to work
against FEPC legislation because he earnestly believed that voluntary action
could bring about implementation of the American Creed while preserving
maximum business freedom. But the failure of firms to begin hiring blacks
placed him in a state of value-action incongruence which he resolved by
threatening not to lobby when the legislature next considered FEPc. 53
While the store managers' own lobbyist pushed for voluntary action,
downtown retailers discovered that their customers were also demanding
black sales people. Although there had been no systematic exclusion of
Negro shoppers from Loop stores during the war, relatively few Negroes
had patronized the larger department stores.54 During the late forties and
early fifties , however, larger numbers of black Chicagoans began to shop in
the Loop as whites began moving to the suburbs. Black shoppers expected
black sales people, and despite the fear that Negro clerks would offend
their white customers, many employers were not willing to sacrifice the
additional patronage by discriminating against blacks.55 The manager of a
chain of women's shops who was among the first to employ blacks boasted
that his success led other specialty shop owners on State Street to come to
him for advice. He told an interviewer, "These shops realize that the upper
middle class is moving to the suburbs and large department stores are going
after them with branch operations. They realize that to survive they have
to cater to the people remaining in the city. " 56
In 1949 the first major downtown department store decided to begin
hiring Negroes in white-collar positions. Store management apparently
beli,eved the propaganda of the retail merchants' anti-FEPC campaign and
felt obligated to prove that voluntary integration could work. Moreover,
the store's personnel director had a social service background and was
instrumental in convincing management that black workers could work
successfully in a major Loop department store. This moral commitment
to hire blacks was undoubtedly strengthened by the steady pressure from
black action groups, especially the Congress of Racial Equality, which had
picketed the store in protest of its hiring policy. 57 In July, 1950, the store
hired a college-trained black man to work as an administrative assistant.
When he became familiar with company procedure, the store moved him
to the personnel department to help coordinate the integration of the rest
of the firm . But management trusted him with the delicate task of hiring
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other Negroes only after he cleared himself of suspicion on several counts.
First he assured his employers that he was unsympathetic to communism
even though he had worked on a black newspaper which was widely accused of being "communistic." He also demonstrated his conservatism on
personnel matters by telling management that he " did not believe that a
firm should go out and hire Negroes without considering problems generic
to the hiring of Negroes and further should not push the matter if all
factors were not propitious to the situation. " 58
Although cautious before it began to integrate, the store moved fairly
rapidly once the policy change was made. Within three months there were
more than eighty blacks on its staff. A subsequent personnel director said
overqualified applicants swamped the store. People with master's degrees
were asking for stock jobs. But however qualified they were, the store
found that their black workers suffered from the disabilities of ghetto culture. Management discovered a number of the new black employees selling
marijuana, and subsequent investigation disclosed that others, including a
store guard, had lied about police records. Despite these minor drawbacks,
the bulk of black workers performed admirably and gained high acceptance from their supervisors. 59
Rank and file employees reacted more negatively than supervisors to
integration. Although there was little overt opposition, the Negroes felt ,
or were made to feel, unwelcome at employee social affairs, and on a
number of occasions were told not to use certain lockers or rest rooms.
Part of the problem may have derived from the failure of management to
inform their employees of the new hiring policy. Older workers in particular felt threatened when they found management "sneaking" Negroes into
the store. 60
Whether or not it was true, store personnel believed that much of the
initial difficulty was due to the activity of the pioneer employee. Other
black employees believed he had hired too many blacks too quickly and
without sufficient quality control. Many employees believed the pioneering black manager was "an entirely too bright young man." According to
one source, the pioneer Negro lost his position after a couple of years when
he became "too friendly" with white women and took one to lunch in the
executive men's dining room.6 1
Despite some initial difficulties, the store maintained its new employment policy and willingly became a symbol of racial progress on State
Street. It accepted the annual human relations award of the mayor's commission and freely shared its experience with others who sought guidance.
It is indicative of the quick change of mood that once a major store had
broken the ice, a smaller, less important firm complained that it had been
hiring Negroes long before the big store and resented the larger firm
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getting all tne good publicity. 62 All the important State Street stores but
one and many outlying stores followed the leader. They followed so
quickly that the American Friends Services Committee, which had been
instrumental in assisting the first store, found itself swamped by requests
for qualified black employees.63 Once they accepted the idea of hiring
blacks, several shops discovered that they didn't have to do anything to
implement their new policy because Negro workers who had been
" passing" admitted their ethnicity. 64
Although most stores seemed eager to jump on the integration bandwagon, some nonretail firms took a dimmer view of the break in the color
line. The head of a Loop business organization expressed strong criticism
of the department stores which had integrated (he admitted some of his
objection was based on his southern background and personal aversion to
Negroes) and contended that the stores had hired blacks only because
there was a labor shortage and that integration would not last. 65 His cynicism was not entirely unfounded since one of the State Street stores admitted that it indeed was employing Negroes because the labor market was
tight. In fact , the market was so tight that the store wanted to wait until it
loosened up a bit lest the personnel department be tempted to fill all open
positions with available black applicants.66
The one major holdout among Chicago department stores demonstrated how a limited amount of personal bigotry and a great deal of institutional racism could combine to prevent action even in the face of
overwhelming pressure to integrate. The most prestigious of the major
downtown stores adamantly refused to follow the trend because management believed that the store had a " distinct personality" which made it
more susceptible to customer retaliation. While stores which catered to
the general public might not suffer as a result of Negro sales people, a
store which served an "exclusive" clientele operated in a more rarefied
socioeconomic environment, farther removed from the American Creedbut no less responsive to the Capitalist Ethic.
Part of the store's reluctance to hire blacks arose from conflicting
beliefs among the firm's administrators. Some executives, including several
at the highest level, felt sympathetic to the equal employment drive, but
they were stopped by a single highly placed individual whose racial attitudes had caused him to withdraw his daughter from college because the
school had a Negro guest speaker. 67
In mid-1950, the executives of the holdout store informed AFSC that
they would hire blacks only when to do so was no longer a controversial
issue. They explained that they could not even hire blacks in traditional
jobs because the store had a policy of promoting from within , and since
Negroes could not be promoted to customer contact jobs, it would not be

50

Black Men and Businessmen

right to hire them for any jobs. The personnel director also claimed that
he had received hundreds of letters from customers who had threatened to
take their business elsewhere if the store were integrated. 68 Furthermore
the store management objected to the pressure to hire blacks as an infringement of their freedom to employ whomever they wanted.69
By the end of 1952 other firms in the Chicago area began to apply
strong pressure on the holdout. Its irreconcilable position had become an
embarrassment to anti-FEPC forces and had caused a split in the previously
unanimous opposition to FEPC. Several of the first firms to employ Negroes,
including some which had actively lobbied against FEPC, came to the conclusion that voluntary integration activity had reached a dead end and
that only legislation could bring about complete fair employment. Those
employers who continued to oppose fair employment legislation sent a
delegation to visit the holdout and explained that unless the store changed
its policy the state legislature might very well pass an FEPC Jaw, in which
case the high executive would have cut off his nose to spite his face.70
The store's managers, however, would not budge. They admitted in early
1953, as they had three years before, that they would integrate someday,
but it would be at a time of their own choosing, when they could be absolutely sure they would meet with no unfavorable reaction from either
their current employees or from their customers. 71
In fact, the store did integrate in 1953, but not because it was the
date of its choosing. Sight unseen, the store hired an applicant for a
management position on his merits. He turned out to be black. The store
refused to honor its commitment to employ him, so he turned to the
Mayor's Commission on Human Relations. Although the commission had
enforcement power only when dealing with public contracts, it was able to
hold public hearings on complaints- which it threatened to do. Faced with
the adverse publicity of public exposure, and with a supertight labor
market, the store hired a black clerk-typist and five other Negro workers. 72
Lacking any fundamental commitment to the American Creed, this
store was able to hold out against a wide variety of forces that normally
pushed employers into providing better jobs for black workers. Sure that
their establishment was unique and that it had a special image to uphold,
the management refused to be persuaded by the examples of others. Fearful and conservative, the employers assumed their customers shared their
bigotry. Yet, three years of constant pounding by integrationist forces
appeared to have had some effect. The problem of black empoyment had
become a constant topic of discussion .in management circles, and management had come to accept the inevitability of Negro employment someday.
Thus when the city moved to expose, if not punish, their exclusionary
policy, the store capitulated. The attitudes of the public and of the busi-
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ness community in Chicago had moderated sufficiently to make public
hearings unpalatable enough to cause the store to violate its image and its
principles, even in the absence of an FEPC law.
Spurred perhaps by the continuing tight labor market, several major
Chicago industrial employers joined the retailers in hiring either their first
black workers or blacks for the first time in nontraditional jobs.73 Nevertheless, Negro employment in nontraditional jobs was spotty at best.
Despite six years of organized support for voluntary equal employment,
in 1956, a group of Chicago businessmen, the Mayor's Committee on
Community Welfare, could not find a single firm in the city that did all its
hiring entirely on the basis of qualification. Many firms expressed support
for the idea of equal employment, but the committee concluded that substantial progress would not be made until an FEPC law was passed.74
Voluntary plans, although designed to head off FEPC, convinced some
employers that legislation was necessary. Operating under the threat of
legislation, under pressure from civil rights groups, and under persuasion
from their own voluntary fair employment groups, businessmen in the
1950's placed a small number of black pioneers in nontraditional jobs.
Such placements were tokens, and most employers continued to discriminate against most black applicants. Nevertheless, in many industrial states
and some municipalities, the early fifties saw a small but growing acceptance of the idea of fair employment and a tolerance of legislation toward
that end.

4
Opposition to Employment Integration:
The Plant

The voluntary fair employment activity and token placements of the
early 1950's were an attempt by some elements in the business community
to live up to the American Creed without sacrificing profitability. These
early postwar applications of the American Creed grew out of the developing popular and government demands for equal employment that had arisen
during World War II. Where the pressure to integrate had become acute
(but not yet law) businessmen who felt uncomfortable discriminating
against blacks could satisfy both their consciences and the demands of
society through a minimal change in employment procedure.
Although the few breakthroughs of the 1950's were important indicators of the kinds of general changes that would follow in the 1960's they
were the exceptions rather than the rule. The business community widely
opposed employment integration during the 1950's. For a significant number of businessmen the refusal to hire Negroes did not come from weighing
the conflicting demands of the American Creed and the Capitalist Ethic
and opting for the latter. These businessmen suffered no cognitive dissonance when they discriminated because they were racists for whom the
American Creed was a whites-only ideology.
Racist explanations for excluding blacks from employment decreased
during the 1950's and virtually disappeared during the following decade.
Employers may not have changed their personal attitudes toward blacks,
but they recognized a liberalizing public attitude toward race relations, and
they sought to present a position more in line with the American Creed.
Once employers recognized there was a growing public demand for
fair employment they found themselves faced with a dilemma. Most whites
( including many of the businessmen themselves) still opposed equal employment and presumably any attempt to hire blacks would be costly in terms
of employee and customer reaction. On the other hand, articulate segments
of the public, the government, and sometimes the employers them~elves
53
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accepted the ideal of employment integration, and any refusal to follow
that ideal required some rationalization. The mos,t obvious, the most rational, and the most frequently used explanation was that, whatever its
abstract merits, fair employment would create unnecessary expenses and
was therefore a violation of the Capitalist Ethic.
Even though fears of high cost kept most businessmen from integrating
their firms during the 1950's the period was marked by increasing demands
for black employment and therefore an increasing amount of business
rationalization as to why no blacks were hired. Although constant discrimination in the job market and inferior educational facilities had combined to
severely limit the number of Negroes trained for skilled and white-collar
jobs, there were almost always more qualified black workers than there
were businessmen willing to employ them. The availability of qualified
blacks and the pressure to hire them made it difficult for employers to
ignore the problem and depend on established institutional procedures to
deal with Negro job seekers. If blacks were denied jobs, managers had to
have a policy to explain why. When the president of a large Chicago store,
who later became a national leader in the fight to solve minority problems,
was asked in 1955 why he did not employ any Negro clerical help, he explained that his staff had a predilection for beautiful red-headed Irish girls.
In other words, it was the fault of the system, not his personal bias that
had led to the racial imbalance. Additional discussion forced him to admit
that having been confronted with the situation, he had to make a personal
decision, and he promised to do what he could to promote integration in
the future. 1
The reasons businessmen refused to hire Negroes between the end of
World War II and the beginning of the civil rights revolution in 1960 fell
into three major categories:
Personal racism-Some employers objected on inherently racial grounds
to employing Negroes. These businessmen either simply did not like
Negroes, or they objected to on-the-job social contact between whites and
blacks, or they believed that Negroes had racial traits that made them
inferior workers.
External racism-Many employers, who usually claimed they had no
personal objections to hiring blacks, assumed that their employees, their
customers, or the community was biased. These businessmen feared that
others would react adversely to black employees and that their business
would suffer.
Inertia-A third group of businessmen were afraid of being pioneers.
They had no specific objections to employing Negroes, but they wanted
to wait until someone else hired blacks first. Large numbers of business-
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men who would otherwise have been willing to integrate, refused to do so
because others in their geographical region or in their industry had not.
The statement of Paulsen Spence at the 1947 Senate hearings on an
FEPC bill reflected the full spectrum of racist thought as it applied to the
employment of Negroes. Spence based his assessment of blacks on the
belief that they were behind whites on the evolutionary ladder and had
less experience with civilization. Specifically, Spence made the following
generalizations about the habits and abilities of Negroes: 1) "The average
Negro is dirty," 2) "A substantial portion of the Negroes are affected
with venereal diseases . . . no self-respecting white woman would use a
toilet that had been used by a Negro," 3) "The Negro is completely unreliable," 4) "No matter how hard they try, there are few Negroes who can
resist the temptation to steal," 5) "The Negro is further handicapped by
the fact that he will not work for another Negro," 6) "Likewise, I doubt
if there is a white man in the whole South who would work under a Negro,"
7) "The Negro . . . has practically no mechanical aptitude, and figures
such as are used by a bookkeeper are a complete mystery to him," 8) "The
Negro is not an immoral person, but rather an unmoral person. I doubt
if the average Negro of either sex has morals much different from Falla." 2
Spence was unusual in his forthrightness and willingness to sum up the
racist's view, but many of the sentiments he expressed were shared by
respectable businessmen both in the South and in the North.
Investigating business race relations in 1946, Everett C. Hughes
found that despite their experience with Negro employees during the war,
businessmen continued to think of the Negro as "a creature unfit for any
but the marginal positions in industry because of his laziness, primitiveness,
and childishness, yet full of an unjustified desire to have what he does
not have and should not want to have, up to and including marriage
with the manager's secretary." 3 Southern employers were particularly apt
to hold racist stereotypes, but during the 1950's many northern businessmen also regarded blacks as racially inferior. As late as 1966, 21 percent
of northern business managers and 68 percent of southern managers in
one sample asserted that they did not think Negroes were as intelligent as
whites. 4
Businessmen who believed that Negroes were biologically inferior
found it not only easy, but natural, to support segregation, and they viewed
integration as a violation of eternal truths. The spokesman for an ad hoc,
small-business, anti-FEPC group explained that segregatiion was "natural
law" because "even the birds of the air, the beasts of the field, the bugs
and the worms in the ground choose to associate and work with their
own kind." 5 Belief in the inherent inferiority of Negroes or in the natural
law of segregation were general values that manifested themselves in the
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specific fear of social integration. Exactly what constituted social integration was, of course, a matter of individual interpretation. In the early
1950's social integration frequently meant any contact as equals between
blacks and whites, but in later years the line was sometimes more finely
drawn. In 1962, an important Georgia manufacturer of office supplies
who had integrated blacks into most areas of his company below the
white-collar level explained that he was willing to extend economic opportunity on a nondiscriminatory basis, but he would not be "a party to any
deviations which might savor of social integration." Apparently he believed
that promoting Negro women to clerical positions was tantamount to social
integration. 6 If an employer believed, as did one Indiana businessman,
that the framers of the "Constitution" [sic] were referring only to white
Protestants when they said "all men are created equal," and that God did
not intend intermingling, then the closer the contact between black and
white, the more un-American and blasphemous such activity would be.7
And in fact, the closer the form of contact between the races, the more
employers (and whites in general) objected. Thus individuals who expressed no opposition to employing Negroes, nevertheless, refused to do
so for fear that equality in employment would lead to more intimate personal contact, which the employers considered improper. 8
Since the closest socially recognized form of intimacy was marriage,
businessmen frequently pointed to interracial marriage as the reason they
would not hire Negroes. A New York employer who affirmed his strong
support of equal opportunity indicated he would not hire a Negro secretary
because he did not want his daughter marrying a colored boy. When asked
what tne connection between these two situations was, he replied, "Well,
the line has to be drawn somewhere, and I draw it at personal intimate
relationships." 9 Managers frequently objected to intermarriage in terms of
their expectations for their own children, and then they transferred this
concern from the family to the firm . Businessmen who viewed their
employees in a strong paternalistic light acted in what they considered
their employees' best interests when they refused to bring blacks into
their corporate families. Both the chairman of the board and the president
of a large Chicago financial institution liked to view their company as a
cross between a social club and a family. They provided employees with
all kinds of fringe benefits, including free meals in the corporation's own
restaurant. Because many of the young employees married each other (the
president had met his wife there), the management carefully screened
all applicants as to "character and social acceptability." Whatever their
character, Negroes were considered socially unacceptable as marriage
partners. 10
In the South fear of intermarriage continued to be a deterrent to fair
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employment well into the 1960's. During the early years of the civil
rights movement the executive vice president of the Retail Merchants
Association of a progressive southern city rejected the idea of employment
integration on the grounds that "Martin Luther King and the NAACP has as
its ultimate objective, intermarriage, and all other activities are directed
toward this end." 11
The businessman who rejected blacks as potential employees because
he did not want his daughter, or for that matter anyone else's daughter,
to marry one, rested his argument on the cornerstone of American racism.
Although some employers rejected blacks as suitable mates because they
attached specific unacceptable qualities to them, most employers who
refused to hire Negroes out of fear of intermarriage did not feel compelled
to give reasons why they wanted their employees to avoid social contact
with blacks. The fact that Negroes were Negroes was sufficient in itself.
The discriminatory businessman had four hundred years of racial exclusiveness to support his position, and even the most persuasive proponents
of integration seemed to be at a loss for an appropriate response.
The employer who would not hire blacks because he wanted to
protect the racial purity of whites was expressing his racism in a purely
social manner. Businessmen seeking to prevent social relations between
blacks and whites could not defend their positions from a strictly economic
point of view. Whatever his employees did with each other after work was
(barring negative community reaction) literally none of his business.
However, when the employer's racism manifested itself by finding fault
with specifically work-related traits, the racism cloaked itself in the
Capitalist Ethic. If, due to biological shortcomings, Negroes were inferior
workers, then opposition to integration made good business as well as
good social sense. By and large, businessmen assumed Negroes were
unreliable, unambitious, unintelligent, and unacceptable to white customers,
and thus were incapable of filling responsible positions. 12 The imaginative
employer could find proof of these childlike characteristics in every aspect
of black behavior. A Baton Rouge employer complained on the one hand
that Negroes were lazy because they would not work longer hours when
he offered them higher wages, and on the other hand that they were
unreliable and undependable because they quit his employment to take
higher-paying jobs. 13
While some employers attributed highly specific physical traits to
blacks, such as the ability to withstand heat or an insensitivity to toxic
chemicals, 14 the most consistent physical stereotype was the classic concept
of "strong back, weak mind." Thus blacks were frequently considered
only for jobs which required a maximum of stamina and a minimum of
intelligence. So ingrained was this stereotype that firms which had sue-
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cessfully used Negroes for years, such as an Atlanta steel company, simply
phased them out with the coming of mechanization on the assumption
that blacks could not do any work of higher levels. 15
To a limited extent businessmen's negative attitudes toward blacks
during the 1950's stemmed from their experiences with Negro workers
during World War II. But, while some employers generalized the poor
performance of a few blacks to the entire race, many more employers
unrealistically generalized their exceptionally good experience with pioneer
black workers during the 1950's. Throughout the war, due to the severe
manpower shortage, many employers hired poorly qualified blacks because
they were the only workers available. Not surprisingly, these businessmen
were dissatisfied with their Negro employees and used their unhappy
wartime experiences to justify discriminatory postwar employment policies.16 In the decade after the war, however, business experience with
blacks was, for the most part, favorable. Many pioneer black employees
were overqualified, and their outstanding performance on the job gave
rise to high expectations for black workers in general. Businessmen who
employed blacks during the fifties rejected the racist stereotype because
experience taught them it was not true. They could conform to the
American Creed by offering employment opportunity to blacks while
getting more than their money's worth in talent.
Beginning sometime in the 1960's, however, as the pool of overqualified black workers dried up, there appears to have been a resurgence of
negative business expectations toward black capabilities. Unlike earlier
racist stereotyping that grew out of ignorance, this later downgrading of
black ability appears to have been based on experience. A study by
Dwight Vines in 1967 found that both in the North and in the South
managers who had no experience with Negro employees tended to expect
higher quality work from blacks than managers who had experience with
them. Vines found increasingly favorable managerial attitudes toward
Negroes, but he also found increasing dissatisfaction with the performance
of Negro workers. 17 It would seem that despite some poor on-the-job
performance by blacks, businessmen during the late 1960's were placing
greater importance on equal employment than on equal performance.
Some businessmen may have claimed they were getting inferior work
from black employees, but the expectation of poor quality work from
Negroes ceased to be a generalized stereotype.
Whether or not they were personally biased against blacks, employers
were often reluctant to admit that they had violated the American Creed
by finding blacks unacceptable for employment. Businessmen preferred to
see themselves as helplessly caught in the trap of other people's racism.
Aversion to Negroes on the part of others was the single most important
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reason cited by businessmen for their failure to employ black workers
between the end of World War II and the beginning of the civil rights movement.18 In 1953, the executive director of Minnesota's Fair Employment
Practice Commission observed that "while we have encountered some
evidence of prejudice, we do not find strong expressions of it on the part
of those who make employment policy." He found that the problem
was "a very general feeling of fear that prejudices on the part of fellow
workers, union members or customers will cause friction in the company
or the union or will cause a loss of trade." 19
Unlike the fear of blacks, which was racist and was condemned by
the American Creed, the fear of losing trade was good business and was
approved by the Capitalist Ethic. By transferring the source of discrimination from himself to others, the businessman not only absolved himself
of guilt for acting unfairly, but also rationalized his unfair employment
policy. The entire burden of responsibility fell from the employer's shoulders when he attributed racial bias to others. He could adopt a position
of moral purity while perpetuating an admittedly immoral policy. The fault
lay in the system. Capitalism was responsive to the demands of the
people and the capitalist could change only after the people had changed.
Businessmen often ascribed the severest racism to their female employees. There was a persistent belief among employers that women were
particularly prone to Negrophobia and the more women a businessman
employed the more likely he was to reject the idea of Negro employment.
The employers' expectations of female opposition to blacks was not
necessarily based on an accurate assessment of the white women's actual
feelings. Blood's study of the integration of Minneapolis-St. Paul retail sales
personnel provides a good example of such unwarranted fear. A thir:d of
the managers Blood questioned predicted difficulties when they introduced
blacks into their white-collar, predominantly female labor force . In fact,
when integration occurred, there was practically no opposition at all.20
A 1955 incident in a North Carolina furniture company illustrates how
far out of touch employers could become. The personnel manager of the
company called one of his top secretaries into a conference in order to
demonstrate to a visitor the extent of white aversion to working with blacks.
Much to his chagrin he discovered that the secretary, although a local girl
without a college education, had no objections whatsoever to working
alongside Negroes. She explained to the incredulous personnel man that
she entrusted the care of her children to a Negro maid-with whom she
ate lunch-and therefore could not see why she should object to a similar
pattern at work. 21
Because most women were white-collar workers who depended to
some extent upon job status to compensate for the typical low pay of
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clerical help, employers faced the double problem of status threat and
female reaction when they employed Negro office help. The office manager
in a Chicago garment factory said he had no objections to hiring black
clerical help but doubted if he could "attract high class white personnel
for employment after employing Negroes." It took a visit to a successfully
integrated department store to convince him that job status was not inversely proportional to the number of Negroes on the staff. 22
Even businessmen who had successfully integrated their firms continued to believe that whites resented interracial employment. As late as
1962, several Atlanta employers refused to allow their firms to be used
as examples of employment integration because they said their white
employees did not want it known they were working with blacks. 23 There
is some evidence to indicate that the introduction of blacks into an allwhite work force did have a detrimental impact on employee morale, 24 and
antiunion employers feared that white employee backlash might take the
form of unionization. 25
Quite clearly some managers were placing their own prejudiced thoughts
in the minds of their employees. Nevertheless, the pattern of employers assuming worker opposition was too consistent to imagine that it was based
solely on the racism of businessmen. Employers who had been "burned"
during the war, like the North Carolina mill owner whose workers had not
only walked off the job when blacks appeared but who had also refused to
touch any of the "contaminated" thread which the blacks had spun, continued to shy away from blacks in the postwar years. 26 Throughout the
1950's many employers who attempted to employ blacks found themselves
facing vociferous employee opposition, and fainthearted employers who
took their workers at their word remained opposed to integration.
When employers did move to hire blacks and refused to be intimidated
by white resistance, they seldom suffered any prolonged trouble. 27 This was
true partly because employers did not attempt to hire Negroes in regions
where the white population was vehemently antiblack. Nevertheless,
the extent of employee Negrophobia is certainly open to question. Even in
a hard-line southern city like Dallas, at least one clothing store successfully
integrated its work force as early as 1952.28 In most cases employers were
not ready to test the depth of employee prejudice, but the case of a mediumsize machine shop in Dallas demonstrated that even a timorous move to
employ Negroes could meet with unexpected acceptance from white
workers. The president of the firm, which made gears, had suffered from
high turnover among his white employees. In 1953, at the risk of being
branded a "nigger lover," he decided to train blacks. He believed that
Negroes would provide him with a more stable work force because they
would not be lured away by the aircraft plants which were pirating his
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other workers-aircraft companies did not employ blacks at skilled jobs.
After secretly training the Negroes at night, the president broke the news
to his day workers, apologized, explained his economic predicament, and
assured them that the blacks would not get their jobs. He even admitted to
the men that he was prepared to back down if there were widespread opposition. There was none. 29
Worker opposition to blacks did not necessarily die after the employer
placed Negroes on the job. While most early fair employment policies
were implemented smoothly, there were numerous instances of continued
employee resentment even after blacks had begun to work. Particularly
during the early fifties when virtually no blacks held nontraditional jobs,
whites were extremely concerned about the structure of white-black relations on the job. Established job patterns relegated Negroes to inferior
positions. Therefore any job at which a Negro worked W<\S ipso facto a
low status job and a threat to the white workers who shared it. When a
Dallas retail store promoted a Negro employee to a cashier's position in
1954, white girls complained and demanded that she wear a uniform. The
store complied and satisfied the white objections by forcing the black girl
to wear a badge of service. 30 This case was not unique. White employees
frequently insisted on some kind of distinction between black and white
workers, usually demanding segregation of work places, lunch rooms, toilets,
and company recreation facilities.
During World War II, Executive Order 8802 had prohibited discrimination in hiring in industries holding government contracts. The executive
order, however, . did not deal with on-the-job segregation of working
quarters and plant facilities and the wartime Fair Employment Practice
Commission did not attempt to do what committee member Mark Ethridge
said "no power in the world-not even in all the mechanized armies of
the earth, Allied and Axis," could do, that is "force. Southern white people
to the abandonment of the principle of social segregation." 31 Wartime
acceptance of on-the-job segregation was not limited to the South. When
RCA brought the first Negroes into its Indianapolis plant in 1942, the company agreed to provide segregated facilities "as a concession to the expressed will of the white workers for the purpose of achieving the introduction of Negroes.32 When integrated facilities had the support of
management the War Labor Board supported such a move against the
objections of the workers, but when management was willing to accede to
their white employees' demands for segregation the government agencies
went along. 33
The physical demands of production militated against continued extensive segregation on the work floor after World War II. In the traditionally unpleasant or menial jobs assigned to Negroes, segregation existed
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by department, but once blacks began to move into production-line work
such segregation became difficult to maintain. It was awkward to try to
turn white jobs into black ones and uneconomical to separate blacks and
whites working at the same job. Some plants did try to keep their workers
separated, however. In 1954 the personnel director of the Chicago branch
of a major insurance company hired eleven Negro clerks and placed them
in a separate office in the cellar. The manager supplied the segregated unit
with its own air-conditioner and Coke machine and, in the absence of complaints, was convinced that the segregated Negro women were happy. He
was so sure that the black clerks were content that he invited a visiting
antidiscrimination field worker to interview them. The personnel man
seemed genuinely shocked and confused when the questions of the visitor
brought the black workers' resentment to the surface. 34
Managers explained the maintenance of on-the-job segregation by
claiming that Negroes had certain characteristics that made them unacceptable to white workers. During World War II, workers in a Connecticut
factory complained that Negroes were dirty, louse-infested, and diseased.
"Diseased" in these cases was usually a euphemism for venereal disease, a
belief which manifested itself in "elaborate efforts to avoid using the toilets
Negroes used." 35 Venereal disease particularly frightened whites and was
a major theme in plant desegregation battles. A midwestern employer explained that he found that Negroes had a higher incidence of venereal
disease than whites, but that during World War II he had hired them anyway as long as they agreed to get the disease treated. Since the company
hired its first black workers only at the lowest level, and gave them no
opportunity to advance, it is hardly surprising that white workers concurred with the management's decision to segregate sanitary and eating
facilities. 36
When first employing Negro workers a number of employers instituted
physical examinations, including blood tests, to forestall possible employee
objections to dirty and diseased coworkers. 37 Although a "hypothetical program" for the integration of Negro employees, drawn up by the American
Friends Service Committee in 1950, did not "recommend additional
Wassermans unless all employees got Wassermans," it then cited the cost
of these blood tests for venereal disease as the only additional expense a
company might undergo as a result of employing Negroes. 38 As late as
1966 a southern firm required its black employees, but not its white
workers, to obtain a report on their health from the public health office on
communicable diseases. 39
White fears of Negro-borne diseases commonly led employers to
separate "social" facilities for black and white workers. During the 1950's
throughout the South and in many areas of the North dining rooms and
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bathrooms were strictly segregated. Frequently the segregated facilities
paralleled departmental segregation. The separate and usually inferior
toilets and lunchrooms assigned to blacks matched their separate and
usually inferior jobs.
In several instances when employers attempted to integrate facilities
during the 1950's opposition came from black as well as white employees.
Some older black workers, fully aware of the social implications of integrated bathrooms and cafeterias, feared the conflict they believed would
ensue. When, in 1955, the vice president of a major Dallas department
store suggested to an older black employee ( the head of the maintenance
department) that the cafeteria be integrated, the employee, who had been
with the firm for 25 years, demurred. He explained that as long as the
black workers ate in the kitchen no white woman employee who might
have a grudge against one of the Negro workers could use his proximity in
the waiting line as an excuse for claiming he had gotten fresh with her.
The vice president admitted he had not considered the problem in that
light, and he called off the move. 40 There were additional instances in
Raleigh, North Carolina, and in Indianapolis where Negro maintenance
workers refused to use company dining facilities which were open to all
employees. In the Indianapolis case the black workers refused to attend a
newly integrated company picnic in 1953 and asked that they be given
their traditional separate outing. 41
Objections to integrated facilities on the part of black workers were
relatively rare and limited to situations in which the Negroes were otherwise relegated to an inferior status. By far the largest number of objections
to integration came from white workers, and most of their objections centered on integrated toilets. In the South, part of the problem arose from
southern laws, ordinances, and commission rulings that required plants
to have separate bathrooms for black and white men and women.42 Such
laws could be a real deterrent to smaller companies' considering the integration of their staffs. When a small firm employed Negro janitors a small
third toilet met the legal requirements, but bringing black women into the
labor force presented a more difficult problem. Employers thought they
would have to construct another complete bathroom to meet the needs of
the new black employees, and the expense was often inhibiting, especially
when coupled with strong opposition from white women. 43 A major national
food chain fired the black women in several of its North Carolina branches
in 1957 when the state inspector demanded that the firm add a fourth rest
room. All the company's stores in the state had been built on the assumption that Negro women would never be employed, and for reasons of room
or expense, local managers were unwilling to expand their facilities to
meet the demands of the law. 44
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Until the late 1950's employers in the North as well as in the South
had to face the problem of integrating the washroom. Indeed, the problem
may have been somewhat more acute in the North because, unlike southerners, northerners had no generally accepted method of dealing with white
objections to sharing facilities. Southerners, whether or not under the aegis
of the law, differentiated between economic and "social" integration by
maintaining segregated facilities even for an integrated work force . Northern employers, on the other hand, faced either the ire of their white
employees if they integrated social facilities, or the awkward alternative of
establishing segregated facilities in a society that did not condone this
kind of blatant racial discrimination. Well into the 1950's many northern
employers continued to react with ambivalence and confusion when employment integration forced them to face the great water closet crisis. One
Chicago insurance company tied itself in knots over the problem of social
integration. The firm, which had traditionally hired Negroes only as
messengers, agreed to open all positions to black applicants. But the messengers had their own lounges and rest rooms, and the management was not
sure what to do with the new black employees. On the one hand management did not want to extend to black women the segregated pattern they
had established for the black men, but on the other hand if the company
did not provide the newly hired black women with separate toilets then the
managers worried that they would have to integrate the men's rooms. 45
Toilet trauma did not strike southern employers widely until after the
Kennedy administration. Most southern employers considered the employment of Negro workers sufficiently daring in itself without attempting to
compound their troubles by integrating their nonwork facilities . In some
cases southern management went to astounding lengths to assure their
black workers of separate but equal toilets. In 1952, a Dallas food company
was able to solve a minor personnel emergency by installing a sanitary
napkin dispenser in the Negro women's rest room after difficulty had
developed over the black workers using the machine in the white rest
room. 46 Frequently separate but equal toilets were more separate than
equal. A small Dallas garment manufacturer hired his first black power
machine operators in 1953. He set up a partition to divide them from his
white workers on the work floor, and made the black workers use a small,
inadequate toilet while his white girls used a much larger wash room.47
Perhaps the most extreme example of the two-toilet syndrome occurred in
1958 in an Atlanta company where the owner bowed to employee demands and made his Negro porter use the segregated toilet of a company
in the next building. 48
Under considerable pressure from the government, from elements
within the business community, from some unions, from civil rights
organizations, and frequently from parent companies headquartered in the
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North, southern firms began to desegregate toilet facilities during the 1960's.
By that time public opinion in the South had evolved to the point where
many white workers could accept shared facilities, but employers did not
always recognize that their employees' attitudes had changed. In 1963, the
Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union forced the Suffolk, Virginia,
plant of the Planters Peanut Company to integrate blue-collar jobs, plant
entrances, water fountains, and the cafeteria, but the company balked when
it came to desegregating the blue-collar rest rooms. 49 The firm claimed it
would lose two hundred of its two hundred and fifty white employees (it
had 1,250 black workers) if it eliminated the separate toilet facilities. The
union complained to the federal government's Committee on Equal Job
Opportunity, which threatened to cancel the firm's government contract
unless the company integrated its washrooms. Faced with the possible
loss of business, the company complied with the union demands and did
not lose any of its white workers. 50
In the North, the attitudes of both employers and employees toward
integration changed at approximately the same rate. However, in the vast
majority of the cases reported from the South in the period after 1960,
southern management appeared considerably ahead of the southern work
force in accepting racial integration. This is not to say that southern businessmen were in the vanguard of social and economic progress in their
part of the country, but rather that employers were vulnerable to external
pressure and therefore made changes in personnel policy before their white
work force was willing to go along. Employers faced with loss of contracts
or legal action could and did enforce nondiscrimination and integration on
the line, but social pressure was frequently sufficient to maintain segregation in work-related facilities even after racial designation signs came
down. 51 By and large southern management believed that southern white
workers looked upon desegregation as inevitable. Employers thought white
workers would try to delay integration by every means at their disposal
but in the end would live with it. 52 And indeed there were examples of
successful integration of facilities in southern companies. Workers in a
southern industrial plant decided they would rather be clean than continue
to boycott an integrated shower,53 and textile plants in Alabama reported
that within a few weeks of integration in 1967 workers had ceased to use
the paper cups at drinking fountains and the disposable toilet covers in trr
rest rooms.54
The demands by employees for duplicate toilet facilities suggest trr
fear of sexual contact between races that frequently complicated attempts
to integrate employment. While the taboos against mixing the ra,'. es were
stronger in social than in economic activities, many white workers and
employers considered the mere presence of a member of the opposite sex
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and race a potential social hazard. In 1952 a small Charlotte, North
Carolina, manufacturer commented that he believed that Negro and white
men could work together and that Negro and white women could work
together, but that a white woman working with a black man would have
"lost something," would have "been degraded." 55 Even when employers
allowed blacks and whites to mix on the job they could demand that male
Negroes adopt a socially subordinate role in their contact with white
women. For example, a long-time black employee of an Atlanta insurance
firm was reprimanded for complimenting a white female employee on her
hairdo and for addressing her by her first name-as she had always addressed him. 56
Since whites were most willing to accept integration in employment
and least willing to accept it in purely social activities, 57 employers frequently feared that they would face their most difficult integration
challenge in those areas where the company sponsored social activities. 58
By and large, however, these fears seem to have been ungrounded. Company-sponsored athletic teams usually had no problem absorbing blacks.
The white bowlers of one midwestern firm even offered to dissolve their
team when they could not find a bowling alley that would allow blacks to
play.s9
Sexually mixed social activities were somewhat more of a problem,
but even at dances and dinners whites accepted the presence of blacks.
A survey of forty-four firms in the upper Midwest in 1949 indicated that
Negroes successfully participated in the social activities of 71 percent of
the companies. 60 However, the definition of "successful integration" has to
be understood in context. In the mid-fifties an executive of a New York
firm which "successfully" included Negroes in its social programs said,
"I don't think they mix socially. You have to draw the line. They brought
their own friends to the Christmas parties. They know their place."61
Perhaps because of the tradition of paternalism toward the Negro,
some southern firms allowed blacks to attend company social programs
during the 1950's before they would give them full job equality. 62 But after
1960 the solutions to the problem of social integration appear to have
polarized among southern firms . Firms which had traditionally sponsored
extravocational social programs either continued them with full black
participation or they were disbanded. One very thorough survey of management practices after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 indicated that many southern companies folded their social programs in the
face of employee resistance to black participation. 63 But at the same time
in the same states there were companies that successfully integrated parties,
picnics, luncheons, and dinner-dances with no employee opposition.64
During the late 1940's and the 1950's the personal racism of many

Opposition to Employment Integration: The Plant

67

employers prevented them from instituting fair employment policies.
Although such men sometimes used economic excuses to explain their discriminatory practices they were not in fact choosing the Capitalist Ethic
over the American Creed but were merely catering to their own personal
prejudices. Some of those employers who rejected blacks for reasons of
external racism were in fact projecting their own personal hates onto their
employees. Other employers, however, who might have personally accepted blacks, truly feared the costs of a negative reaction from their employees if they integrated. For these businessmen external racism was a
genuine economic threat which forced them to choose between their individual acceptance of the American Creed and the Capitalist Ethic which
prohibited unnecessary business disruption. This fear of friction between
blacks and whites was so strong that many employers attempted to maintain separation on the job and in plant facilities even after they had begun
to extend some measure of equal opportunity to Negroes.

5
Opposition to Employment Integration:
The Community

Even those businessmen who honestly believed that white workers
would seriously object to integration, and therefore claimed economic considerations prevented them from hiring blacks, were dissembling to some
extent. External racism on the part of employees was rarely strong enough
to significantly endanger company operations. After all, employers held
the ultimate economic whiphand over their employees, and businessmen
were not inclined to cater unduly to workers' whims except when they
coincided with the employers' own interests. Thus, with only an occasional
exception, when a strongly motivated employer put integration on a
"take it or leave it" basis, white workers were not willing to sacrifice their
livelihoods on the altars of bigotry.
While employers feared the reactions of those over whom they held
economic sway, they were even more afraid of the external racism of those
upon whom they were economically dependent-their customers and the
community at large. If a businessman were willing to fire a white employee
who openly opposed integration, the worker had to have a profound commitment to his racist values to undertake the personal disruption of leaving
one job and hoping to find another. However, the customer who objected
to blacks in a business had merely to walk into another firm and transact
his business there. While there was usually a high correlation between the
attitudes of the community and those of a company's employees, if there
were differences, the community attitudes had a much stronger impact on
business thought. From the perspective of the Capitalist Ethic the reaction
of customers was much more important than that of employees. While
the "customer is king" concept may have been overemphasized in the
perpetuation of the myth of free market capitalism, it was nevertheless
an important consideration in the minds of many businessmen, particularly
in the retail and service industries.1 Employers, always sensitive to their
customers' feelings, assumed that their patrons would object to Negroes
69
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dealing with them as equals and catering to their intimate personal needs. 2
The vice president of an Atlanta credit company explained that his firm
would not hire black investigators because it would be extremely embarrassing "for a white person to be asked personal questions about his friends
and their habits by a Negro." 3
Prior to 1960, many employers were so convinced that their customers
would reject Negro sales and service personnel that even firms with a black
clientele excluded blacks from their staffs. Despite the fact that Negro
organizations had been agitating for equal employment opportunity c:: t
least since the 1930's,4 many employers continued to insist that Negroe :
objected to being served by members of their own race. In fact , there are
a few substantiated cases of black customers objecting to Negro sales or
service personnel. In 1953 a Greensboro, North Carolina, furniture dealer
claimed that his uncle attempted to allow Negroes to run an outlet in a
black neighborhood, but that "not one of them called him to express
appreciation for having given this sales position to a Negro but many of
them complained to him for having sent a Negro to transact business with
them." 5 For the most part, however, managers merely assumed that their
black customers shared the values of the white society and would feel
demeaned if served by a Negro. In 1955 a Chicago insurance executive
predicted that if he "opened a Southside office in the Negro section and
hired Ralph Metcalf, Jackie Robinson or other famous Negro athletes to
work there, the Negroes wouldn' t gc there. " 6 And as late as 1962 an
Atlanta furniture store owner explained that in order to "satisfy customers
of both races white salespeople only are employed. " 7
As was so frequently the case in the history of American race relations, the black worker was discriminated against both coming and going.
If some employers who had black customers refus.ed to hire black salespeople because both their white and their black customers might object,
many more refused to hire black sales or service personnel because they
had few black customers and did not want to attract any. The general
opinion in the business community until well into the 1960's was that
Negroes could only be used to cater to Negro clientele.8 If there were
few or no potential black customers, then many businessmen shared the
attitude of a Chicago broker who could not understand "why we should
have to go.way down and look for employees from the Negroes when we
are able to reach out and hire the best in the community." 9
A 1953 article in the trade magazine Sales Management aptly illustrated the assumptions which limited business use of Negro sales and
service personnel. David J. Sullivan, a black marketing and management
consultant, discussed in some detail the hiring and use of black salesmen.
The entire article was predicated on the assumption that Negroes would
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only be used to sell to members of their own group: "To sell effectively to
retailers in Negro areas is it necessary to employ Negro salesmen? ... Do
retailers in Negro neighborhoods prefer a Negro or a white salesman to
call on them? ... The answer in both cases is 'yes' [sic]." Sullivan went on
to discuss the cultural uniqueness of the black community, and concluded
that only black salesmen could overcome the obstacles to profitable sales
in Negro neighborhoods. Nowhere in the article did Sullivan even hint
that blacks might be able to sell to whites. 10 The idea that Negro sales and
service personnel should be used primarily with Negro customers continued to exert great influence on employers into the mid-sixties, especially
in the South. As late as 1963, Negro baseball star and businessman Jackie
Robinson encouraged businessmen to hire more blacks sales people by
emphasizing, "you will demonstrate to the Negro consumer that you want
his business ... [and] you will find you have won the consumer loyalty of
the Negro." 11
Employers based their fears of customers' objections to black sales
people on the same stereotypes which made employers fear their employees' opposition to blacks. Employers widely held, for example, that
Negro men could not serve in any position which brought them into contact with white women, especially in the woman's home. In Columbus,
Ohio, the manager of an office of a large life insurance company agreed
in 1952 that Negro policyholders and employees should not be forced to
do business in a special segregated office. Despite his inclination toward
equal treatment, however, the manager resisted the suggestion that black
men be used as premium collectors. He said that collectors called at the
homes of policyholders and that they dealt mostly with white married
women whose husbands would object and whose neighbors would talk if a
Negro man visited them during the day. 12
Employers' fears, of course, were not entirely unfounded. The
Columbia, South Carolina, branch of a national retail firm, somewhat
atypically, used a black appliance repairman as early as 1952. During one
of his house calls a white woman accused him of "frightening her." The
man was brought to trial (the specific charges are unclear) and was found
innocent only after his supervisor interceded on his behalf. The store itself
assuaged the woman's fright with two hundred dollars and started keeping
a file of complimentary letters on all its Negro employees to use in such
cases in the future. 13 A similar incident occurred in 1954 in Chicago, when
an investigating company which had been using Negroes in Negro neighborhoods decided to use them in white areas as well. Not only did the
clientele object, but one of their men was picked up by the police on a
loitering charge after a woman complained about him being in a white
section of town.14
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Throughout the 1950's, in both the North and South businessmen believed the public still would not accept the implementation of the American Creed and they invariably sought justification in the Capitalist Ethic.
In every kind of retail and service industry and in many manufacturing
firms, the response to the question of integration was the same-"our
customers would object and we would lose business." The comments in
1952 of a man who was later to become one of the South's leading spokesmen for moderation and integration are indicative of the depth of potential opposition to black sales people. Not only did this Atlanta businessman personally reject the idea of hiring Negro stenographers, but he said
that if Rich's (the leading Atlanta department store) "put on a Negro
sales girl I would never let my wife shop in that store again .... " He went
on to bolster his self-proclaimed position as "a long way ahead of the
others ... and a southern liberal" by praising Booker T. Washington's
accommodationist Cotton States Exposition speech. 15
It need hardly be said here that, for the most part, the fears of massive
customer resistance in the North were unfounded. Stores which placed
blacks in sales positions rarely experienced sufficient public disapproval to
even warrant mentioning. A few dissatisfied customers occasionally cancelled charge accounts and there were isolated incidents of unpleasantness,
but by far the vast majority of employers discovered that the public was
much more willing to accept Negro sales people than they were. 16
It appears that both southern employers and southern consumers were
slower to accept black sales personnel than northerners. Large numbers of
southern employers continued to use customer nonacceptance as an excuse
for not hiring blacks, at least until the passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Interviews with numerous businessmen in Atlanta, Georgia, during
the early 1960's disclosed widespread agreement that firms would lose
white business if they employed blacks in customer contact positions. 17
Atlanta firms that had begun to integrate in 1962 were reluctant to advertise their activity for fear of alienating, or further alienating, their
customers. 18 They need not have been. Under pressure from boycotts and
sit-ins a group of almost a dozen stores in the city hired their first Negro
sales help during the Christmas rush of 1962 and received no adverse
public reactions. 19 The following year the manager of a home-delivery
bakery not only agreed to hire his first black routemen, but also agreed to
assign them without regard to the racial makeup of the neighborhoods,
thus breaking the taboo against black men calling on white housewives.20
By the mid-sixties many national firms had begun to use Negro outside salesmen without regard to the race of their potential customers.
Public attitudes had changed to the point where Negro salesmen in the
North and Midwest were in a position to tap the guilt feelings which a

Opposition to Employment Integration: The Community

73

hundred years of agitation against the evils of discrimination had cultivated. White customers were frequently eager to give orders to black men
as a way of demonstrating their freedom from prejudice. 21 Nevertheless,
even among the supposedly sophisticated and progressive giants of American industry old stereotypes continued to play a role in determining
personnel policies. At the end of the 1960's, steel executives still felt that
Negroes were generally so socially unacceptable that they could not be
hired as salesmen because "certain social contacts away from a business
place are important. For example, a salesman may be expected to take his
client to dinner or discuss a contract over cocktails at a private club. " 22
Internal racism, that is, personal employer bigotry, was the first possible barrier to black employment. But even when they accepted the
American Creed many businessmen rejected employment integration because of external racism from the white employees and customers. Public
opposition to integration was the final category of external racism which
stood in the way of black employment. The public can be defined as those
people who, though not necessarily the firm's customers, influenced the
social, political, and economic climate in which the company operated.
Although businessmen frequently equated specific powerful local figures
with the public, they could also mean the more amorphous collection of
customs, social patterns, mores, and habits which established the intangible
real boundaries of corporate action.
The businessman who molded his actions to fit public opinion could
not cite the immediate costs or profits of integrating. Nevertheless, the
Capitalist Ethic underlay business decisions based on conformity to local
values. The atmosphere of community respect and goodwill so necessary
to smooth day-to-day operations was a product of good local citizenship,
and that meant adhering to community hiring patterns. Two surveys
taken a decade apart disclosed that when businessmen did integrate they
counted "public image" and "favorable community relations" as the
most important benefits gained from employing Negroes. 23
The search for public approval was indicative of the secondary role
the American Creed played in the businessman's decision-making process. Even when the employer personally accepted the ideal of equal
opportunity and believed he could surmount the obstacles of employee
and customer opposition, the fear that he might offend some vague community standard was frequently enough to preclude black employment.
In such situations the businessman played a passive role and allowed
social forces to determine the timing and extent of integration. By remaining morally neutral the management of the company followed what it
perceived as the path of least resistance. Such a stand gave maximum
weight to organized power blocs within the community during times of
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social flux, and maximum weight to local social patterns during times of
stability.
Because of their monopolistic status, public utilities offer a unique
illustration of the relationship between public opinion and the Capitalist
Ethic. Even though they were frequently among the first companies in a
region to hire Negroes in nontraditional jobs, the utilities consistently
soft-pedaled their pioneering during the 1950's. In 1950, a midwestern
telephone company refused to allow the American Friends Service Committee to use it as an example of successful integration because they
feared that other businessmen would accuse them of pioneering only
because they were a monopoly that did not have to face competition.24
On the other hand, those utilities which refused to integrate placed great
emphasis on their vulnerability, as controlled monopolies, to public opinion. In 1952, an eastern telephone company fired a newly hired black
girl because white employees objected to her. Their personnel man explained that the white objections were indicative of public sentiment
and that "a public utility could not crusade, nor could it be far behind
nor too far ahead of the general community feeling. "25
During the 1950's public opinion in the North shifted sufficiently to
become a force for, rather than against, integration. In 1955 conservative businessmen in Indianapolis cited the "favorable climate" as the
reason for initial black employment. 26 Those employers who continued to
resist integration were less able to hide behind the Capitalist Ethic. Racism
could no longer be cloaked in acceptable economic terms, and businessmen began to experience the conflict of values that arose when violations
of the American Creed went unjustified. A group of Columbus, Ohio,
businessmen who had previously been able to hold off the demands of
black pressure groups became "scared to death" when white groups
began pushing for equal employment opportunity in 1953. They were
afraid that there was a major movement behind the fair employment
drive which would "some day bring forth a big editorial or publicity
about their ,policy of discrimination. " 27 By 1958, the mood of the country
outside of the Deep South had moderated enough to allow how-to-do-it
b9oks on employment integration to discuss the pros as well as the cons
of publicizing steps toward equal employment opportunity. 28
In the South, where segregation and discrimination had not only
been a long sanctioned historical practice, but where formal ideological
justification for discrimination also existed, employers were likely to
attribute discrimination to "local custom." Local custom reflected not
only the desires of the dominant segment of society (not always the
majority in the South), but also the quasi-legal mores of race relations
to which all citizens were expected to conform. 29 Southern employers
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were fully aware during the early fifties that change was in the offing,
and many of them expressed their willingness to begin hiring blacks
when the time came-but not until then.
Even when national companies hired integrated work forces in their
plants outside the South, local custom dominated their employment patterns below the Mason-Dixon Line. In 1954 a manufacturer of electrical
equipment decided to open a plant in Raleigh, North Carolina. The
industrial relations manager reported that the city's responsible citizens,
"and I don't mean Rotary and Kiwanis," demanded that the firm agree
to abide by the city's segregated employment practices. The company
had three options: 1) not to move to the city, 2) move, but refuse to abide
by local patterns, and 3) move and knuckle under. It chose the third
option and operated under the constant scrutiny of the city's first citizens,
who made sure that the firm towed the color line. 30
When a businessman was confronted by public opinion, either from
common citizens or from pillars of the community, he was dealing with a
tangible situation. The employer could judge the impact of his integration activity through community feed-back and adjust his policy accordingly. So long as the Capitalist Ethic took precedence over the American
Creed, public opinion was the final arbiter of whether or not to integrate.
However, public opinion could change without the employer realizing
it, and, as long as there was no pressure for integration, many businessmen
clung to policies which were no longer demanded by community mores.
Such employers were tradition-bound. A survey of more than one thousand discriminatory firms by a special Pennsylvania commission in 1953
revealed that well over a third of them listed "tradition" as the cause of
their discriminatory policies. 31 The report did not disclose what the
firms meant by "tradition," but it is possible that in the early fifties some
of them may have been entirely innocent of any conscious effort to exclude blacks from their firms. An Indianapolis insurance executive expressed surprise in 1952 when an equal employment opportunity worker
asked why he had no black clerical workers. The manager said it had
simply never occurred to him to ask that question. He had no answer,
and he promised to begin actively looking for Negro clerical employees. 32
For firms like these, discrimination did not exist because of a conscious decision on the part of management not to hire blacks but rather
was the result of a failure of management to make a firm policy in favor of
fair employment. As soon as such firms realized that no cost was involved
in living up to the American Creed, the low-key, low-pressure tactics of
pro-fair employment groups, including the usually circumspect activity
of state FEPc's during the 1950's, were frequently strong enough to prompt
them to adopt a formal fair employment policy. Tradition-bound corn-

76

Black Men and Businessmen

panies usually existed in northern industrial states where public opinion
had come to oppose discrimination. In many cases it took only a minor
incident to bring the shift in public opinion to the company's attention. 33
A closely related, but somewhat different set of rationalizations and
justifications came into play when the businessman perceived his role not
as one of passive response to public opinion or community standards, but
as a creative force within the community. Ideally, employers liked to limit
their community leadership to broadly acceptable activities, such as support for charities, education, and noncontroversial civic improvement.
Thus, there would be no conflict between a businessman's role as a power
in the community and his need for good public relations. The equal employment issue placed the employer on the horns of a dilemma. While
Negro employment was clearly a problem that called for decisive business
leadership, it also threatened to expose the employer to adverse publicity
no matter what he did, either from the opponents or proponets of employment integration. Joseph Ross, a Detroit department store executive,
explained that the businessman had ''been trained all of his life in the
tradition of his craft to be a useful citizen in his community, but never to
get involved in controversial issues. " 34 Faced with the unavoidably controversial issue of fair employment, during the 1950's businessmen usually
decided that they owed greater allegiance to the patterns of the local community than to the ideal of the American Creed-at least when it came
to hiring blacks.
Even when equal employment was required by law, the extent to
which employers hired blacks was almost invariably determined by the
prevailing racial attitudes of the local community. Very rare were men
like the manager of an Indianapolis variety store who said that he was a
citizen of the company, not a citizen of the community, and would abide
by community patterns only to the extent necessary to maximize profits. 35
Much more common were remarks like, "our recruitment has been limited
to white workers because of the responsibility we owe this community." 36
In 1953, when one of the nation's largest steel corporations was challenged
by black leaders to do something about discrimination in the Philadelphia
area the company assured them that it wanted to be a good neighbor and
work along with residents and other businesses in the area. But the company made quite clear that because of its size and the potential impact of
any of its decisions on the community, it would not take the lead in pushing to end discrimination.37
Except for instances in which the business community feared economic disruption, employers usually opposed attempts to alter community
race relations patterns. The urge to conform to community patterns of
employment was so strong that even firms which pioneered in placing
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Negroes, thus deviating from the accepted norm, expressed their policy in
conservative rather than liberal terms. International Harvester, which in
fact did break community patterns, albeit cautiously, privately admitted
that "when they went into a community they studied very carefully what
other business practices were, then I. H. went just as far in its integration
as the most progressive company in that vicinity and then just a little
farther." 38 In public statements, however, this policy was interpreted as
meaning that "when Inte·r national Harvester enters a new community its
plant adopts policies generally in consonance with community patterns. " 39
A series of events at the end of 1963 served to focus public attention
on the problem of the corporate role in the community. In September, the
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) accused the United
States Steel Corporation, along with a number of other Birmingham,
Alabama, employers, of encouraging by silence the racial violence that had
recently led to the bombing of a church and to the death of four black
children there. 40 sNcc's charges were followed four days later by a similar
accusation from Charles Morgan, Jr., a Birmingham lawyer. Morgan told a
Yale University audience that Roger M. Blough, chairman of the board of
U.S. Steel (and a graduate of Yale Law School), could telephone Alabama's governor, George C. Wallace, and tell him, "frankly, a) the Birmingham schools aren't good enough and b) the Negro children should be
admitted by nightfall... ." 41 Within a week groups were picketing U.S.
Steel's office in New York City. 42
Under the threat of contract cancellation from the federal government, Tennessee Coal & Iron, the U.S. Steel division in Birmingham, had
begun to eliminate some of the more blatant forms of anti-Negro discrimination practiced in its plant, such as its dual seniority system. However, Arthur V. Wiebel, president of Tennessee Coal & Iron, rejected
suggestions that he exert pressure within the business community and the
city to ease racial tension. Wiebel and other businessmen did talk with
government conciliators and sign a newspaper advertisement calling for
the employment of black policemen. 43 But on the one hand Wiebel claimed
that U .S. Steel did not have much economic power in the community, and
on the other he insisted that the firm would not do anything "because the
minute that would happen, people would say: 'There's U.S. Steel trying
to run Birmingham.' " 44 Roger Blough backed up Wiebel at a news conference when he stated, "for a corporation to attempt to exert any kind
of economic compulsion to achieve a particular end in the social area
seems to be quite beyond what a corporation can do. " 45 Despite encouragement from newspapers and the President of the United States, the
company stuck to its position that "any attempt by a private organization
like U.S. Steel to impose its views, its beliefs and its will upon the com-
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munity by resorting to economic compulsion or coercion would be repugnant to our American constitutional concept. ... " 46
While it may be questionable whether Roger Blough actually refused
to exert his influence in Birmingham because of constitutional scruples, at
least he cannot be accused of hypocrisy. Neither U.S. Steel nor its representatives were in the forefront of the drive for economic civil rights or in
the movement to promote social consciousness among businessmen. The
same, however, cannot be said of the Crown-Zellerbach Corporation. For
a number of years in the mid-sixties this San Francisco-based paper company was one of the important big business advocates of increased black
employment. James P. Mitchell, Secretary of Labor in the Eisenhower
administration, an important, socially concerned businessman and a senior
vice president of Crown-Zellerbach, became a leading spokesman not only
for extending equality to Negroes but for actively going out to recruit
and train qualifiable Negroes. Mitchell based his advocacy on a number of
the standard arguments: it was morally and socially right, it would under•
cut radical demonstrators, and it was cheaper than other methods of
solving the problem. 47 As the head of a special committee appointed by the
mayor to study the problem of Negro employment in San Francisco,
Mitchell had recommended that the mayor establish another commission
to set up a privately financed training program. 48
Mitchell's stand brought him and his company widespread recognition in the firm 's home city. By 1964 northern white attitudes had changed
to the point where people not only accepted equal employment opportunity but could applaud Crown-Zellerbach's call for extra assistance to help
blacks achieve economic equality. However, when faced with a much
cruder form of discrimination, in a much less enlightened environment,
Crown-Zellerbach's vaunted liberalism failed to materialize. At precisely
the same time that Mitchell was exhorting his colleagues in the Bay Area
to go the second mile, Crown-Zellerbach was trying to turn its back on the
racial problems of Bogalusa, Louisiana. Crown-Zellerbach had acquired
its Bogalusa plant in 1955. For almost ten years it maintained segregated
facilities and separate lines of promotion for blacks and whites. Not until
the federal government began to put pressure on the company did it slowly
and reluctantly begin to alter its discriminatory practices. 49
Crown-Zellerbach's reluctant acquiescence to the fair employment
demands of the federal government may have been less impressive than the
company's West Coast rhetoric, but it was positively radical compared to
the firm's response to racial upheaval in the city of Bogalusa. Bogalusa
had chosen to ignore the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and Crown-Zellerbach,
which provided 70 percent of the town's income, chose to stand back while
the Ku Klux Klan intimidated the few whites who supported the law.
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Not until word of Crown-Zellerbach's callousness got back to San Fran•
cisco, where public pressure was exerted against the company, did the
firm express its support for equal rights for all citizens in Bogalusa. Violence continued in Bogalusa, and the company continued to hide within its
shell, insisting that civil rights were a community not a company responsibility. so
The Congress of Racial Equality, which had come to Bogalusa to help
the black com_munity gain its rights under the Civil Rights Act, instilled a
new militancy in the people. In early 1965, the company which had only
recently desegregated its water fountains, suddenly found itself confronted with a black work force that challenged the firm, not in the com•
munity, but within its own walls. The company may have been reluctant
to act outside of its immediate jurisdiction, although it apparently would
when sufficient pressure was brought to bear, but when blacks started
protesting Crown-Zellerbach's employment patterns the firm could no
longer hide behind claims of corporate noninvolvement in civic affairs.
Demands by the black community for improved job conditions overflowed
into general civic disorder which ended only after the home office sent one
of its vice presidents to Bogalusa to oversee negotiations with the protesters. Robert F. Collins, a lawyer for the black protest group, announced
"the real issue is what, if anything, the company is willing to do to compensate for the past discrimination. To merely say that at this point you are
going to be fair is not enough." 51 The company, whose northern spokesman had been nationally honored for his calls for hiring qualifiable blacks,
was reportedly "appalled" at this suggestion. The company, whose
northern spokesman had urged his fellow businessmen to act in order to
forestall government action, responded to southern demands for better
economic treatment with the comment, "This company cannot be expected to solve these problems by itself. The government will have to lay
down industry guidelines. "52
The U.S. Steel and Crown-Zellerbach incidents illustrate the difficulties faced by firms when they attempted to reconcile their internal employment policies, the demands and expectations of their immediate community, changing national standards, and the requirements of governmental bodies. Executives of both companies had refused voluntarily to
intervene on behalf of blacks in the community. When circumstances
forced them to contend with the de facto power they wielded, they both
chose to deny the obvious and retreat behind ideological arguments for
noninvolvement. Writing in Harper's, David G. Wood, himself a steel
executive, called U.S. Steel to task for failing to act. Using the same argument Crown-Zellerbach used in San Francisco, but not in Bogalusa, Wood
called on industry to move ahead, both inside and outside the plant. If they
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did not, Wood warned, businessmen were inviting government interference
into the conduct of business "in a situation where it is right and we are
wrong." 53
Wood was only one of a number of voices that began to call for increased corporate participation in the social affairs of the community in
the mid-sixties. Some of the calls for business involvement were extensions of business' safe and long-accepted role as a mainstay of the Community Chest and a governmental ally in making noncontroversial civic
improvements.54 More socially concerned employers, however, denounced
individual action and called for corporate commitment to solving the
community's social problems. In 1967, Elisha Gray, chairman of the board
of the Whirlpool Corporation, said,
We businessmen can put together more sheer power for good or for evil than
all the rest of the elements of the community combined. Our, call it influence,
call it clout, by any name it is the ability to get things done. Most of us, however, and you can include me until recently, have not wanted to throw our
weight around. We have not felt it the province of business to get into social
problems. Whatever personal comfort you may get from the individual approach it won't do a thing toward curing problems of such great dimensions.
I believe the job can only be done by organized, unanimous, mass assault by
businessmen.ss

As government and public pressure grew during the 1960's firms
increasingly began to ignore local custom and started to emphasize their
responsibilities to a constituency beyond their immediate community.
This new found sense of national social responsibility reflected the changed
relationship of the Capitalist Ethic and the American Creed. The black
revolution of the early 1960's and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made it
economically wise to adhere to the American Creed. Leadership suddenly
became a practical policy. Companies began to take positions like that of
the Caterpillar Tractor Company, which told its management, "we should
be prepared to contribute strong leadership to community endeavors to
alleviate the long years of injustices which exist for so many minority
group people." 56 Thus businessmen brought pressure on their own to extend open housing to blacks in Chicago,57 lobbied for open housing legislation in Delaware, 58 put pressure on the directors of local recreation facilities to extend equal treatment to blacks, 59 and generally began making
themselves visible in areas traditionally considered outside the proper
sphere of business. Things had gone so far by 1967 that Edward C.
Logelin, Chicago regional vice president of U.S. Steel, told a college business symposium, "more and more business is finding it must be concerned
with other than its commercial aspects .. . . The problems [of society] cannot be solved by government alone, but rather the private sector will have
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to supply many of the answers and all of the wealth that will be required." 60 U.S. Steel had at least learned the rhetoric of the new era.
After 1960, leadership, that is, a willingness to be first, became a popular virtue in the eyes of businessmen. But prior to the Kennedy administration even businessmen who fully accepted the importance of the American Creed (with some important exceptions which will be discussed in
later chapters) were afraid to be the first to employ blacks. In a confidential interview in 1955, one of the nation's most important management
consultants observed that "most businessmen are not bigots, but they are
cowards. " 61
A detailed consideration of the variables responsible for a firm assuming the leadership role in equal employment are beyond the scope of this
study. However, as far as businessmen themselves were concerned, company size, length of time in the community, and sometimes the nature of
its ownership seem to have been the most important factors in determining
an employer's willingness to pioneer. 62
While large corporations were not necessarily in the forefront of
social innovation, throughout the 1950's small businesses often waited for
larger companies to take the lead in nondiscriminatory employment, and
the limited available data indicate that larger companies were more likely
to begin hiring Negroes than smaller firms. 63 The personnel director of a
small Chicago packing house indicated in 1951 that he would like to promote blacks to supervisory positions but did not dare proceed until the
large meat packing companies began doing so. 64 Similar views were held by
many managers of smaller businesses, including the president of a Columbus, Ohio, bank who refused to employ blacks because it would be "highly
contrary to established Columbus tradition ... until some of the larger
banks had made a move first. " 65 On the other hand, there were firms, like
U.S. Steel in Birmington, which claimed they would not act precisely because they were dominant and did not want to be accused of trying to
control the town.
The herd instinct is strong in the business community. No employer
likes to break a new trail into controversial areas, but once a pioneer indicates a new direction many other employers are eager to follow his lead.
Virtually all organized efforts to crack the employment barrier attempted
to exploit the businessman's propensity to follow by holding up to reluctant firms examples of successful employment integration. 66 Where
leaders existed who were willing to be used as examples, this technique
could be very successful since many employers quite consciously modeled
themselves after the most progressive firm in town. 67
In his study of department store integration in Minneapolis-St. Paul
during the late forties, Robert 0. Blood, Jr., found that when one com-
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pany advanced a Negro to a job above the generally accepted level for
blacks other firms usually followed suit. Blood referred to this process as
the "domino theory of employment breakthrough." 68 For the theory to
work, not only did the dominoes have to be lined up, but the first one had
to fall, or be pushed over. The first domino frequently had a very broad
base and was not easily tipped. Indianapolis department stores were under
pressure to upgrade Negro employees after 1951, when they began losing
black workers to Indiana Bell Telephone and to the Finance Department
of the Army which maintained a large office in that city. 69 In May of 1952,
the personnel manager of one of the city's major department stores determined that the time had come to hire blacks as sales clerks. He had the
reputation of being an "excellent combination of idealist and realist," and
other managers had said that when he began hiring Negroes they would
know that the time had come for action. The personnel manager took his
leadership role in the business community quite seriously but preferred to
give another store the opportunity to be the first in the city to move on this
particular issue. He devised a plan whereby the other store would place a
black worker on the selling floor on Monday morning and he would follow
on Tuesday. He believed that a third store would then be willing to employ
black sales people on Wednesday. 70
The other stores were not willing to conspire to integrate. They
played Alphonse to the first store's Gaston, and nothing happened during
the first part of the summer. Because the first store had always dominated
patterns of retail conduct in Indianapolis, other employers refused to
budge until it acted. 71 An American Friends Service Committee field
worker in Indianapolis then accused the personnel man of the key firm of
being "the greatest single obstacle to integration in the city. " This charge
apparently stung, and the personnel man showed the accusatory letter to
the store's president. The president manfully suggested that the integration take place while he was on vacation. That way there would be no way
of appealing the decision up the line. 72
On September 16, 1952, the personnel manager announced at a meeting of the merchants association that two Negro sales clerks were starting
work that morning. He explained that he had held off, hoping that someone else would move first so that his store would not always get the credit
for being the most progressive firm in town, but since none of them would,
he felt compelled to take the step.
Other companies in Indianapolis were favorably impressed by the
experience of the pioneer, and within three months the Indianapolis outlet
of a major national chain had promoted two blacks, one to head its service
station, and one to a sales position in the store. The other two of the three
big department stores in Indianapolis were a bit slow to come around, and
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the personnel manager of the pioneering store jocularly, but significantly,
teased their management as "being slow in recognizing that a new community pattern had taken place," to which one of them responded that he
himself would begin employing blacks within a month. 73
The pattern of integration in the department stores of Minneapolis-St.
Paul, Indianapolis, and Chicago demonstrated the importance of leadership, albeit reluctantly assumed leadership, in breaking with tradition. The
inaction of the banks of Chicago is a good example of how the failure on
the part of any businessman to take the lead could greatly impair progress.
As early as 1950, one Chicago bank which did a large amount of business
in the black community began hiring Negroes, but the president of the
institution did no proselytizing himself and would not let his bank be used
as an example by groups who were attempting to get other banks to adopt
fair employment practice. 74 In 1952, a second Chicago bank hired its first
Negro white-collar worker. It had been the subject of extensive pressure
from the black community which had exploited the bank's close ties to
the labor movement to embarass it into employing blacks.75 Since the
situations of both banks were atypical, neither constituted a precedent for
the rest of the financial community.
At a meeting of Chicago bank personnel directors in 1952, those
present agreed that when the time came they would all hire blacks simultaneously, but they could not agree on when the time would come. The
vice president of the most important bank in Chicago, the institution
which could set the pattern for the industry, refused to employ Negroes
because he believed if he changed his policy the other banks would feel
morally committed to follow him, and he certainly did not want to run
the risk of being labeled a moral leader.76 Two years later, despite constant requests from the black communi,ty and fair employment groups,
Chicago area banks had still refused to hire blacks. Banks in outlying
areas said that they were waiting for downtown banks. Middle-sizeg Loop
banks said they were waiting for the industry leaders, and the industry
leaders dragged out all the excuses in the book to explain why they were
not ready to integrate. They feared their employees would object. They
feared their customers would object. Negroes had too high a crime rate,
and too many of them were on relief, and if the banks gave them jobs they
would just attract more undesirable black immigrants from the South.
Management said that such a controversial step had to be initiated by
the banks' boards of directors, and the members of the boards said that it
was an operational matter which should be decided by management. 77
Finally in the spring of 1955, the bank which had previou·sly refused
to integrate because it did not want to exert undue moral pressure on its
fellows began hiring blacks in nontraditional jobs. The bank had been
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under fire from various Chicago organizations since 1950. The Urban
League, the American Friends Service Committee, and the Chicago Commission on Human Relations had all approached, cajoled, and threatened
the institution, but to no avail. The deciding factors apparently were "a
gentle prod by government people" and a meeting with executives from
similar institutions throughout the nation, many of whom had successfully
employed Negroes for some years and wondered why their Chicago counterpart had not acted. 78 Like the management of the first two pioneers,
the leaders of the third bank to integrate refused to urge similar action
on their colleagues. Each bank had started an equal employment policy for
internal reasons, and while they might have been able to bring pressure
on other banks, their managers apparently valued their friendships with
other bankers too highly to endanger these relationships with social pressure. 79
The blame for the resistance of the Chicago financial community to
integration cannot be laid entirely at the feet of the three pioneering
institutions. One of the most influential of the Loop banks was controlled
by an ardent racist, 80 and other internal factors undoubtedly played a part
in preventing the dominoes from falling. The failure of the pioneers to be
leaders also was extremely important. The pioneers were so circumspect
about their employment policies that the neighbor bank of one of them
could explain his lack of black workers by pointing out that because the
bank's owners were Jewish they had to be extremely conservative and
"conform to the standards set by other large banks in the community,"
even though an integrated bank was located next door. 81 It was not until
1957 that some of the more important downtown banks began to hire
Negroes. This was more than seven years after the first breakthrough, and
almost three years after the second. 82
The emergence of plans for cooperative action to achieve integration
simultaneously among businesses reflected the businessman's fear of
moving ahead of his colleagues in the controversial area of equal employment. Both the Indianapolis retail stores and the Chicago banks made
abortive attempts to coordinate the introduction of black workers. This
hide-in-the-crowd approach had wide business support and was recommended by some integrationist advocates. 83 In the 1950's employers as
divergent as a Philadelphia banker and a North Carolina shoe manufacturer called for coordinated action in order to protect individual employers
from customer retaliation and from the charge of breaking local custom. 84
Even in the mid-sixties the President's Committee on Equal Employment
Opportunity proposed this technique of unified action to persuade reluctant southern employers to comply with the law.85 It was not, for the most
part, until after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, that company
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executives occasionally felt brave enough to take the position of the corporate personnel manager of Owens-Illinois who said, "We hope to chart
an independent course of our own so that we will be ahead-a little bit
ahead-of the law and the average company. We would like to be two or
three years ahead of the times but not twenty. " 86
Even when businessmen personally accepted the idea of fair employment and believed they could overcome objections that might arise within
the plant, they frequently still refused to employ blacks out of fear of
community opposition. Basically businessmen viewed themselves as chips
floating on the stream of society. They sought to follow the strongest currents of customer response, public opinion, community mores, and colleague reaction, rather than attempt to risk the danger of being swamped
by moving against the tide.

6
The Rationale of Integration

Between the end of World War II and the beginning of the Kennedy
administration, increasing numbers of firms reluctantly and slowly began
to employ Negroes and advance black workers to positions previously
barred to them. While personal and external racism were sufficiently strong
to prevent the majority of employers from hiring blacks, nevertheless the
trend during the late 1940's and 1950's was toward larger numbers of
blacks in better jobs. The improving Negro employment situation was
based, to a large extent, on factors beyond the control of the business community. State FEPC laws, increasing federal pressure for equal employment, the manpower shortage of the Korean War, and a growing public
demand for fair treatment of blacks all forced businessmen to reconsider
their stands on black employment.
Whether or not there were compelling practical or economic reasons
to integrate, an important segment of the business community sought to
develop a rationale for integration which would explain the changing pattern of Negro employment in terms of morality, ethics, and the American
Creed of fair treatment and equal opportunity for all citizens. Pioneering
employers of the 1950's, more than any other group of businessmen, had
to come to grips with the full implications of the American Creed. Even
when the motivation for black employment was more practical than ideological, large numbers of pioneers seized the American Creed as the most
satisfying justification for their change in policy. For the businessman with
a strong personal commitment to human equality, the American Creed
stood as legitimate in its own right. But for the employer who was under
pressure from forces besides his conscience, the American Creed provided
that wonderful little extra which transformed a mere business decision into
an act of Christian virtue and an affirmation of the American dream.
The single most important factor in the liberalization of hiring policies
after World War II was the adoption of state fair employment practice
laws. By and large, businessmen opposed the passage of these laws 1 and
87
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were less than enthusiastic in complying with them once they were passed.
Yet, in those states that had strong enforcement procedures (usually also
an indication of strong popular support for the FEPC laws) businesses did
begin to grant equal employment to job applicants. In 1948 the American
Friends Service Committee (AFSC) drew up a list of corporations which
had good reputations for fair employment. Of the sixteen firms on the list,
fourteen were located in New York State (nine of those in New York
City), one was in New Jersey, and one was in Chicago. New York and
New Jersey both had very strong antidiscrimination laws, and the Chicago
firm, International Harvester, was a national leader in the movement for
integrated employment. 2
New York led the way both legislatively and in terms of public attitudes
which made it comparatively easy for New York businessmen to employ
blacks. In other states, without strong FEPC laws and with more public
antipathy toward integration, employers who allowed Negroes to pierce
the job ceiling could not protect themselves from criticism under the
aegis of legislation. In the period before the legal and popular pressure of
the civil rights revolution, many pioneering businessmen justified their unorthodox employment practices on ideological grounds.
The American Creed was the most important ideological argument
businessmen used to defend their employment of Negroes. The discrepancy
between the American Creed3 and the actual treatment of Negroes became
particularly evident during World War II. When the wartime FEPC forced
a New Haven firm to hire Negroes, management told the white workers,
"millions of American boys of all races, colors and creeds are now fighting
shoulder to shoulder to rid the world of a system which is based on racial
intolerance and the crushing of personal liberty." The company explained
that many of the same undemocratic tendencies existed in the United
States, even in New Haven, but that industry could "do more than any
other single agency to contribute to a solution by showing its willingness
to employ those who are best qualified for employment opportunities."4
Black men are dying in a war against racist totalitarianism; how can we
then deny them equal job opportunity in the war effort at home?-this was
a standard, and frequently telling, argument which employers used to convince their employees to accept black coworkers. 5
While many businessmen used justifications based on democratic philosophy when explaining why they employed Negroes during World War II,
references to the American Creed were usually window dressing for the
more cogent pressures of the wartime FEPC and the manpower shortage. 6
The three-step procedure developed by a West Coast aircraft company to
try to calm white workers when they objected to new black employees
demonstrated the reality of legal compulsion which lay beneath the ideo-
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logical facade of the American Creed. First, the company used the stock
"black soldiers are dying" argument, to which it added that the company
needed black manpower to help the home-front war effort. Second, the firm
made a humanitarian appeal to the whites, explaining that "they have to
have money to buy food and clothing just as we do." If these two somewhat abstract appeals were not sufficient grounds to accept the new black
workers, the management pointed out that Executive Order 8802 forced
the company to stop discriminating and declared that any employee who
objected would be fired. 7
The wartime rhetoric of patriotism and democracy may have been a
convenient facade to cover up the actual compulsory sources of integration,
but there was too much truth in the moral arguments for them to lapse
along with Executive Order 8802 at the end of the war. William F. Rasche
warned the Milwaukee Employers Association in 1946 not to slip back
into prewar discriminatory employment habits. Among other reasons,
Rasche explained "that in a world in which the combined populations of
all the countries on the globe consist of colored and white people in the
ratio of two to one, we will sacrifice our position of world leadership if
we fail to practice our principles of American freedom and justice at
home." 8
The antifascist patriotism of the war quickly became anticommunist
patriotism in the postwar years. Those who opposed equal employment
legislation sometimes branded its proponents communist. 9 Occasionally
those who advocated voluntary fair employment were also viewed as dangerously left. The president of an insurance company told an AFSC field
worker in 1952 that talk "about helping businessmen find pioneer placements . . . was a fine way to introduce subversive people into a business"
and that for all he knew the field worker might even be a communist. 10
However, it was also common to find businessmen espousing integration
as a method of fighting communism. The American Creed of equal opportunity was in theory, if not in fact, the human corollary of the free market
and was therefore theoretically anticommunist. However, like the arguments which stressed patriotism during World War II, arguments emphasizing anticommunism during the Cold War appear to have been mostly
the payment of lip service to the prevailing mood. It is unusual to find
records of businessmen who advocated the anticommunist approach in
private. When the national personnel director of a large mail order house
did mention anticommunism in a private discussion in 1950, he did so not
in terms of his own personal convictions but rather as a suggested method
of most efficiently reaching other businessmen. 11
If there was a dearth of private comment favoring integration as a
way to stem the red tide, there was a surfeit of it in published sources.
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Supporters of FEPC in the state of Washington in 1949 tried to convince
the legislature that communists wanted the bill defeated because it would
deprive them of a valuable source of propaganda. 12 Throughout the Truman and Eisenhower administrations supporters of economic equality for
blacks, whether through legislation or through voluntary action, commonly
exploited the fear of communism in advocating their cause. 13 As late as
1960, Frank M. Folsom, president of RCA, said that "job discrimination
against any of our people on the basis of race or creed weakens us in the
face of adversaries who would destroy our democratic system." 14
Anticommunist arguments for fair employment picked up logically
where antifascist arguments had left off. During both World War II and
the Cold War patriotic arguments directed against the nation's enemies
served to link the essentially conservative ideals of nationalism with the
progressive values of employment integration. Moreover, by taking the
offensive, fair employment proponents tried to stop short those who
attacked their cause as disruptive and communistic. However, the concern
with tying fair employment to the antired bandwagon was as much a
public relations maneuver as an expression of business ideology.
By the standards of the 1970's the actions of pioneering fair employers
personally committed to the American Creed appear to have been halfhearted tokenism. Their policy of hiring an extremely limited number of
blacks, frequently overqualified, did not even attempt to meet the fundamental problem of mass unemployment and underemployment in the
black community. But those business pioneers in the forties and fifties were
far ahead of most of their colleagues, and their successful experiments with
integration eliminated many of the racist arguments on which discrimination
had rested for years. The favorable experience of businessmen with pioneer
placements in the 1950's effectively cleared the ground for the civil rights
onslaught of the 1960's, which was able to build on the pioneer experience
by demanding more extensive integration than would have otherwise been
possible.
In the vast majority of cases in which a company voluntarily played
a pioneering role in integrating its work force, a single "great man" who
believed the American Creed was more important than the Capitalist Ethic
was responsible for the policy .15 In the absence of obvious external pressures the pioneering businessman frequently ascribed his decision to employ
blacks to ideological motivations. Such an employer did not act on the
basis of the Capitalist Ethic rationale traditionally accepted in the business
community; instead he frequently claimed he was answering an inner call,
variously referred to as ethics, morals, principle, conviction, or liberalism.
These terms were the employer's name for the reason he chose to follow
the American Creed even when it appeared to be in conflict with the
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official staff may be . . doing the right thing on the race question is one
thing, to operate a business successfully from both a financial and organizational viewpoint is something else entirely different from the first." 49 One
of his colleagues in the Chicago financial community also divided his personal ethics from his business activity when he observed, "bankers are very
sympathetic, highly moral and concerned about the affairs of the community. As such, on an individual [as opposed to a corporate] basis they are
doing whatever they can to carry out their social concems." 50
Evangelism is a common corollary to commitment and a number of
integrationist employers attempted to convert their colleagues and their
employees with race relations education programs. Proponents of equal
employment opportunity placed great stress on the efficacy of education as
a method of persuading others to accept their ideology. They believed, as
did Myrdal, that Americans "are all good people. They want to be rational
and just." 51 If one assumes that businessmen, and their employees, wanted
to live according to the American Creed, but were not doing so, then one
must conclude, as did Myrdal, "that the social e·ngineering required should
have its basis in a deliberate and well-planned campaign of popular education."52 Many of Mydral's ideas were picked up in the postwar period and
provided the basis for several educational campaigns designed to encourage
voluntary employment integration.
The American Friends Service Committee started one of the first of
these educational efforts with its Job Opportunities Program ( JOP) in
Philadelphia in 1945. JOP and its successor, the Employment on Merit program, eventually spread to a half-dozen cities over the next twenty years.
JOP was predicated on the belief that an educational campaign could help
businessmen adhere more closely to their expressed values of equality and
brotherhood. 53 AFSC used businessmen as field workers, but businessmen
who were willing to give up several years of their time to work for the
advancement of black employment were rare indeed.54 More often than
not, even pioneering employers were reluctant to proselytize among other
businessmen, so aside from AFSC, integrationist educational efforts in the
business community were limited to the very practical, nonmoralistic efforts
designed to head off compulsory FEPC legislation.
More commonly employers attempted to transmit their values and
beliefs to their own employees through some kind of in-plant educational
program. Interest in education to further better race relations during the
late forties and fifties may have been as indicative of the business community's fear of employee opposition as it was of businessmen's beliefs in the
educability and rationality of men. The businessman who had decided to
hire Negroes still had to face his employees, and some employers used
educational programs as a way to ease acceptance of the new black
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workers. If first-line management could be persuaded to support integration, employers were usually able to impose the change on the rank and
file. Thus foremen were almost always included in the educational programs
while the workers on the line were sometimes excluded. For example, the
Pollack Manufacturing Company of Arlington, New Jersey, regularly indoctrinated supervisors during the late forties, but "where it appeared that
discussion of the Negro subject might invite troublesome free-for-all arguments," newly employed blacks were simply assigned to their departments
without anything having been said to their white coworkers. 55
While there were occasional firms which ran their own elaborate
employee race-relations programs, it was not until 1949, when the National
Conference of Christians and Jews (NCCJ) organized in-plant race education programs, that the process of employee indoctrination received widespread notice. Dwight R. G. Palmer, president of the General Cable Corporation and an important leader in interreligious and interracial activities,
sponsored the first NCCJ seminar in his Perth Amboy, New Jersey, plant.
Palmer's commitment to equal employment went back at least to
World War II. At that time the St. Louis plant of General Cable, which
made vitally needed field telegraph wire, suffered a wildcat walkout when
black women were introduced into sections of the plant where they had
not been employed before. Black men had previously been integrated with
no difficulty, but the white women reacted violently to having to work beside black women. An army officer attempted to set up a program to educate the women into seeing the error of their ways. The workers were not
receptive and the officer quit in frustration. Other military personnel seemed
willing to go along with the white workers and bar the blacks from the
plant. The military men believed that the production of wire was more
important to the war effort than strict adherence to the nondiscrimination
clause in the contract.
Initially Palmer went along with the military decision, but the idea of
denying blacks equal opportunity did not rest well with his personal philosophy. While sitting in church during an Easter Sunday service Palmer came
to the conclusion that only his personal intervention could solve the problem. He walked out of church in the middle of the service and flew to
St. Louis where, despite the pleas of military officers on the scene, he confronted the angry women who had just shouted down the plant manager,
calling him, among other things, a "bald-headed son-of-a-bitch."
In a speech that rang all the changes in the integrationist repertoire,
Palmer persuaded the women to accept black coworkers. He called upon
the women to judge others by what they did, not by their color or religion.
He explained that black soldiers and nurses were dying to save democracy.
He pointed out to the women, many of whom were of Eastern European
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background, "our ancestors left the countries overseas to come here and
practice equality and live on merit, and live in democracy and in freedom
and to get away from all of the crochety stuff that they have over there,
social classes and everything else." He then asked them in the spirit of
Americanism and in the spirit of Easter to accept "these nice colored girls."
His plea worked. Black women were successfully placed on the work
floor. 56 Moreover, General Cable continued to employ Negroes and actually
increased its percentages of black workers after the end of the war. s1
In the postwar period, Palmer served on the committee which organized
the integration of the armed services and later was the chairman of the
Government Contract Compliance Committee under President Truman.
Despite his various official positions as an enforcer of executive decisions,
Palmer maintained that he was effective not because he represented the
power of the President but because he stood as an example of what could
be done by a businessman willing to back up his convictions with action. 58
Palmer was not oblivious to the fact that his position as head of a committee that could cancel contracts was at least partly responsible for his
successes in persuading other large firms to begin hiring and upgrading
Negroes, but as far as he was concerned it played a secondary role.
Dwight R. G. Palmer was a man motivated by a strong personal philosophy which linked Christianity, democracy, and capitalism. He believed
that "democracy is an extension into the political field of the religious view
which regards every person, whatever his ancestry or social station, as the
possessor of an immortal soul destined for salvation." 59 Palmer opposed
discrimination because, as he said in an address to the Canadian Council
of Christians and Jews, it sapped "the economic vitality of both our
countries [Canada and the United States]. . . . It is undermining the
political health of our democracies .... Most important of all, it is weakening the moral fibre of our nations by a kind of spiritual erosion." 60 As a
businessman Palmer understood that people expected him to defend his
beliefs on the basis of good business, and in fact he did see a link between
democracy and capitalism, but he also believed that human equality could
stand by itself without economic buttressing. Thus, he expressed annoyance and embarrassment with the idea that "democracy is good for business; that tolerance pays cff in high production and profits; that civil rights
are a good investment." He contended that those opposed to hatred and
intolerance would act in a democratic manner "even if it were bad for
business, which it is not." He concluded that "the undue emphasis put on
the economic element in moral behavior is really one of the pernicious
products of Marxist propaganda in our generation." 61
Palmer used NCCJ seminars to inculcate his workers with his sense of
moral commitment in the same way he used his positions in the govern-
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ment to inculcate his colleagues with his beliefs. In both instances he was
in a position of authority over those to be converted. While Palmer's position of dominance might raise questions about the sincerity of the converts,
his insistence that people be educated rather than forced to conform to
his standards indicated his strong belief in the acceptability of the American
Creed.
NCCJ seminars became something of a fad for several years after the
first experiment at General Cable in 1949. The program itself consisted of
nine weekly two-hour seminars. The meetings were held on company time,
which undoubtedly helped contribute to the remarkably good attendance.
Each nine-week session was limited to twenty-five employees drawn from
all levels of the firm, from blue collar to management. Guest lecturers and
leaders at the seminars discussed such topics as the three major Western
religions, the anthropology of race, cultural differences, and prejudice,
with the emphasis placed on free discussion. As Palmer put it, "within the
limits of common decency, no holds were barred in the attempt to isolate
and identify the bacteria of mutual prejudice and interracial myths, and
then to examine the pesky creatures under the microscope of frank
discussion. " 62
When the program was first instituted, Palmer was not willing to measure the success or failure of the seminars in terms of dollars and cents,
although he was willing to say that the discussions had reduced tensions
and improved citizenship and the spirit of teamwork. 63 However, by 1951
Palmer was more willing to make specific economic claims for his program.
He said, "We found among our personnel a new spirit of cooperation with
other employees and with the management. Tensions seemed to ease up.
Somehow production records took .on a new personalized interest, scrap
figures improved, grievances did not come up so often. 64
Perhaps because employers discovered that the integration process was
not as fraught with trouble as many had feared, interest in race-relations
seminars flagged after the first few years. Once businessmen realized that
the presence of blacks in nontraditional jobs would not bring the walls
down about their heads, they took a more cynical attitude toward converting their workers, particularly if the businessmen were not of an evangelical bent in the first place. A couple of New York employers belittled the
importance of education in the late fifties when they said "education is ineffective. You'll never change my mind by talking to me. It can't be done.
The thing to do is just do it. That's the best education," and "It's not so
much what employees feel. They can be controlled."65
During the forties and fifties the moral and ethical assumptions inherent
in the American Creed played an important part in motivating the placement of pioneer Negroes in nontraditional jobs. For some businessmen,
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their religious and ethical beliefs were enough to prod them into hiring
and upgrading Negroes. Such persons frequently assumed that other citizens shared their basic values, and so they placed a high value on education
as a way of promoting fair employment practice. For most businessmen,
however, it took direct economic or legal pressure to germinate the seeds
of guilt sown by their failure to apply the American Creed to their employment practices.

7
Economic Pressure and Attitude
Changes in the Eisenhower Era

Due to general economic expansion and the Korean War, the business community experienced a manpower squeeze during the 1950's. Because there were highly qualified yet unemployed blacks available, businessmen could get superior black workers when they could not find any
white workers at all. Therefore, employers had a sound economic reason
for employing blacks. Moreover, the Eisenhower administration was encouraging businessmen to increase their rate of Negro white-collar
employment, so any move for greater black hiring would not only rest on
sound Capitalist Ethic grounds but would also have the support of a
Republican administration which was trying to prove that equal employment could be achieved without federal legislation.
Forced to choose between the pull of conscience and the iron law
of the Capitalist Ethic, most employers were unwilling to scrap their economic faith no matter what the demands of their religious beliefs. 1 However, if the businessman could demonstrate that equal employment opportunity stood the tests of both finance and faith, he could reconcile his
religious and his economic convictions. "Most of us have a difficult time
from the moral viewpoint accusing ourselves or to a lesser degree our
predecessors of aggressive or even passive resistance to the realization of
these rights of minorities," said a Rhode Island utility executive in 1965.
He continued, "Let that be so. We wouldn't have so difficult a time of it
when we perceive the situation from an economic viewpoint. After all,
we are all businessmen; we're in business to make a dollar whether for
ourselves or our stockholders." 2
Ideally the businessman wanted the exigencies of the marketplace to
compel him to employ Negroes. The Capitalist Ethic required the employer to maximize profits, which, among other things, demanded that he
hire the best possible workers at the lowest possible price. By and large,
however, the price of Negro labor, no matter what its actual cost in
103
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dollars, was too high because of the reactions of a racist society. But if no
white labor were available, then the employer would have to hire Negroes
if he wanted to stay in business. The Capitalist Ethic would require compliance with the American Creed, at least for those jobs for which no
whites could be found. Thus economic arguments provided the businessman with a completely consistent rationalization: a manpower shortage
meant the best available workers were blacks, and therefore hiring blacks
conformed to the Capitalist Ethic as well as to the American Creed.
The racial employment policy of International Harvester illustrates
the interplay between fair employment values and economic pressure in
creating better job opportunities for blacks. Both International Harvester's motivation and the justification used by its management combined
elements of the American Creed and the Capitalist Ethic. Harvester
originally announced a policy of nondiscrimination in 1919. The 1919
disclaimer of prejudice included the usual "race, sex, political or religious
affiliation" wording, but these seemingly liberal sentiments were actually a
facade for the final phrase, "or membership in any labor or other organization," which was the firm's declaration of an open shop.3 Although
Harvester had good experiences with its black workers, the company did
not develop a positive approach toward minority hiring until after the
establishment of the wartime FEPC. Fowler McCormick, who became company president in 1941, the same year the FEPC executive order was issued,
decided the firm should not be content with minimum compliance with the
law but should become a leader in employing blacks. McCormick's new
policy was administered by assistant personnel director Sara Southall, who
went on to become a member of FEPC under President Roosevelt. 4
Even though McCormick pursued a policy of equal employment because it fit into his concept of the American Creed, publicly the company
sought to play down the role of ideology in determining its employment
policy. McCormick, who had a reputation as a liberal in the Chicago business community,5 personally believed that his company should be "concerned as much in the interest of employees and customers as in the
interest of its stockholders" and that the corporation should perform "a
useful economic and social service for the community." 6 However, McCormick's expression of social concern appears to have been unique in the
public statements of Harvester management until the mid-sixties. Much
more common were such comments as, "We do not wish to cru~ade. We're
not undertaking to establish social equality, a matter of community acceptance;"7 "Harvester is not running a crusade;" 8 and, "No high ethical
or moral tone was taken. Nothing was said about 'loving thy neighbor as
thyself.' " 9
During the late forties and fifties, Harvester spokesmen sought to
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justify their employment of Negroes by using a combination of arguments
which linked the equal opportunity aspect of the American Creed with
the broader interpretation of economic self-interest. "The basic philosophy
behind the policy," according to Southall, was "that a man has a right to
earn a living." 10 Ivan Willis, the head of personnel, said the same thing
but added, "It is our belief that if this policy is not followed, our company
and the nation are the losers. " 11 Willis developed the economic implications of his position when he observed in 1951 that blacks "represent a vast
consumer market that will add to national prosperity as rapidly as Negroes
can improve their purchasing power." 12 And in its own internal training
program the company stressed not only the "right of a man to earn a
living," but also the "relationship of the nondiscrimination policy to a
democratic society. "13
There was almost a schizophrenic duality to Harvester's position. On
the one hand, they did not want to be seen as social crusaders and liked to
emphasize the strictly business aspects of their policy. On the other hand,
the company wanted to place its policy within a broader ideological framework of social commitment. While company spokesmen denied the firm
had any interest in the problems of blacks outside of the factory, 14 company policy claimed, "We believe we have social as well as business obligations. " 15 It was not until after the beginning of the civil rights revolution
that International Harvester felt free to crusade openly, stressing that
equal employment was good for the country and therefore good for the
company. "This is a 'self-interest' motive, of course," said the head of
Harvester's employee relations department in 1965, "and we are not embarrassed to say so, but it is also a valid and compelling reason, one in
harmony with the democratic principles of our country, as well as in the
best Judeo-Christian tradition. " 16
Harvester's attempts to couch its policy in mostly self-interest terms
until the mid-sixties reflected both the importance of the Capitalist Ethic
in business thought and the ambiguity of equal employment opportunity
as a source of moral concern.
When a businessman was faced with clear, immediate, and direct
economic retribution if he refused to practice fair employment he had
little choice but to comply. Unless he had a very strong personal aversion
to hiring or upgrading blacks, unless he would really "rather close first," a
strongly enforced FEPC or a civil rights boycott provided sufficient economic pressure to persuade most businessmen to employ blacks. Not as
dramatic, but equally effective was the pressure of a severe manpower
shortage. In either of these situations most employers would probably have
agreed with the wife of one of the partners of a major Chicago stock
brokerage who claimed that "contrary to beliefs held by many workers
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among minority group people, businessmen are really not concerned about
the race problem as such, they look at it primarily from the business
angle." 17
Prior to 1960, most businessmen believed that hiring blacks was potentially more disruptive than excluding them-except during periods of
severe manpower shortage. Labor shortages also meant_increased demand
for white labor, and, for the most part, blacks were employed to replace
whites who had moved up to better jobs. 18 This, of course, meant that
while blacks got more and better jobs, they were still apt to get the most
undesirable jobs in a given firm, or in the most undesirable firm in a given
region. Moreover, when executives began to to hire blacks for a position,
the job often lost status and became less desirable to whites. Thus manpower shortages frequently had the effect not of integrating employment
but of turning previously white departments into predominantly black
departments. t9
World War II created an extreme manpower shortage that led to
widespread employment for Negroes. Although the wartime FEPC unquestionably had a significant impact on business, its greatest importance may
have been the excuse it gave businessmen to hire blacks. FEPC provided
the rationalizations and created the psychological atmosphere which eased
the employment of blacks who were desperately needed and who might
well have been hired even without the executive order. 20 In some cases
management perceived the employment of blacks during the war as an
extraordinary device to meet an unusual situation and had no intention of
keeping black employees after the emergency. 21 Returning veterans who
had accumulated seniority while in service displaced some Negro workers,
and others lost their jobs when employers reverted to traditional employment patterns.22 .
However blacks did not suffer major job losses after World War II.
In the absence of a postwar depression and with the growth of "clean"
jobs due to increasing mechanization, most blacks were able to maintain
their positions in unskilled and semiskilled jobs as whites moved into new,
higher status positions. Having discovered that the black population was
a source of reliable labor many employers saw no reason to return to
prewar patterns of discriminiation.
In the postwar era, only obedience to the law ranked ahead of the
labor shortage as a universally accepted excuse for integration of employment. Businessmen who could not understand why anyone should ask them
to hire blacks when they could get all the white workers they needed frequently explained that they would employ Negroes, but only when they
could no longer find whites. In 1952, an official of a Texas aircraft company explained that only if the international situation worsened and the
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labor market tightened would they resort to hiring blacks, and even then
the Negroes would be employed on a segregated basis. 23 The same attitude
was neatly summed up in 1953 by the manager of a notoriously conservative Columbus, Ohio, firm who said he would not hire Negroes in any
positions above the production level because he "did not have any difficulty in finding enough white people, so why should he?" 24
Beginning as early as 1949, in some areas, and continuing through
the end of the Korean War employers in many parts of the country experienced labor scarcity. As during the 1940's, they turned to the black
community for the necessary manpower. In early 1952, one trade journal
warned, "Plants that, for any reason, have not hired members of minority
groups in the past are likely to have to change their policy. No great
reserve of unemployed is left to draw on, as there was a decade ago. And
in the absence of full-scale war, not enough women to meet needs are
likely to be drawn back into the plants. " 25 A Philadelphia utility confirmed
this prediction in 1953 when it broke a long tradition of barring blacks
from clerical and meter-reading jobs. The company was particularly concerned about the latter because it required "high moral character, since
the meter re~der has to go into a person's home," but because the personnel director was having great difficulty finding enough persons to fill
the vacancies in this job, he was willing to begin considering Negroes. 26
The absence of any major recession in the 1960's meant a continued
steady demand for labor, and employers continued to cite their manpower
needs when discussing Negro employment, 27 although the coming of the
civil rights revolution displaced manpower needs as the primary reason
for business interest in the black community. The southern textile industry, which had traditionally used only white workers, finally integrated
during the 1960's when higher paying industries drained its white labor
pool. Southern businessmen, however, preferred to blame the government
for their new integration policy rather than their low wages and the resulting loss of white workers. It was only under prodding from the federal
government that southern mills began a widespread movement to employ
more blacks in skilled, white-collar, and even some managerial positions.
But the vice president of a large textile corporation played down the importance of government pressure. "It was a choice of running the plant
or not-we would have hired Negroes for these jobs with or without civil
rights legislation," he said. A plant superintendent in Alabama explained,
"We hired Negroes and trained them for production jobs, but LBJ got the
blame."28
Throughout the postwar pedod, businessmen who explained their use
of black labor as a rational economic response to manpower needs frequently assumed that a large untapped pool of skilled black labor existed.
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The pool does not seem to have been as deep as some businessmen assumed, and as soon as the first wave of pioneering employers had snapped
up the graduate engineers who were working as janitors and the skilled
typists who were working as maids, this argument ceased to have much
validity. But while the surplus of skilled black labor existed the arguments
in favor of using Negro workers could get extremely cold-blooded. One
observer has reported that in 1951 the Chicago Urban League tried to find
jobs for Negroes by urging employers to exploit the competitively weak
position of black workers. Using "strictly business terms," the Urban
League pointed out that employers who hired blacks not only expanded
their labor market but got a better type of worker because "Negro applicants are usually overqualified and also show greater job stability since
limited job opportunities make them hesitant to quit." Furthermore, the
League is reported to have told employers that by expanding the labor market they would help drive down the price of labor. 29 In 1952 an executive
in an important media survey company who believed the company's owner
would be impervious to moral arguments said he might be reached "on a
cold turkey basis of better employees at the same or lower rates. " 30
However, most individuals who advocated equal employment practices
did not urge clear-cut exploitation of the Negro's weak economic position;
rather they said they were concerned with the most efficient use of the
available supply of labor. The officers of a plant which broke local discriminatory hiring patterns in a border state immediately after the war
explained, "We haven't time to do anything else. We are going into a
line of business that is highly competitive, and we will have many problems in engineering, manufacturing and sales. We need the best people we
can get, and we can't afford to go into the problem all over again every
time we hire a Negro in a new department or upgrade one:" 31 Businesses
that claimed they were employing Negroes because they needed the best
available workers were dealing with some combination of a severe manpower shortage, a relaxation of antiblack social pressure, or readily available, highly skilled, low-cost black workers. All of these were factors which
made complete sense in terms of the Capitalist Ethic and also conformed
to the American Creed because they did not involve explicit exploitation.
Widespread underutilization of trained Negro workers during the
late forties and fifties created a situation in which a good economic argument could be made for hiring blacks as the most qualified people for the
job, particularly for smaller firms which chronically lost out in the bidding
for trained manpower to better paying large companies. 32 Highly trained
blacks found no ready market for their skills and frequently took jobs far
beneath their capacities. Thus, the firm which decided to begin hiring
Negroes, for whatever reason, could justify its actions in Capitalist Ethic
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terms. The first black employees were almost always extremely competent
employees whose productivity was higher than that of the average white
worker.
But businessmen continued to allude to the efficient-utilization-ofmanpower argument even after the pool of readily available skilled black
labor had dried up. At the heart of the efficient-use argument was the belief that the employer should hire the best available man. This belief conformed to both the American Creed and to the Capitalist Ethic and thus
continued to have currency well into the 1960's. In 1964, Thomas F.
Hilbert, Jr., labor relations counsel for the General Electric Company,
said his firm did not hire blacks merely to comply with the law. "We are
mainly acting in our own and our shareholders' self-interest," he explained.
"We want the best employees we can find, and we would only be penalizing ourselves if we excluded from consideration any group of potential
applicants from which we can procure good employees." 33 After having
used almost these identical words in a speech in 1965, one businessman
went on to observe, "I don't want to imply here that there is a superabundance of qualified Negro applicants for all the job vacancies we have
in our community. If this were so, then our failure to take advantage of
such a condition would be perfectly obvious to us all. " 34
In its narrowest sense, the Capitalist Ethic requires a company to
adopt policies which will maximize profit. But inherent in that definition
is the modifier "long-run.'' Even if black applicants were not superior to
whites businessmen could still argue that they derived long-run secondary
or indirect benefits from employing Negroes because they were helping to
alleviate conditions which led to social and economic disintegration. Long
before the turmoil of the civil rights revolution, perceptive businessmen
understood the necessary relationship between the elimination of racial
discrimination and the existence of the kind of pacific domestic climate in
which business operated most efficiently. As early as 1941, the borough
president of Manhattan was able to persuade the vice president in charge
of personnel of a New York City utility to begin hiring Negro women in
nontraditional jobs by arguing that employing blacks would help society
and the utility would thus benefit indirectly. The businessman explained to
his workers that they as individual citizens and the company as a corporate
citizen had a responsibility to solve the social problem of discrimination
against blacks. As the borough president had explained it, the problem
arose because widespread unemployment among Manhattan Negroes led
to a high crime rate. "We have a labor shortage," the executive said. "We
have an untapped pool of workers. These workers need better jobs. Society
will benefit if they get them."3 5
When speaking about the secondary benefits of nondiscrimination,
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businessmen usually claimed that fair employment would lead to the expansion of the domestic market and would reduce crime and welfare and
their related costs. Public opinion analyst Elmo Roper, one of the most
prominent early business supporters of fair employment, viewed increased
Negro employment and spending not only as a source of new business but
also as a cushion against recession. 36 New York businessman Frederick W.
Richmond said, "It is very simple. My business won't grow unless America
grows. The more Negroes that can buy cars, the more the auto companies
have to expand and buy steel. I can sell equipment to the steel mills. "37
Among others, the president of RCA, the president of Textron, and the
president of the Aluminum Company of America were all early advocates
of employing blacks to benefit society. 38
Just in case the lure of potential profits from an expanded black purchasing public was not enough to convince businessmen to hire more
Negroes, fair employment proponents regularly pointed out to employers
that they were already losing money because of their discriminatory employment policies. "Jt is generally accepted as fact," said Elmo Roper in
1949, "that the segregated sectors of our large urban centers are the most
expensive to maintain. The social cost of crime, juvenile delinquency, the
rate of sickness and accidents, is higher in our depressed areas than it is in
other parts of our cities. This is a waste of tax money. " 39 Seventeen years
later Baltimore's Voluntary Council on Equal Opportunity painted a similar if somewhat more apocalyptic picture. Commenting on the falling demand for unskilled (mostly black) workers, the council warned, "Failure
to prepare for it can mean a city with a large mass of unemployed among
all ranks, but particularly Negro, and a consequent burden upon the rest
of the community that will prove unattractive to new industry, drive the
established industries out, and bring a state of depression and despair from
the top of the business leadership right through the ranks. " 40
The major difficulty with the indirect-benefit argument was its inapplicability to any given firm. If the management of a firm took a traditional narrow view of the Capitalist Ethic it could easily dismiss arguments
which depended on generalized social benefit. While it might be true that
all businesses would gain if Negro unemployment were reduced, each individual firm could never be sure all other companies would act in a
socially constructive manner. If they did not, then the firm which did
integrate would run the risk of suffering economic retribution for an
action whose benefits would be shared equally by those competitors who
did not share in its costs. Thus, a conservative Atlanta business executive
could admit in 1962, "The economic status of minority people reflects
itself in the social health of the community and in the economic stability
of the country," while at the same time cautioning against moving too
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fast. 41 Since the benefits were to be long-run, businessmen also looked
for long-run solutions-until the riots of the mid-sixties demonstrated
that the end of the long run had finally arrived.
Before these Piots of 1965-1967, employers most frequently cited legal
compulsion as their reason for employing blacks. Even more than a labor
shortage, the law removed the burden of decision from management's
shoulders. The law forced many businessmen to adhere to the American
Creed, and permitted them to do what was economically sound, that is
hire the best man for the job. Furthermore, obeying the law fit t-he businessman's image of himself. As one executive put it, "American companies are basically law-abiding; they may seek favorable interpretations
of the law, but essentially executives want their companies to be good
citizens. " 42
In and of itself the existence of a legal requirement to practice equal
opportunity employment was frequently enough to spur management to
analyze its employment practices. Large, highly visible firms which were
likely to become the target of complaints from the black community were
particularly quick to comply with the law. Saying he was pleased with the
way the Massachusetts FEPC had worked out, the vice president of one of
Boston's largest insurance companies observed, "Perhaps you shouldn't
need a law but the fact is we didn't do anything until there was one." He
implied that the company might not even have acted then were it not for
the law's punitive provision. 43 This manager's reaction is fairly typical of
the responses of employers in the industrial Northeast. Although the employers did not want fair employment legislation and were less than
gracious in their compliance, they nevertheless recognized that the law
reflected a change in public expectations and that the time had passed
when personal racism or even fears of racism in others would be accepted
as a legitimate excuse for discrimination.
It usually did not take much pressure from a government body to
persuade a company to begin hiring blacks in nontraditional jobs. For
example, in 1953, the manager of a New York restaurant refused to hire
Negro waitresses because he had an "exclusive clientele." A visit from the
FEPC commissioners persuaded him to change his hiring policy and his
customers accepted the change without objection. 44 Even reluctant employers began to practice fairer (if not completely fair) employment after
specific complaints lodged against them were found valid. In a follow-up
study of 334 proven cases of discrimination, the New Yark FEPC found
that in 85 percent of the cases there was "definite improvement in the employment pattern as compared with the conditions which existed at the
time the original complaints were filed against these firms. " 45
Reports vary on the extent of the success of FEPC legislation in actu-
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ally procuring new positions for black workers. Most studies seem to indicate that the laws did have some effect and, moreover, had a very powerful educational impact on the attitudes of management and the public. 46
If there was a positive correlation between popular opinion and the enactment of controversial legislation such as FEPC, businessmen were hardly in
a position to strongly and publicly oppose antidiscrimination legislation
once it had been passed. Employers were sensitive to community pressures,
and they opposed the legislative expression of the "people's will" only
when it presented an obvious threat to their economic position.
At the beginning of the Eisenhower administration only seven states
had compulsory FEPC laws. They were New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Washington.47 Although FEPC legislation had been introduced into the legislatures
of virtually every other state outside of the Deep South, there was no
legally enforceable bar to racial discrimination in employment in fortyone of the forty-eight states. In those states only firms which held contracts
with the federal government had any legal obligation to practice equal employment. Roosevelt's second PEP Committee had folded in June, 1946.
The Truman administration expended its efforts to extend employment
opportunity on unsuccessful attempts to persuade Congress to pass a
permanent federal FEPC. Until the outbreak of the Korean War, except
for airport facilities constructed with federal funds, Truman made no
attempts to use the power of the executive office to insure integration in
other than government jobs. However, on December 3, 1951, Truman
issued Executive Order 10308, which established the Committee on Government Contract Compliance to oversee the nondiscrimination clause
which continued to be written into all government contracts. The elevenmember committee existed for little more than half a year before it was
forced to resign by the change in administrations. In its final report the
Truman committee called for a stronger antidiscrimination clause in all
government contracts and suggested that the chief executive create a
committee with the specific power to cancel the contract of any employer
who did not live up to the letter of the fair employment clause. 48
During the 1952 campaign Dwight D. Eisenhower promised that
"without the impossible handicap of federal compulsion, we can and must
provide equal job opportunities for our citizens, regardless of their color,
creed or national origin. " 49 This remarkable task was to be carried out by
the President's Committee on Government Contracts which Eisenhower
created in August, 1953, by Executive Order 10479. True to his word,
the president gave this new committee absolutely no power. Vice President
Richard M. Nixon served as chairman (thus, the Nixon Committee) of
the thirteen men who hoped to work a major change in national employ-
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ment policy through the dynamic force of their personalities and positions.
In fact, the Nixon Committee was nothing more than a clearinghouse for
information on employer experience with integration and a propaganda
agency which coordinated antidiscrimination activity among various governmental agencies and sought to encourage nongovernmental educational programs "in order to eliminate or reduce the basic causes and costs
of discrimdnation in employment. "50
Business Week overgenerously referred to the committee's first two
years as a "comparatively low-geared, behind-the-scenes, but increasingly
effective campaign .. . . " 51 It certainly was low-gear and behind the scenes.
Positive action by the committee consisted of rewriting the nondiscrimination clause to require contractors to treat employees equally in all aspects
of employment, not merely in hiring. It also required employers doing business with the government to post in conspicuous places notices attesting
to the firm's nondiscriminatory policy. 52 In only two other instances did the
committee do anything that could be even remotely considered helpful to
the cause of equal employment. It persuaded th~ District of Columbia's
Board of Commissioners to include the standard nondiscrimination clause
in all the District's contracts, and it convinced the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company, which served Washington, to end its Jim
Crow hiring practices.53 The rest of the committee's activity was limited
to printing pamphlets, establishing liaisons with private agencies in the
field of intergroup relations, and generally keeping out of peoples' way. 54
In October, 1955, the committee exhibited an unprecedented burst of
energy and called fifty-five leading business chief executives to a closeddoor White House conference. The conference was the first of a series of
similar meetings that Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson would
call. All three Presidents tried to get top business leaders to do some leading in the area of fair employment. The Eisenhower administration had
held a few meetings with individual contractors and small groups prior to
the October conference,55 but the October meeting was the first attempt
to appeal collectively to the top corporate executives of the country's most
important federal contractors. Shortly after the meeting ended Secretary
of Commerce Sinclair Weeks commented, "It's hard to believe that it has
taken nearly a hundred years for national leadership to call together the
people who have the major responsibility for solving this problem, to discuss it with them in free 'give and take' and ask their cooperation." 56 No
significant action took place as a result of the meeting, which perhaps explains why future Presidents were willing to call such conferences again.
Commentary on the meeting indicated that the business community
fully recognized that its traditional discriminatory personnel policies were
not seriously threatened by the Nixon Committee. On the one hand in an
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article titled "How the President is Winning the War on Discrimination,"
the trade journal Factory Management and Maintenance concluded that
the President's committee was determined to wipe out discrimination and
was succeeding through voluntary means. The magazine attributed this
success to the committee's "prestige in the business circles it deals with,
and to its recognition of the fact that discrimination is a difficult problem
that cannot be solved by edict or penalty. " 57 On the other hand, the failure
of the business press to cite hard data, or even token examples of integration, clearly implied that the increased visibility of the President's committee was not to be confused with actual demands that firms live up to
their contractual obligations. Business Week reassured its readers that "the
federal team pointedly noted there would be no compulsory actions to
force immediate compliance with the nondiscrimination clause in contracts. " 58 "No federal agency has ever canceled a contract because discrimination exists," one trade journal observed, "and there's no indication
that the present Administration ever will. Instead, the idea is to persuade
contractors to do voluntarily what is legally correct, and to show them
how this will help company, employees, and community." 59 It is little
wonder that businessmen and "moderate" southerners thought highly of
the Nixon Committee. David Sarnoff, chairman of RCA, said with unconscious irony, that he was "impressed not only by the Committee's achievements but also by its practical approach," and he quoted Mississippi editor
Hodding Carter to the effect that "there has been nothing sensational
about the Eisenhower program-except its success." 60
Only a Mississippian or a conservative businessman could find "success" in the committee's record. All accounts agree that the Nixon Committee did little to resolve complaints. During its seven-year tenure the
committee received 1,042 complaints but was able to resolve only 372, or
just a bit more than a third. Moreover, there is no way of knowing what
sort of action the committee recommended to the agencies in the 372
cases in which some final action was taken. 61 After reviewing a third of all
the complaints filed with the Nixon Committee, Paul H. Norgren concluded that not more than twenty people actually got jobs as a result of
the committee's action. 62 This unimpressive record is ironically highlighted by an early comment of Vice President Nixon expressing his hope
that the 1955 meeting would convince people that the government was
willing to take action. He said, "Most people just don't like to make formal
complaints ... and I am afraid even today there are many people who do
not file complaints because they do not know whether it will accomplish
anything. " 63
While the President's Committee on Government Contracts may have
been little more than an empty gesture in terms of enforcing the legal
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obligations of government contractors, its actual impact on the business
community went somewhat beyond its limited effectiveness in resolving
complaints of discrimination. A large part of the committee's purpose was
educational, and it could more legitimately claim success in that area than
in complaint settlement (but perhaps only because it is more difficult to
measure success in changing attitudes). In some cases the positive educational impact of the committee could readily be measured by the change
in hiring practices of firms which were not actually accused of violating
their contracts, but which for one reason or another came under the
committee's purview. One of the country's largest soap manufacturers
adopted an across-the-board (i.e., in the South as well as in the North) fair
employment policy after Fred Lazarus, president of Federated Department Stores and one of the nongovernment members of the Nixon Committee, applied pressure to the firm's chief executive officer.64 In its fifth
and sixth annual reports the committee listed scores of cases in which it
claimed to have been instrumental in bringing about better employment
opportunities for black workers. Most of these cases, in which companies
employed Negroes in white-collar and skilled jobs for the first time, did
not arise from complaints but rather were the result of "direct consultation and negotiation with senior management of selected major government contractors." Fourteen operators at the Chesapeake and Potomac
Telephone Company, or one professional and one clerical worker at Litton
Industries in San Carlos, California, were hardly the stuff of which real
progress was made, but for the companies involved, many of which were
in the South, even token employment meant that the door had been opened
a crack.65
The isolated breakthroughs in black placement instigated by the
Nixon Committee proved that those who claimed the employment barrier
was an unbreachable wall were wrong. After meeting with the Nixon
Committee in 1955, government contractors in Dallas were reported to
have "expressed great enthusiasm for the work of the committee and have
shown the desire to really move toward employment on merit. " 66 While
such feelings may not have been immediately translated into practice,
they undoubtedly paved the way for the big push that came after 1960.
Having briefly emerged into the public limelight with its "summit
conference" for business leaders in 1955, the committee dropped back
into the shadows for two more years. It again caused a brief stir of interest in 1957, when it announced that government agencies granting contracts would unilaterally begin to survey major defense industries to see if
they were complying with the nondiscrimination clauses. There were no
specific threats coupled with the new "compliance review program,"
although the administration did hint that it might be more difficult for
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companies found wanting to get contracts in the future. The depth of the
committee's devotion to enforcing the contract clauses was well reflected
in the observation of one committee official that "most companies cooperate easily enough. But occasionally you have to threaten them with
loss of business-not so much an actual threat as a certain raising of the
eyebrows or a shaking of the head. " 67 There must have been a lot of head
shaking and eyebrow raising during the next three years because there
certainly were not any contract suspensions, nor was a single company's
name ever placed on an "ineligible list" for additional contracts. 68
The 1957 "tough line" quickly followed the 1955 summit conference
into oblivion. Even though the committee experienced its only pronounced
and concentrated successes in the period between 1955 and 1957, it
simply did not have enough impetus to keep the hard line alive. In 1955
NAACP filed a series of suits against southern oil refiners with the Nixon
Committee. As a result the committee forced at least nine southern oil
refineries to abolish separate seniority lists for blacks, although substitution of departmental seniority in cases where Negroes were in segregated
departments frequently wiped out much of the effect. The Nixon Committee also made some attempt to see that companies administered fair
tests which would permit blacks to move up the job ladder. Actual advancement of Negroes into better oil refinery jobs was minimal at best,
but it was done only under strong government pressure and in the face
of reluctant management and unions and of intransigent local custom. 69
The committee spent its final year and a half puttering around making
movies, translating its publications into Spanish, and holding confercnces. 70
Statistically the President's Committee on Government Contracts
was a failure. Subsequent studies have shown that there was no appreciable
increase in nonwhite employment in contractor firms over the life of the
Nixon Committee. Plants continued to follow local employment patterns
even when the firm had officially adopted a national fair employment
practice policy.71 Yet, despite the committee's gross shortcomings, it was
instrumental in placing pioneer black workers in many new positions and
in forcing many other firms at least to pay lip service to the philosophy
of equal employment. The committee may not have wielded anything more
lethal than a velvet fist in a velvet glove, but it did help prepare employers,
especially in the South, for the new era. A 1960 survey of North Carolina
firms holding federal contracts did not find a single company which gave
the traditional excuses that customers and white employees would object
to integration as the reasons for not giving black workers jobs. There
were firms, of course, which continued to use those excuses, and employers who still believed them in the 1960's, but at least among govern-
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ment contractors in one southern state the fabric which had held the
prodiscrimination arguments together had disintegrated. 72
The strength of the Nixon Committee lay in its reinforcing, with
the prestige of a business-oriented Republican administration, of the fair
employment arguments that integrationist forces had been using since
World War II. The committee joined other fair employment proponents
in reciting the great catechism of equal employment: integration is good
business; businessmen should be leaders in their communities; a fair
employment policy attracts qualified applicants; black workers are not
inferior to white workers; neither employees nor customers will object
to black workers. 73
The committee's weakness lay in its unwillingness to use its potential strength to demand, rather than suggest, that government contractors
practice fair employment. Operating during a time when most of the
attention in race relations was focused on the school integration crisis,
the Nixon Committee recognized that widespread discrimination against
blacks existed as much in the economic as in the educational sphere, but
the committee was insufficiently motivated to take the action that
might have mitigated some of the destructive force of the civil rights
revolution that was to follow in the 1960's.
The testimony of a business representative to the U.S. Civil Rights
Commission during the first days of the Kennedy administration neatly
summed up both the educational successes and the enforcement failures
of federal fair employment activity during the Eisenhower years. Adrian
J. Falk represented the California State Chamber of Commerce, the San
Francisco Chamber of Commerce, the Oakland Chamber of Commerce,
the Downtown Association, and the Federated Employers of San Francisco
and its sixteen affiliated associations. Mr. Falk was despondent. It seems
that the previous year the State of California had passed a fair employment practice law nullifying a San Francisco fair employment ordinance
in which he had placed great faith. Falk approved of the San Francisco
ordinance, which he termed a "compromise" program, because it "emphasized that the entire community shares responsibility for bringing about
improvement in employment opportunities for minority group members
and because it recognized that because discrimination is rooted in prejudice, it is eliminated by persuasion and education rather than by punitive
measures." The new state law was unacceptable. First, Falk called the
state law "the most restrictive and punitive of all state FEPC laws in
the Nation today," and second, Falk complained that "nowhere in the act
does the word 'education' occur." Based on his study of "other States
and cities so far," Falk concluded that "no FEPC law will be successful
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to any significant degree without years of education to change the
prejudices which cause such discrimination. "
Summing up his position, Falk found "the word 'education' has a
magic meaning to a great many people. A lot of people are a little bit
dubious and afraid of something which says 'you must.' They much
prefer the idea of the 'you ought to or let's do it together' kind of approach. " 74 Not the least of Falk's "many people" were those in the
business community.
The entire period between 1945 and 1960 was one of education, or
perhaps consolidation is a better word. The state FEPC laws along with
the manpower crunch of the Korean War created a situation in which
pioneering became increasingly easy. The law provided protection from
racist competitors and the war provided economic impetus. Successful
integration in one area provided examples fo r other areas, and the business
community as a whole began to recognize that the Capitalist Ethic and
the American Creed were indeed compatible. By the end of the period the
conflict between the two values had all but disappeared and the ideological
system had reached a point of equilibrium. In the industrial North businessmen could employ blacks without fear of massive public opposition.
The American Creed could be fulfilled without fear and the Capitalist
Ethic could be adhered to by choosing exceptionally qualified blacks and
ignoring the needs of the millions who could never be "Jackie Robinson."
The crisis of World War II had been responsible for establishing the
trend toward using blacks in nontraditional positions. The wartime FEPC
not only set the pattern for subsequent state fair employment legislation,
but it also demonstrated that legal requirements could successfully bring
about racial integration, at least under extreme circumstances of national
emergency and stringent labor shortage. More importantly, wartime integration demonstrated that blacks and whites could work together. Writing immediately after the war, two close observers of the labor relations
scene concluded that personnel men had learned that four of the major
anti-Negro employment arguments were untrue: 1) "Negroes have no
mechanical aptitudes," 2) " Negroes and whites cannot work together,
mix together," 3) "the Negro is more susceptible to disease, has more
disease," and 4) "management cannot force Negroes on the blue collar
ranks."75
Southern congressional opposition blocked attempts to extend the
federal FEPC into peacetime, but the Truman years were marked by a
series of state antidiscrimination laws. While businessmen opposed the
state laws, their opposition was seldom racist in tone. Voluntary attempts
to promote economic integrat.ion did not always head off fair employment
legislation, but they did reflect the basically positive attitudes toward
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hiring blacks which many managers held. At the same time employers
opposed FEPC, they actively sought recognition and approval for action
they took in hiring and promoting black workers. 76 The personnel manager of a Dallas automobile plant claimed in 1952 that "if the civil rights
talk in Washington does not set progress back . . . the problem will be
solved in 1960." His company had begun to use blacks as maintenance
men, and he believed that given time the Negroes would move up into
higher positions. 77 At about the same time, and with equally unfounded
optimism, two fair employment field workers said they believed that "race
relations in the United States . .. have passed the point of revolution and
reached the stage of negotiation." 78
The idea that somehow good faith, honest pleading, negotiation, and
education would wipe out job discrimination dominated much of the
thinking of those concerned with the plight of the black worker. For the
most part progress toward fair employment during the 1950's was token.
The concept of the pioneer prevailed. Firms pioneered by being the first
to hire blacks at particular jobs, and the Negro workers themselves
pioneered in the positions. Each token advance was taken with elaborate
planning and much trepidation. Caution and moderation were the watchwords. Lemuel R . Boulware, General Electric's vice president of personnel relations, and a man with a reputation as a tough and unyielding
executive, summed up the attitude of many prominent businessmen of the
1950's when he said, "What we try to do is develop a natural and
unselfconscious association that comes along as fast as we can bring it
about naturally. We are just going along as temperately and constructively
as we know how with merit as our sole standard at every level of employment. " 79
A 1956 New York Times observation that "community sentiment is
generally much more hospitable to integration on the job than to integration in housing, schools or social activities" 80 seems accurate as long as
the word "sentiment" is emphasized. After surveying the racial attitudes
of New York businessmen in 1956, Rosenberg and Chapin concluded that
"the job situation is ripe for improvement. The psychological predisposition already exists in good measure; it needs to be more fully crystallized
and institutionalized. " 81 Although businessmen did not necessarily implement the increasingly favorable public attitudes toward job integration, examples of fair employment were becoming less exceptional, and
profession of the ideal of equal employment was becoming the rule in the
business community. The "crystallization" and "institutionalization"
which would finally do away with the most blatant forms of job discrimination came after 1960, in the form of legal and social pressure. Historically, the civil rights revolution, as it applied to business, was not an
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attempt to "force" morality, but rather a semisuccessful attempt to force
an already "moral" segment of the society to live up to its convictions.
Nothing more clearly illustrates this change in business concern and
orientation than "how-to-do-it" articles on fair employment. Before the
civil rights revolution, they recommended elaborate, cautious, and hypersensitive techniques for pioneering, with an emphasis on blue-collar jobs.
Although many of the arguments and methods remained basically unchanged, after 1960 the articles tended to be crisper and more to the
point. The success of the educational emphasis of the 1950's could be
seen in what the articles no longer said, but were able to take for granted.
For example, during World War II the National Industrial Conference Board published ten principles which characterized successful
industrial integration programs. Like virtually every other list, it started
off with the observation that no program would work unless top management was fully committed to the policy. A postwar article elaborated on
this point, suggesting that the employer "put himself through something
like a course of reading, conference, round-table discussion, and inspection trips" in order to prevent his integration program from being "halfhearted, unsure, stupid, or trouble-instigating." Once he had convinced
himself, the employer was urged to convince supervisory personnel,
workers, and the union of the possibility of effective fair employment. 82
Having thus prepared the way, articles appearing prior to 1960
usually proceeded to devote an inordinate amount of attention to the
selection of the pioneer black worker. During the war, NICB had suggested that care be taken to pick "the right type of Negro as the first
worker of his race in the plant." Experts on integration urged that the
first blacks in a new position be highly qualified, and some writers even
suggested that pioneers be overqualified, although others cautioned
against this "Jackie Robinson syndrome" for fear it would breed resentment among less qualified white workers and might make it even harder
for normally qualified black workers to follow. There was, however,
little disagreement on the suggestion that the black pioneers "have more
than the usual amount of poise'" and that "the grooming of this group
should be above average. " 83 In addition, many of the how-to-do-it plans
included rather extensive suggestions for orienting the new workers, both
to reassure the black employees of management's support and to caution
them against "undue" sensitivity to the discrimination they would probably face for a while on the job. 84
During the early 1960's how-to-do-it articles assumed less racism
and wider acceptance of blacks in blue-collar jobs, 85 but their gentle
urgings of management to proceed carefully at the upper levels were
reminiscent of the advice for the integration of all positions during the
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fifties.86 After mid-decade, however, the pressure of the civil rights revolution dominated fair employment practice activity. All the standard integration methods, all the caution, the careful selection and introduction
of pioneers, the concern about customers and the community, almost
faded out of the picture under the civil rights onslaught of the mid-sixties.
The how-to-do-it articles suddenly became concerned with how business
should respond to outside pressure, not from the white community protesting integration, but from the black community demanding it. 87
In 1963 the Public Relations Journal published a list of problems
it believed businessmen should be prepared to meet. The tone and content of the list indicate how quickly the business community could change
its attitudes when circumspection ceased to be a virtue. The article warned
that employers should know: 1) how to enforce antidiscrimination hiring
rules, 2) how to handle unqualified applicants so they would not feel
discriminated against and how to build a case should antidiscrimination
agencies come into the picture, 3) how to seek out the qualified black
workers rather than waiting for them to come in, 4) how to improve
promotion and training programs to maximize the opportunities for advancement available to minority workers, 5) "how to expose the sophistries which might be used to cover up unfair practices," and, an old
friend, 6) how to meet and overcome opposition to fair employment from
employees.88
Many of the specific recommendations in the new period remained
the same, but they had a notably bolder tone. Articles began to encourage companies to adopt employment policies that went beyond mere
evenhandedness to consider some of the unique problems of the black
job seeker. In addition to traditional suggestions such as the necessity of
a strong commitment from top management and a full explanation of the
policy down the line, the how-to-do-it articles of the later sixties suggested
that companies review their testing procedures, their application blanks,
their job requirements, their help-wanted advertising, and their contact
with black community leaders.89 Businessmen were becoming more sophisticated about the nature of institutional racism.

8
Sophisticated Jobs and Sophisticated Racism

During the war and the immediate postwar years most interest in
employment integration centered on getting black workers into plants from
which they had been wholly excluded or on obtaining promotions for those
who were confined to unskilled positions. With the passing years attention
shifted from production work to the more prestigious white-collar, technical, professional, and managerial positions. By the late 1950's and early
1960's the business community had become largely concerned with promoting and hiring Negroes into what were considered high-status jobs.
This, of course, does not mean that blacks had obtained fair treatment at
the blue-collar level, but enough firms in various parts of the country had
made enough breakthroughs so that the focus of the equal employment
movement could be redirected.
As Negroes moved into higher jobs, increasing numbers of whites
felt threatened. From what little work has been done in the area of white
gains from Negro subordination, it appears that some groups of skilled,
managerial, and clerical white workers may have in fact improved their
economic condition by antiblack discrimination. 1 Although there is considerable difference of opinion among economists about the legitimacy of
these findings, scholars generally agree that Negro employment did not
pose a real economic threat to production workers. 2 Thus, if employee
objections to equal opportunity for black workers were at all based on an
actual economic competition, opposition should have increased as Negro
workers began moving up the occupational ladder.
The objections to working with blacks voiced by white employees3
were widely accepted by employers throughout the country in the late
forties and early fifties. In the South the patterns of job discrimination
were so strong that one observer elevated them to the status of "laws."
With the usual exceptions to which all such laws were subject, sociologist
Donald Dewey claimed in 1952 that in the South : "1) Negro workers
seldom hold jobs which require them to give orders to white workers,
123
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2) Negro and white workers do not ordinarily work side by side at the
same jobs."4 In 1952 the laws were as applicable in the North as in the
South. Although the laws decreased in importance in the North during the
1950's, they still applied in many areas of the South as late as 1962.5
As one might logically expect, because there was less status loss in
being equal to rather than subservient to a black, the barriers against
whites working alongside Negroes came down sooner than those which
prohibited blacks from giving orders to whites. Southall noted an early
break with the rule against blacks and whites working side by side in a
Tennessee firm which employed Negroes to work alongside whites in the
late forties . But she observed that "even here where so much progress has
been made, the traditional pattern of white superiority triumphed; for
whenever any kind of issue arose, the Negroes, afraid of offending their
white associates, refused to stand up for their own rights." 6
In many instances, particularly in the South, promotion of blacks on
a par with whites was barred through contractual agreements with whitedominated unions. The Nixon Committee's campaign against separate
seniority lists in southern oil refineries was directed at some of the most
blatant examples of discriminatory collusion between management and
white workers. 7 Even where there was no formal dual seniority system,
many southern plants had informal agreements that blacks would not bid
up into white jobs. In 1960, when Negroes in a Texas manufacturing firm
demanded their rights to promotion under the contract, the management
agreed, but retaliated by halting all hiring of new black workers. 8 The dual
seniority system remained common until President Kennedy's Committee
on Equal Employment Opportunity was able officially to end a large
number of such arrangements. 9
The abolition of contractual bars to promotion, however, did not
necessarily mean upgrading for the black worker. Because many firms did
not want to promote Negroes, they made it a practice to hire nonpromotable blacks, that is, workers without high school educations or other skills.
Although education was frequently not necessary for success on the job
( and in fact was not demanded of white workers), the requirement of a
high school diploma was a useful method of keeping black workers in
menial jobs. 10 Even when firms did not unfairly apply an educational
criterion, just the existence of such a requirement discriminated against
Negroes. The dual educational system of the South, with inferior schools
for Negroes, virtually insured that a black man would be unable to compete with a white even for jobs in which educational criteria were fairly
applied. 11
The end of job segregation sometimes also meant the actual loss of
black positions. There was some truth to the observation that "the ruts
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into which the nonwhites have been pressed are sufficiently deep that the
steam roller of white competition ... passes over them quite harmlessly." 12
The forces that had made black workers members of a depressed and exploited economic colony within many southern firms were also the forces
which protected that colony from white competition. While blacks could
not move into white jobs, neither would whites be hired for black jobs, and
that situation insured a minimum number of black jobs in many plants.
The elimination of racially based occupational enclaves meant that whites
were in fact hired for jobs which formerly only blacks had held. 13
The development of a highly formalized segregated employment pattern in the South was an industrial extension of the general southern pattern in which rigid custom, and often law, formalized the inferior status of
the black. The northern employer, on the other hand, did not have any
such contractual or quasi-contractual means for hiring blacks at a low
level and for keeping them there. When promotable Negroes hired by
northern firms demanded their rights to apply for higher jobs on an equal
basis with whites, their employers faced, frequently for the first time, the
necessity of creating a policy to deal with black promotion. 14 Northern
companies which had a strong policy of promoting from within were apt
to use the policy as an excuse not to hire any blacks at all. If all employees
were potential supervisory or even managerial personnel, and if the
management believed that blacks would be unacceptable in positions of
high status, then of course management would not hire Negroes at any
level. 15 A study in the late sixties of employment patterns among unskilled
janitors and material handlers in the Chicago area disclosed systematic
discrimination against blacks even in such menial occupations as material
handling. The author concluded that Negroes received janitorial jobs but
not material handling positions because blacks traditionally carried out
custodial work, because janitors were usually isolated from the white work
force and would be less apt to upset white employees, and because custodial work was seen as a dead-end job while material handlers were in position to advance to higher paying jobs. At least in firms which paid high
wages, material handlers were better educated, younger, and more often
white than janitors because these were the qualities necessary for promotion.16
For the most part, however, after the mid-fifties it became increasingly
more difficult for northern employers completely to bar Negroes from
employment. Once blacks were in the work force normal promotions began
to occur. Northern employers found that their equal employment policies
augumented the natural pressure for promotion exerted by seniority and
forced them to upgrade minority workers into supervisory, technical, and
sometimes even managerial positions.
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When employers began promoting blacks to higher-level jobs they
faced many problems analogous to those which had occurred when the
first Negro blue-collar workers were hired . The most common fear was
that white workers would object to black coworkers. Every time a Negro
was introduced into a new occupation or into a new work group, the
employer had to face the potential problem of his employees' position.
White workers based much of their opposition on the historically inferior
status of blacks. Since black workers had traditionally been limited to
low-status jobs, any job into which a Negro was introduced ipso facto
became low-status. Businessmen frequently shared their employees' evaluation. A San Francisco employer complained that "Negroes are degrading
to the profession of selling," 17 and another said his employees would object
to black coworkers "because our employees have acquired 'social
caste.' " 18
The problem of social caste or status became more acute when a
Negro was placed in a position where he had power over whites or contact
with noncompany personnel. Thus, a Chicago personnel man said in 1955
that while he would hire any qualified engineer who came along, he would
not place a black in any position, notably sales and personnel, where he
would come in contact with other people. 19 Although this Chicago personnel manager's reasoning was quite typical, his refusal to place blacks in
the personnel department deviated somewhat from the usual pattern.
Employers placed most pioneering black technical and professional employees in internal staff rather than in line departments. Businessmen
probably found blacks more acceptable in staff positions for two reasons.
First, staff departments had no actual control over any aspect of production, and thus no member of such a department was in a position to give
orders to anyone outside of his immediate department. Second, by definition, staff employees exist to provide a service to management, and it may
be that whites felt better about blacks working in a department which
existed to serve, not to create. 20 According to an Urban League official,
Cleveland employers liked to use Negroes to head the mail room. In this
way the company could have a black supervisor, but in a relatively invisible low-status department which had a purely service function and which
was frequently staffed by young workers, blacks, or other marginal
employees. 21
The personnel department was another popular spot for employing
the first Negro on the managerial level. To some extent personnel men
hired blacks for their own departments because they did not want to be in
the position of telling other departments to do something they had not
done themselves. In addition, however, personnel was essentially a staff
department which had little if any control over actual plant production
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and thus was a "safe department" for a potentially disruptive pioneer
placement. 22
Well into the sixties many employers believed that while there might
be industrial "poor whites" who had to work alongside blacks, no white
was so low that he had to take orders from a black. The placement policies
of the electronics industry make it particularly evident that position and
power are not synonymous, and that blacks were seldom given the latter
to wield. Government pressure, particularly after the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, persuaded many electronics firms to begin hiring
blacks. Because of the electronics industry's high percentage of professional
and skilled jobs many of the placements were necessarily in positions which
blacks had not previously filled. A black engineer in Detroit observed in
1964 that "you may find a Negro with a fancy title and a high salary, but
these things are usually meaningless because he won't have responsibility
over people. " 23 When a manufacturer of electronics said, "You can't put a
Negro in a position where he will give orders to a white engineer because
it will cause too much friction," 24 he was only parroting one of the standard cliches of industrial race relations. Employers who were willing to
break the first "rule" that Negroes and whites could Iiot work together on
the same job were still not willing to break the second rule, "Negroes
cannot work over whites in the chain of command." 25 While there are
indications that even some blacks objected to Negro supervisors, during
the forties and fifties businessmen permitted black supervisors only in
those positions where they controlled other blacks, or a mixed crew working in a traditionally black area, such as the foundry. 26
The "law" which forbade blacks from supervising whites applied
equally to the North and South through the forties and fifties. By the midsixties, however, the rule had lost much of its force in the North, but
continued unabated in the South. More than half of the managers questioned in a 1947 survey of two northern cities said they would have objections to placing a Negro supervisor, administrator, or professional over a
group including wpites. 27 A similar question asked of a sample of northern
managers in 1966 indicated a major change of employer attitudes. Eightytwo percent of those questioned agreed with the statement, "A Negro
supervisor would be accepted by white subordinates in my company after
he had successfully proven himself a good manager." More than half of
these managers expressed the view that black workers would be able to
rise above the level of foreman. However, only a third of the southern
managers que;stioned believed that whites would ever accept a Negro
supervisor, and approximately the same number thought that a black could
rise above the level of foreman. 28
Once large numbers of blacks began to work in white-collar jobs
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(large numbers being a relative term), the barrier against black supervisors
fell quickly. The widespread fear that whites would not obey when blacks
gave the orders, and the objections which whites raised to working under
blacks, evaporated as society began to accept blacks as legitimate workers
in higher status jobs. Once society accepted, and even encouraged, the
use of blacks in desirable jobs, whites no longer had to fear the psychological cost of taking orders from blacks. Even token promotions beyond
the white-collar level removed the terrible stigma of being dominated by
a member of the "mudsill." The status gain for blacks meant less of a
status threat for whites. So great was the change that in 1967 sixty white
sales people in Miami, Florida, submitted without protest to the complete
supervision of a black man. 29 While opposition to black supervisors was
still the dominant pattern in the South, the Miami case would not have
been possible even as an isolated example a decade earlier.
White acceptance of black supervisors was closely related to the
increasing acceptance of blacks in white-collar jobs. While most whitecollar workers below the managerial level were not in positions of power
over their coworkers, blacks seeking white-collar employment nevertheless
found barriers similar to those that existed for supervisory positions. Because the status of nonsupervisory white-collar jobs was almost wholly
dependent upon socially accepted symbols of position, rather than on
real power, blacks had as difficult a time breaking into sales, clerical, and
technical positions as they had moving into supervisory jobs. Whereas
whites objected to being supervised by blacks because it lowered their
status directly, they resisted the encroachment of the blacks into whitecollar positions because the low social standing of blacks demeaned the
status of the job-and job status was frequently all poorly paid white-collar
workers had.
Until the beginning of the I 960's, employers' fears of worker and
customer opposition were usually strong enough to limit Negro white-collar
workers to token positions in isolated locations. Breakthroughs in whitecollar employment for Negroes were of primarily symbolic importance and
were pursued one at a time. Victories were counted in ones and twos. The
Urban League placed a few workers here and the American Friends
Service Committee placed a few workers there. 30 The I 958 report of
Eisenhower's Committee on Government Contracts, optimistically entitled
Five Years of Progress, clearly illustrated the token nature of black advancement in industry. The report listed more than fifty firms with
government contracts which opened up new positions to blacks. Though
all of the firms employed more than a thousand people, and many employed more than ten thousand, the companies averaged fewer than
fifteen black professional, technical, or clerical workers each. Even this
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low average is misleadingly high since three firms had disproportionately
large numbers of Negro white-collar workers, and the vast majority employed fewer than ten blacks. 31
The classic arguments against hiring Negro workers in white-collar
positions fell into disuse in the North after 1960 as employers began hiring
more blacks for such jobs. 32 While the actual number of blacks involved
was pitifully small, and Negro white-collar workers remained severely
underrepresented by any statistical measurement, nevertheless, at least in
large border and northern cities, the hiring of Negro white-collar workers
had begun to move beyond the tokenism of a company Negro toward a
somewhat wider use of Negroes in higher status positions. 33
The increasing employment of blacks in white-collar jobs, which might
be called "stage two" tokenism, even began to appear in some areas of
the South among government contractors during the early 1960's and
among nongovernment contractors in the border states. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights found widespread discrimination against blacks in
Washington, D.C., in 1962, yet it concluded that "in clerical and sales
work, where customer relations are of prime importance there is evidence
that Washington's Negro majority is slowly but steadily influencing changes
in employment." 34 Similar studies of Houston, Texas, and Dade County
(Miami), Florida, in the early 1960's disclosed the same kind of reluctant
but discernible change in employment policies. In both cities tokenism continued to be the order of the day, and blacks were still unable to get whitecollar jobs for which they were qualified, but there was "occasional acceptance of Negroes in better than traditional jobs, a change slowly impelled
by rapidly growing industry and fast increasing population."35
By the beginning of the 1970's the process of token integration in the
North had finally worked its way up to the level of management. It is
almost impossible to ascertain employers' attitudes toward this final step in
the process of economic integration. The Civil Rights Act, the urban crisis,
the ghetto riots, and the change of mood in the black community from
passive resistance to militancy-all contributed to businessmen's acute
awareness of the need for equal employment at all levels. By the late sixties
few if any employers were willing to engage in the kind of public rationalization and justification for discriminatory hiring that had marked the
black man's steps up the previous rungs on the employment ladder. Despite
executives' use of liberal rhetoric there is some indication that the questions
and doubts which accompanied acceptance of blacks in white-collar and
supervisory jobs continued to exist as Negroes moved into managerial positions, which were both white-collar and supervisory-or at least nominally
supervisory.
The first blacks hired into managerial positions frequently found that
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they were not even tokens but mere window dressing. At least the first
Negroes employed in blue-collar and lower level white-collar jobs were
expected to do the work for which they were hired. But too often black
"managers" were not even expected, or allowed, to perform any managerial
work. Public opinion had come to demand a "house nigger," and no matter what their actual training and competence, many of the new black executives were just expected to be the company's liaison with those segments
of the community that wanted to see Negro employees in executive positions. A black lawyer in an electronics firm was expected to handle but not
to process most of his company's legal papers. His job brought him into
contact with the firm's top executives so he could serve as a constant reminder of their liberal policies. 36 In a similar vein a young black professional complained, "I don't want to be hired as an engineer and then find
myself assigned as the company's representative to Plans for Progress or
some other government-sponsored program in the equal opportunity bag.
Above all, deliver me from presiding over the company table at the annual
Urban League benefit dinner." 37
Employers sought and frequently found overqualified black applicants
for managerial positions. Although this approach was scored by some
observers as an attempt to avoid the problem by choosing employees who
had learned to be as "unNegro as the recruiters," 38 reports indicate that
despite their superior qualifications the black executives were not promoted. 39 Hired for decorative rather than functional purposes, the token
black managers could serve their purposes just as well in powerless junior
positions as in senior positions where they might have real control over
the company.
Employers' demands for black employees and the increasing willingness
of Negroes to apply for nontraditional jobs did not necessarily mean that
large numbers of new black workers would begin appearing in the nation's
offices. Employers may have accepted the American Creed sufficiently to
hire Negro white-collar workers but they still insisted that the new workers
be qualified. Until the early 1960's the term "qualified" frequently meant
white, and technical ability was simply unimportant. Thus companies
which were the first in their areas to hire blacks sought, and could usually
obtain, overqualified candidates. When no Negroes could get any job
which required training or skill the numbers of qualified blacks from
which the first pioneer firms could choose was relatively large. However
by the late fifties even though firms were still seeking black workers with
qualifications superior to those of white workers, they were beginning to
encounter difficulty in finding them. What had appeared to be a large pool
of Jackie Robinsons was quickly drained dry by the early comers. 40
Chronically inferior educational opportunities, coupled with the knowledge
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that they could not expect to get jobs which required education, meant that
few blacks were either able or motivated to gain the necessary training for
white-collar jobs. Once hired there was no institutionalized means of replenishing those few highly motivated individuals who had prepared themselves for acceptance in the white business world despite the fact that they
had no valid reason to expect that their preparation would actually result
in a job.
There is little question that beginning in the early 1960's a shortage of
qualified Negro employees began to develop. While employers may have
wanted blacks at the managerial level more for their publicity value than
for their business acumen, they nevertheless desired, but could not find,
Negroes with education in technical and managerial skills. The validity of
the qualification crisis was reflected in the response of the organizations
working for improved Negro employment opportunity. Formed to deal
with economically irrelevant forms of discrimination, i.e., those based on
racial grounds, the fair employment organizations suddenly found themselves confronted with economically relevant discrimination, i.e., that based
on real inability to perform the job. 41
Until the early sixties, service organizations such as the Urban
League and the American Friends Service Committee could usually meet
the lack-of-qualified-applicants dodge by offering the reluctant employer a
living, breathing, fully qualified black candidate the next morning. But in
1961 the personnel director of Standard Oil of California, Fred Russell,
claimed that "the real problem for the Negro in this area is job qualification. In southern California, at least, I think people are ready to employ
Negroes." Russell was a member of the Urban League and was presumably
aware of whether or not qualified Negroes were available in his locality. 42
American Friends Service Committee field workers in Atlanta found that
by 1962 they were having difficulty coming up with fully qualified candidates to meet employers' arguments that no suitable Negroes ever applied.
One field worker observed, "I am beginning to think that perhaps the
employer has strong ground on which to stand by using this excuse rather
than the fear of what may be the reactions of his white employees . . .
because while it is true that a proportion of the staff does resent the desegregating process it recognizes that change is taking place." 43
In early 1964, the AFSC employment program in Atlanta reported that
it was "shifting from major emphasis on confrontation to recruitment and
encouragement in the Negro community to prepare for job openings as
they are occurring in the post-pioneering stage.. .. Unfortunately," the
report continued, "when the nontraditional job occurs we are frequently
frustrated in our attempts to recruit qualified applicants." 44 In 1962,
Guichard Parris, public relations director of the National Urban League,
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announced that "state and federal laws have reduced the needs and pressures for getting more and better jobs." Parris predicted that within a
decade "most of the [discriminatory] laws and other restrictions shall have
disappeared and the Negro will be able to compete in the open market
place." In order to enable blacks to compete more successfully the League
said it would increase its emphasis on motivating youths to seek training
for better jobs, rather than serving only as a placement agency. 45
Two years later, in 1964, the Urban League established its National
Skills Bank, a clearing and coordinating center for placement of skilled
black workers. After six months of operation the Skills Bank boasted of
placing more than a thousand Negroes, and according to Mahlon T. Puryear, director of the program, "In many cases the jobs were obtained by
a major breakthrough in the 'whites only' barrier in the upper echelons of
business and industry." 46 But the record of success was somewhat less
dramatic than Puryear made it seem. Although the Skills Bank screened
more than two hundred thousand individuals during its first year it was
able to place only five thousand. The problem did not lie with reluctant
employers. Puryear reported that "60 to 70 percent of the largest corporations have placed job orders with the skills bank for talented Negroes. Some
of them have open orders with us, more jobs than we can fill some places."
Rather, the difficulty lay with the reluctance of many black workers to
move to areas where jobs were available and with the lack of professional,
executive, and clerical skills among Negro job seekers. 47 The problem of
finding qualified workers had become so prevalent by 1967 that 64 percent of more than four hundred employers questioned agreed with the
statement "Negroes are apt to be less well trained than whites, so hiring
many Negroes will either decrease production or increase training costs." 48
Despite a great tradition of paternalistic white capitalists urging and
assisting education for Negroes, the American business community as a
whole did not seem particularly concerned with the lack of trained workers
until the advent of the civil rights revolution. The absence of an overwhelming manpower shortage meant that business used blacks in menial
capacities, and the rudimentary education which the public schools provided blacks was sufficient to fill the limited intellectual demands of unskilled work. There were some complaints from employers in the immediate postwar years, as there would be again in the sixties, that Negroes
needed to be instructed in the responsibility of employment, but the demand for this kind of education was quite different from the demand that
blacks receive instruction in a salable skill. Many of the white demands for
Negro education in the early period after the war were not for education
at all but rather for indoctrination in the attitudes which made successful
employees-from the employer's point of · view. The business community
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wanted black workers who were honest and who had a desire to please the
boss.49 On the whole, however, businessmen merely ignored the question
of Negro education. Blacks were well enough trained for the jobs available
to them and an occasional corporate gift to the United Negro College Fund
appeased the spirits of General 0. 0. Howard and Booker T. Washington.so
As legal and social pressure forced employers to increase their hiring
of Negro workers for upper level positions, businessmen began to pay more
attention to the state of Negro education. The renewed interest in education
allowed the business community to let itself off the hook by attributing the
scarcity of black employees to the failure of Negroes to "educate themselves" ( as the businessmen frequently put it). By blaming either individual
Negroes or the educational system for the economic problems of black
men, businessmen shifted the burden of responsibility for Negro underemployment to institutions beyond their immediate control. Implicit in their
faulting of education was a generalized acceptance of the complementary
values of the American Creed and the Capitalist Ethic. Employers were
willing to hire blacks equally with whites ( or so they stated) if the blacks
were equally prepared. At the same time since most blacks were not equally
prepared, the businessman could maintain his all-white professional, technical, and managerial staff.
To some extent businessmen recognized that problems inherent in the
country's dual educational system caused Negroes' educational shortcomings. Commenting on the failure of blacks to enter management positions
in the textile industry, the associate editor of a textile trade journal noted
that no Negroes were enrolled in any programs which southern universities
offered in the field of textiles. While all the colleges were legally integrated,
the magazine observed "that Negro high school students graduating from
an educational system that is substandard are going to have an exceedingly
difficult time in completing today's university textile curriculum." 51 Yet
even when businessmen recognized the source of the lack of training, some
drew curious conclusions. The manager of an employment agency in San
Francisco observed in 1963, "We have found that the majority of Negro
applicants-even those with high school diplomas-coudn't pass the simplest clerical tests," from which he concluded not that the schools were
wanting but rather that Negroes "are not equipping themselves." 52
As increasing numbers of blacks moved into upper level jobs, businessmen who continued to employ few Negroes needed a new and more sophisticated set of rationalizations to explain their failure to hire blacks. The
arguments that employees and customers would object, although sanctified
by tradition, were becoming embarrassingly transparent. Not only did the
success of pioneer placements belie the traditional excuses, but the public
and the government were becoming more knowledgeable. New times de-
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manded new rhetoric, if not new action. During the 1960's businessmen
began to show an increasing awareness of the underlying sociological reasons for the lack of qualified black workers-or at least they demonstrated
an increased sensitivity to sociological jargon.
By focusing on environmental rather than personal obstacles to Negro
advancement, businessmen seemed to imply that society could alter the
offending institutions, such as the educational system, and eliminate the
problem of economic discrimination . In fact, discrimination ceased to be
a subject of discussion. Business began to act as though discrimination hac!
disappeared and the only problem that remained was motivating and training blacks to take advantage of the myriad of opportunities that were now
open to them. So far as businessmen were concerned, the American Creed
was a reality and all they needed to do was to convince blacks that jobs
existed if only they would prepare themselves. Sponsors of an upgrading
seminar for employers held in Milwaukee in 1968, urged their colleagues
to prove that fair employment was a reality by promoting blacks. Seminar
leaders believed that such examples would motivate "other minority group
persons to seek employment, to stay employed, to aspire to better jobs,
and to take steps necessary to prepare themselves for better jobs." 53
Increasing business emphasis on sociological explanations was an
attempt to shift the cause of unequal employment for blacks to the society
at large or even, by implication, to the blacks themselves. In 1966, Howard
C. Lockwood of Lockheed Aircraft noted, "Three or four years ago the
problems looming largest would have been how to eliminate discrimination
in employment and the acceptance of minority personnel in occupations
which formerly had been closed to them." Although Lockwood admitted
that "there is still much to be done," he felt that a more serious sociological problem had arisen. "Because of many years of discrimination and rejection," Lockwood said, "many minority individuals are very poorly prepared educationally and even psychologically to accept their new role." 54
Two officials at a Georgia aircraft company took a similar view when they
told an interviewer that Negroes were not only unprepared for available
jobs but could not even qualify for company training programs. They believed that more emphasis should be placed upon motivation in the home,
urging parents to discipline their children to further study, [and] radical
changes in the school curriculum. " 55
Even hard-line southerners began to use sociological reasoning as a
facade to cover more traditionally racist viewpoints. Explaining his opposition to civil rights legislation in 1962, an officer of an Atlanta bank said
he felt it was economically and morally wrong to expect industry and provident people to care for the "shiftless and the chiselers." In itself, his was
the classic position of conservative businessmen, but he capped his argu-
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ment with a more sophisticated sociological explanation when he admitted
that "taken as a whole and disregarding the individual, the Negro is not a
second-class citizen but a third-class citizen," whose inferior socioeconomic position was due not to any racial traits but rather to "lack of cultural advantages, etc." He believed, however, that these shortcomings
could not be overcome with civil rights legislation. 56 Charles B. Potter,
personnel vice president to Burdine's one of the largest department stores
in Miami, Florida, insisted that the race problem could not be attributed
to businessmen. Potter deary believed that the American Creed would be
fulfilled by adherence to the Capitalist Ethic. Public antipathy toward
black employees had vanished, and cnly blacks' lack of ambition and
skills stood between them and good jobs. "The profit motive overlooks
color; the dollar has no color," he explained. "The businessman isn't the
obstacle. Our whole society has been the obstacle. The conditions society
has imposed on the Negro's life have produced thousands of would-be
workers without the skills or attitudes sought by employers." Potter called
for remedial training to bring the black job seekers up to employers' standards. He warned however that "a simple expenditure for training is not
going to do the job unless it includes the motivational, psychological factor.
If the Negro is going to follow, as too many still do, the historical pattern
-get paid on Friday and get drunk on Saturday-what is the training
going to accomplish?"S7
Although it is perhaps a bit clearer in Potter's comments than in those
of other businessmen, a persistent trend developed during the sixties which
used social science terminology not only to justify continued discrimination, but also to perpetuate racial stereotyping. The National Industrial
Conference Board quoted an executive as saying large numbers of Negroes
would never qualify for industrial employment because "they are illiterate
or semi-illiterate, irresponsible, overly submissive or hostile, suspicious,
resentful of white supervisors, and in other ways badly formed by their
life experience." 58 It is a matter of some question whether the modifying
phrase "formed by their life experience" is an honest attempt to express
the problems of the black subculture as seen from the businessman's
perspective or is merely a modem tag line on a time-honored string of
racist generalities.
Employers became particularly fond of explaining the lack of qualified
black applicants by alluding to the shortcomings of Negro family life.
Some businessmen's discussions of black family patterns had obvious racist
overtones. A Houston oil company executive whose company refused to
take any community-level action to improve the conditions of the Negro,
relieved himself, his children, and probably his grandchildren of any
responsibility when he explained that "it will take several generations of
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greatly improved education for Negro youth before any long strides can
be made; as the 'home atmosphere' of Negro children is not conducive to
intellectual attainment and advanced education, at least one generation of
educated parents is needed to lay the proper groundwork." 59 His words
were echoed by a New York employer who said, "Home life, as far as
parents are concerned, is probably not the best for colored people. The
momentum of parents is probably carried over into children. There must
be several generations yet before there will be any real change." 60
Like the efficient-use-of-labor argument, the sociological argument was
a double-edged sword. Early proponents of fair employment had urged
employers to use blacks because Negroes were a readily available source
of trained manpower, only to have their argument turned against them
when the supply of trained blacks was exhausted. Conversely, the sociological objection to Negro employment was used mostly by opponents of
black employment, but could be used by problack forces as an argument
in favor of extra help for Negroes. Because the environment was subject
to change, the emphasis on the nonmiddle-class nature of many black
families Jed some employers to urge their colleagues to make a special
effort to bring blacks up to white par. Harold Mayfield, director of personnel relations for Owens-Illinois, called upon employers to "make allowances ... to see that a man may be qualifiable although not yet qualified ;
we must make our selection of men on the basis of their teachability rather
than their present knowledge." This, Mayfield said, was because Negroes
"may not even have heard of these [technical] jobs nor of the tools we use
in them. They did not have chemistry sets as children; their parents and
friends did not talk about these matters; they are unprepared for this work
in a profound sense most of us cannot grasp because it is a subtle matter
of attitude more than simply a matter of facts." 61
The "subtle matter of attitude" was the frequent target of employer
comments when they spoke of the environmentally caused shortcomings of
Negro workers. In another article Mayfield noted that people from "the
city slums, the rural backwoods, or an Indian tribe . . . are truly handicapped in performing business jobs and not all of them can or will make
the transition." Among the important qualities Mayfield believed these unfortunates lacked were an "acceptance of personal competition, respect for
authority, concern for the distant future, admiration of thrift, industriousness, subordination of the personal good to the group welfare under certain circumstance, willingness to settle most personal disagreements peaceably, a complex code of ethics governing relations of one person to another,
and so on. " 62
The preoccupation of some businessmen with motivating Negroes
rather than with providing educational facilities could almost be viewed as
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a sociological reincarnation of the stereotype of the lazy black. During the
1960's a large segment of the business community participated in a number
of programs designed to counteract what the businessmen believed was the
lack of motivation among black youth to seek the education and training
necessary for successful employment. The youth-oriented motivation programs which sprang up in the wake of the riots of the mid-sixties could
have very conservative sociopolitical overtones. For example, several businessmen in Racine, Wisconsin, arranged for ex-boxer Archie Moore to
bring his ABC Club presentation to the high school students of that city.
Although the businessmen wished to help motivate Racine's black youth,
they did so by sponsoring an organization which actively campaigned
against the activist thought prevalent in the black community at that time.
Moore's club stressed self-discipline, education, and "a program that will
inspire young people to walk away from trouble with courage and dignity
and without cowardice." Moore was an outspoken opponent of urban violence and of the black power demonstration of John Carlos and Tommie
Smith at the 1968 Olympic Games. Moore provided businessmen with a
perfect opportunity to demonstrate their new-found sympathy with the
American Creed without having to deviate a step from a fundamentalist
interpretation of the Capitalist Ethic. 63
The Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce established a more elaborate,
but equally conservative, motivation project when it created the Committee
for Employment Opportunity in 1965. From a number of sources, including business and industry, the committee recruited volunteers to counsel
unemployed job seekers. While the Indianapolis project was not unique in
its method of one-to-one individual counseling, committee supporters justified their activity in a way that clearly illustrated the conservative business
interpretation of black sociological problems. Committee literature said
that "on-the-spot research showed that the unskilled job seeker's frustration and lack of motivation to find work is caused primarily by poor job
focus, personal problems, a history of poor interviews, and a resulting lack
of self-confidence." The committee carefully explained that the root of the
problem lay with the individual, not with the business community. The
committee claimed that the unemployed worker's "lack of good work attitudes is caused by a poor understanding of his personal responsibilities to
an employer, oversensitivity and defensiveness with supervisors, and a
generalized hostility to business and industry whom he views incorrectly
as the source of his troubles. " 64
The most concerted business attempt to <;lea! with the problem of sociological disabilities related to employment was the Plans for Progress series
of Youth Motivation Programs. The programs began in Cleveland in 1965
and consisted of sending minority employees into local schools to speak
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to the students as "living witnesses" that properly trained blacks could get
nontraditional jobs. Linked with a national advertising campaign organized
by the Vice President's Task Force on Youth Motivation, local Plans for
Progress councils in sixteen cities sponsored programs in fifty-nine
schools during the 1967-68 school year. While the program was basically
an antidrop-out campaign, it was specially directed at minority students.
The Youth Motivation Program recognized that many black youths needed
both models and proof that education would indeed lead to jobs. Thus
the program was a tacit admission that the business community had failed
in the past to provide jobs to qualified blacks and was now trying to rectify
the imbalance it had created. In the introduction to a booklet which contained hundreds of pictures of successful minority employees, Vice President Hubert H . Humphrey wrote, "There was a day when your choices
might have been limited. But that day has now passed." 65
To a limited extent the Vice President's words were accurate. By 1966,
breakthroughs had been made into white-collar, supervisory, technical, professional, and even some managerial positions. Businessmen spoke out
uniformly in favor of equal employment opportunity. While tokenism was
undoubtedly still a problem, the lack of qualified black workers had supplanted the reluctance of business to hire Negroes as the chief difficulty
facing the fair employment movement. During the mid-sixties pressure
from the federal government and pressure from the black community finally
forced business to begin living up to the pious expressions of equal employment which had been the formal position of most large national companies
since World War II. In many cases the original policies of nondiscrimination had been instituted as the result of state FEPC laws, federal contracts,
and, in some cases, pressure from industrial unions. It took the civil rights
revolution to persuade businessmen, even those with formal policies of
nondiscrimination, to stop taking the line of least resistance and instead
face up to the implications of institutionalized racism.66

9
The Turning Point: Federal Pressure
and the Civil Rights Movement

The combined forces of the federal government under the Kennedy
and Johnson administrations and the direct action of the black community wrought a major change in the fundamentalist interpretation
of the Capitalist Ethic and American Creed which had marked business
attitudes towards blacks during the first fifteen years after the war.
The state laws and tokenism of the forties and fifties had consolidated
the position of blacks in semiskilled labor and had opened the possibility for Negro employment in higher level jobs. Many southern and
border state firms and some northern companies as well continued to
discriminate against blacks in production line work, and the black presence in white-collar jobs was statistically insignificant. Nevertheless, as
a whole, the business community had come to accept black operatives,
and to at least consider the possibility of Negro white-collar personnel.
Up through the beginning of the Kennedy administration business
acceptance of black employees was predicated upon an extremely orthodox interpretation of the Capitalist Ethic. Blacks would be hired when
there was no risk of excessive employee or public opposition and then
only if the blacks could meet or exceed regular qualifications. The
American Creed of equal opportunity was a reality only as long as there
was no additional cost to the firm. It was this narrow economic interpretation of the American Creed which would fall by the boards under
the onslaught of governmental and black demands during the 1960's.
Barely a month after he took office, President John F. Kennedy
issued Executive Order 10925. From March 6, 1961, until it was superseded on October 24, 1965, by President Lyndon B. Johnson's Executive Order 11246, 10925 dominated the industrial race relations of the
country's federal contractors. It established the President's Committee
on Equal Employment Opportunity (PCEEO), which, unlike its prede139
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cessor, the Nixon Committee, had the power to initiate reviews of businessmen's compliance with their contracts and the authority to rectify
any injustices it found. The Kennedy administration transformed an
impotent coordinating and educational organization into a body with
the power (if not the will) to search out discrimination in employment
among federal contractors and to compel equal employment opportunity.
The new committee differed from the old in four significant respects. First, PCEEO created a definite timetable for dealing with complaints. The timetable applied both to the committee itself and to the
contracting federal agency. While complaints could be filed and processed by either the agency or the committee, the committee had the
power to review all cases and order compliance no matter what the
findings of the contracting agency's compliance officer. This precluded
possible deals between the agency and contractors at the expense of the
complainant.
Second, PCEEO enlarged upon the review procedure begun by the
Nixon Committee in its last several years. Unlike the Nixon Committee,
which had to rely upon the contracting federal agencies to carry out
reviews of compliance, PCEEO had the authority to conduct such investigations itself. These investigations were designed to dig deeply into
potential problem areas revealed by the compliance reports which each
employer was obliged to submit to the committee-also an innovation. 1
Third, PCEEO rewrote the mandatory nondiscrimination clause which
was a part of every government contract. Not only did the new clause
contain the standard admonition, "The contractor will not discriminate
against any employee or applicant for employment because of race,
creed, color, or national origin," but it went on to require the contractor
to "take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and
that employees are treated during employment, without regard to their
race, creed, color or national origin. " 2
Finally, the Kennedy committee had the authority to impose a
variety of sanctions on noncooperating employers. Although the executive order urged that the committee act through informal means, such
as "conference, conciliation, mediation, or persuasion," whenever possible, it did permit the committee to: 1) publicize the names of discriminatory contractors, 2) recommend injunctive or criminal action by the
Department of Justice, 3) terminate contracts, and 4) prohibit further
contracts until the contractor complied with the nondiscriminatory requirement.3
Compared to the Nixon Committee , PCEEO was a whirlwind of
activity. It adjusted more complaints during its first year than the
Nixon Committee had in seven years. 4 More importantly, it engaged
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in a series of highly publicized confrontations with contractors which
gave it a reputation in the business community for toughness which in
turn influenced many employers actively to recruit black workers in
order to stave off similar difficulties.
During its first two years the committee forced the Lockheed
Corporation to adopt the Plans for Progress which opened up a new era
in affirmative racial personnel practices. PCEEO also placed five firms on
the list of those prohibited from receiving further government contracts
until they submitted acceptable compliance reports. 5 The committee's
two most important moves were against Comet Rice Mills of Houston
and Beaumont, Texas, and against the Danly Machine Company of
Chicago. Danly, although it was located in an area with a large Negro
population, did not have a single black worker among its more than 1,300
employees. Comet exhibited the typical pattern of segregation and discrimina tion thait existed in many parts of the South. Its noncompliance
included "racial separation of employees by department, racially discriminatory rates of pay, racially separate application forms, and separation
of sanitary facilities by the designations, 'White,' 'Negro,' and 'Latin
American.' " 6
Early in 1962 PCEEO declared both companies ineligible to receive
government contracts until they submitted plans for compliance with the
nondiscriminatory clause. Within a month each company had submitted
an acceptable plan to the committee. The plans were important not only
because the companies agreed to eliminate the objectionable conditions,
but because plans also specified the "affirmative action" steps each firm
would pursue to insure equality of employment. Danly agreed to "establish contact with sources of minority group recruiting for referral of
qualified minority group applicants,'' issue a policy statement, and set up
methods to evaluate the success of its program. The company also "notified in writing all sources of recruitment that it expected referral without
regard to race, creed, color, or national origin,'' and "it broadened the
base of its advertising and recruitment activities to include periodicals
reaching the minority group community and colleges with substantial
minority enrollment." 7 Comet's affirmative actions were of a similar
nature. In addition, Comet agreed to survey its minority employees to
see if they had any skills which might qualify them for promotion. Before
the committee's action Comet had not even provided space on its application blanks for blacks to indicate their educational experience.8
While the action against the five companies showed that the committee could get results when it was willing to use its muscle, PCEEO
nevertheless operated very cautiously. One observer ·believed that the
committee's caution sprang from its fear of being declared unconsti-
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tutional, at least until the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 9 Even
though the publicity from the prosecution of offending firms gave the
committee an important no-nonsense reputation in the business community, it was reluctant to engage in widespread public prosecution.
According to vice chairman Jerry R. Holleman, the committee did most
of its work in secret because, "we are seeking to avoid publicity. We're
working through cooperation, not through compulsion or threats. We
don't want to blacken [sic] anyone's name." 10
While conciliation and informal pressure appear to have had some
positive effect, particularly in the wake of the Danly and Comet cases,
which lent an implicit threat to committee requests, 11 PCEEO clearly took
a soft line. It was not trying to maximize the number of black job
holders. 12 Despite its power to supersede government agencies, PCEEO,
like its predecessor, continued to leave most of the enforcement up to
the contracting agencies even though they were less than adamant in
their demands for compliance. Although the committee had demanded and
received affirmative action in recruitment from firms it threatened to
prosecute, the head of compliance for the General Services Administration (along with the Defense Department, it was the largest purchaser
in the federal government) said, "We don't tell companies that they have
to go out on the street and hire Negroes, we just ask them to take applications and put everyone on an equal basis." 13 According to one trade
magazine, PCEEO wished to achieve "more or less voluntary compliance.
The theory is that the 'converted' are more likely to increase job opportunities for Negroes beyond a mere minimum than companies that are
pushed hard and penalized. " 14 It is difficult to distinguish between this
concept of voluntary compliance and the supplicatory attitude of the
Nixon Committee. The new committee was born with teeth. It tried
them out a couple of times and apparently decided that it did not like
the taste of red meat so it reverted to the gum beating that had characterized the previous Republican administration. 15
Business generally reacted favorably to Executive Order 10925, perhaps because even such staunch conservatives as Barry Goldwater supported the government's right to demand nondiscrimination in its contracts.16 Businessmen were concerned with the government's requirement for "affirmative action," but in comparison to some of the demands
that were forthcoming from black protest organizations, the government's demands appeared reasonable, and businessmen sought to meet
the new government standards. For example, several firms in Atlanta
which held contracts with government agencies indicated they felt more
pressure to act under Executive Order 10925 than they had under
previous executive orders even though their contracts had obligated
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them to fair employment for as long as they had held them. In 1963, the
Atlanta district manager of an office machines company said that the
executive order had prompted him to "casually mention" the possibility
of hiring Negroes and "to his satisfaction and some surprise lounge talk
evidenced no unfavorable comment. " He said, "It was almost as though
thoughts of desegregation of the work force were in the air." 17
The committee's power to deprive· a company of its contracts,
present and future, plus its threats to do so on a small number of occasions, created an atmosphere more conducive to employing blacks.
Coupled with a rising tide of black antibusiness militancy, many contractors felt it prudent, if not imperative, to begin hiring more blacks in
nontraditional positions. 18 The apparent willingness of white employees
and public to accept blacks reduced the potential cost of integrating
while the threat of contract cancellation clearly increased the cost of
continued segregation. Under such circumstances there was obviously no
conflict between the Capitalist Ethic and the American Creed.
The business community was singularly silent in opposition to civil
rights legislation during the 1960's.19 Public acceptance of the civil
rights movement indicated a generally sympathetic attitude toward the
American Creed, not only in theory but also in practice. Civil rights
legislation was opposed by decreasing numbers of congressmen, and by
opposing such legislation businessmen ran the risk of placing themselves
outside the mainstream of national attitudes. Moreover, by the early
1960's most industrial states had FEPC laws and businessmen found they
could live with them without incurring any additional costs. Of employers' organizations, only the Illinois Manufacturers' Association testified
against proposed federal legislation, and even that occurred at the beginning of the decade. 20 The silence continued even after it became clear
in 1964 that a civil rights bill of some sort was going to pass. With the
single exception of the Wall Street l ournal, which feared the law would
open "the gates to new floods of bureaucracy and litigation" and would
compel employers to hire unqualified workers, 21 open opposition to the
civil rights bill came from nonbusiness conservatives, not from employers.22
On the other hand, on several occasions President Johnson called
directly on businessmen to lend active support to the pending civil rights
legislation. 23 But employers were no more willing to publicly support
the legislation than to oppose it. Only a handful of employers spoke in
favor of the bill.24 Halward L. Homan, personnel manager of Friden,
summed up the business position on the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when
he wrote, "A few years ago I would have said there is only one way to
handle the Fair Employment problem-voluntarily. I still feel that way,
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but we have done very little about it." Homan continued, "I am not
particularly fond of legal coercion. I think that voluntary conduct is far
better than legal force. But- where the rights of the individuals are not
protected voluntarily, the law must step in." 25
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited employers from
discriminating against employees in any facet of employment because of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and it established the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to administer the law. 26
Congress passed the law as part of the memorial wave of legislation that
followed President Kennedy's assassination. The period was also one of
increasing antibusiness activity on the part of civil rights groups. Given
this background, and the almost total absence of outspoken opposition
to the law before it passed, it is hardly surprising that the business community accepted the new legislation calmly. The Mississippi Manufacturer's Association, for example, urged its members to accept the Civil
Rights Act and pointed out that everyone in Mississippi would benefit
"through gainful employment in a useful occupation in an expanding
economy in which all citizens, all Mississippians have the equal opportunity to enjoy the fruits of their own individual labors. " 27 A generally
calm reception was not indicative of the disappearance of discrimination
in employment. The work of EEOC made that abundantly clear. Rather,
lack of opposition by employers indicated that the business community
either accepted the new ideal, or at least was unwilling to speak out
against the law of the land.
The apparent lack of animosity toward EEOC may have been due in
part to the law's emphasis on conciliation. Upon investigation of a complaint, if EEOC found "reasonable cause" to believe that there had been
discrimination, a conciliator contacted the complainant to determine
what kind of remedy he would accept. The conciliator then presented
this proposed remedy to the employer along with whatever other changes
in policy EEOC believed were necessary to insure continued nondiscriminatory practice. The law did not bind the employer to sign the conciliation agreement. However, if EEOC found that the employer had not
stopped his illegal behavior, it could recommend to the Attorney General
that criminal charges be brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act.28
When the commission demonstrated a willingness to recommend
legal action against uncooperative firms-and it initiated thirty-five such
cases in fiscal 1967-it undoubtedly bolstered employer eagerness to sign
conciliation agreements. EEOC officials reported that most businessmen
they approached would comply both because they feared the legal and
public relations impact of extended litigation and because direct ap-
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proaches from the government gave the businessman someone else to
take the blame for integrating his work force. 29
Conciliation agreements with EEOC were designed to have a broad
impact on the employment practices of the firm in question. Not only
did the agreements include policy changes in areas not directly relevant
to the specific complaint which initiated EEOC investigation, but the
agreements also required the employer to take affirmative action, a continuation of the policy first developed by PCEEo. 30 Also like PCEEO, EEOC
could initiate investigations into industries that appeared to widely
underutilize minority workers. Unlike PCEEO, of course, EEOC was not
limited to employers with government contracts. The policy of "confrontation and visitation" with firms in specified industries and geographic
areas served the purpose of encouraging employers to hire more minority
personnel both among those "confronted" and among those who wished
to avoid awkward public hearings.3 1
The willingness of even southern firms to accede to the demands of
the law without great bitterness or recrimination was a result of the
Capitalist Ethic, which required the employer to do whatever was necessary to minimize disruption to normal business procedures, and it was
obviously less disruptive to obey the law than to face the criminal consequences of maintaining blatant discrimination. The president of Hunt
Foods said that his company would abide by its nondiscriminatory policy
even if there were no Civil Rights Act, but he added, "I think governmental inspection of our plants and facilities is an asset. We all need
some prodding. "32
The state laws, the government contract compliance committees,
and finally the Civil Rights Act of 1964, provided businessmen with a
method of meeting the demands of black pressure groups and the liberal
white community without having to deal with the protesters themselves.
Given a choice, businessmen would undoubtedly have preferred no interference in their racial practices at all, but forced to decide between the
demands of legislative bodies, with whom they had traditionally been
friendly, and the demands of an aroused and angry black population, it
is little wonder that they embraced the former.
While many businessmen felt that compliance with the law should
have made them immune from attack by civil rights groups, the black
groups did not share this point of view. The refusal of civil rights groups
to depend on EEOC was probably well founded. A 1966 survey of 180
oompail!ies concluded, "Fair employment practices legislat-ion is a necessary but not a sufficient cause in creating equality of opportunity." The
report said that one or more of the folfowing factors had to exist before
a firm was likely to institute a fair employment policy: "A contract with
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government, a top company official imbued with the injustice of inequality, the organized awareness and resistance of the Negro community." 33
Agitation for equal employment had originated in the black community years before any state or federal agency had even considered outlawing economic discrimination. There is no comprehensive study of
black fair employment activity, but direct action by blacks took place at
least as early as the 1920's. After white store owners had denied Negro
requests to employ black salespeople in their Harlem establishments,
black pickets forced the owners to change their policies. 34 A more concerted effort toward the same ends also took place in Harlem during the
1930's. The "Don't buy where you can't work" movement organized a
boycott against offending proprietors and met with some success, 35 although some of its efforts at picketing were blocked by court injunctions. 36 And it was black activism in the form of the March on Washington Movement that forced President Roosevelt to issue Executive Order
8802, which opened the way for the modern fair employment campaigns.
To a limited extent during the 1940's and somewhat more widely
during the 1950's, black action groups experimented with direct pressure
techniques to open up more and better jobs for Negro workers. In 1943,
a City-Wide Citizens' Committee on Harlem successfully continued the
earlier pressure on uptown New York stores. 37 In 1946, when the Silvercup baking company in Chicago refused to hire Mrs. Mary Blake as an
office worker because she was black, the co-op market in her neighborhood took Silvercup bread off its shelves. Silvercup claimed that a quarter of its workers were black and tried to convince the store manager to
restock its bread by having some of the company's Negro employees
testify as to the firm's fair employment policy. All the black workers,
however, were in menial positions, and the boycott was not lifted until
the company hired Mrs. Blake and other Negroes in nontraditional
positions.38 In 1952, NAACP picketing opened up job opportunities at a
Philadelphia Philco plant, and in 1958, the combined efforts of NAACP
and CORE convinced St. Louis retail store owners and a bread manufacturer that employing Negroes was less disruptive than picketing and
boycotts. 39 While these local efforts clearly had an impact on the businessmen involved, the business community remained unconcerned about
the possible effects of concerted black activity until the civil rights revolution began.
The civil rights revolution was manned and led by southern blacks,
and quite naturally the first business reaction came from southern employers. The tragedy of Little Rock, Arkansas, became the number one
exhibit in the moderate southern businessman's case for compromising
with the civil rights movement. The tragedy, as far as the business com-
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munity was concerned, was not that the governor of the state had used
armed troops to prevent implementation of a Supreme Court ruling. The
tragedy was that armed troops had enforced court-ordered desegregation, which in turn sparked riot and disorder on the part of whites. The
head of the state's industrial commission, Winthrop Rockefeller (later
to be governor), stated the business community's position bluntly when
he said, " The industrial prospect doesn't give a hoot whether your schools
are segregated or not, but he wants no part of disorder and violence." 40
Although some businessmen who shared Rockefeller's observations
reacted by urging caution and deferment of integration lest they "arouse
resentm ent among white employees and violence 'on the nature of Little
Rock,' " 4 1 many southern businessmen, particularly those in larger firms,
supported moderation and peaceful progress. The 1957 disturbances in
Little Rock severely retarded the city's economic development. During
the five years preceding the integration crisis at Little Rock High School
an average of five new plants a year moved to the city, providing a million dollars worth of investment and more than three hundred new jobs a
year.42 It was not until five years after the integration riots that any
other important new industries moved into Little Rock.43 There are
clear indications that this hiatus in the city's growth was a direct result
of the tension and turmoil that resulted from Governor Faubus' hardline segregation policy. 44
When Virginia's Governor J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., supported the
Byrd machine's plan for "massive resistance" in order to protect Virginia children from "the livid stench of sadism , sex, immorality and
juvenile pregnancy infesting the mixed schools of the District of Columbia and elsewhere," he met strong resistance from his state's business
community. 45 Almond's state-wide policy forced the closing of several
city and county school districts which otherwise would have had to desegregate under court orders. Virginia businessmen publicly opposed
the school closings. They said it was hard enough to attract skilled technical and professional employees to the South without the additional
obstacle of having no public school system. 46
Business proponents of an industrial South placed growth ahead of
segregation. Public pressure, including that from the business community, had a telling effect on Governor Almond, who changed his
tune and began to warn against "those who would have Virginia abandon public education and thereby consign a generation of children to
darkness and illiteracy, the pits of indolence and dependency and the
dungeons of delinquency." 47 The legislature responded to the moderates'
counterattack by repealing the massive resistance laws in a special session
in 1959 and by instituting a local option plan in which each school dis-
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trict could make its own decision on whether or not to integrate.48 The
siren song of economic growth was sweet enough to insure at least pro
f orma compliance with court orders in all school districts except Prince
Edward County. But even there, where the public schools remained closed
for five years, local businessmen formed the backbone of the preschool
forces .49
Under pressure from the courts to desegregate the schools in
Atlanta, G eorgia, politicians considered following the Virginia pattern
of massive resistance. Once again the bu siness community proved to be
the crucial force that prevented hard-line segregationists from permanently destroying the public school system of the state. Businessmen
were not in favor of integration, nor was their opposition to the hardliners a display of respect for the law ; but if some businessmen cared
little for law, they cared mightily for order. Mills B. Lane, Jr. , president
of the Citizens and Southern Bank , insisted , "I am just as much in disagreement with the Supreme Court decision as anyone, for I view it as
an invasion of state's right 's." 50 Y et he, along with twenty-si x other prominent busi nessmen, petitioned the state legislature in 1960 not to close
the schools. 51 In order to insure Georgia's attractiveness to new industry,
bu siness maintained pressure to keep the schools open. The bu sinessmen
were successful in convincing the legislature not to close the school system to escape court demands for what was, after all, only token integration.
It remained, however, for Dallas to provide the ultimate demonstration of the effect a highly organized business community could have in
bringing about peaceful racial integration , not only in the schools but in
other facets of civic life. While most businessmen were aware of the
power they wielded in their communities, few organized that power as
effectively as the business leadership of D allas. The Dallas Citizens
Council (DCC) was an organization of 250 of the city's most powerful
business executives which was able to exert influence, if not absolute
control, over every aspect of city life with which it was concerned.52 In
1960, DCC established a Committee for D esegregation. The committee,
in concert with a number of other civic groups, launched an extensive
year-long propaganda campaign to convince D allasites that peaceful desegregation was in their best interests. Fear of the economic consequences
of racial violence apparently motivated the DCC, but the council tied its
public education program to civic pride, of which D allas had an ample
amount, and to obedience to the law. 53
The Dallas program was notable not only because it successfully
averted the violence which was endemic in desegregating southern cities
during the early 1960's, but also because it extended desegregation be-
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yond the schoolroom. Under the leadership of ncc, with some prodding
from the American Friends Service Committee, a number of firms promoted Negroes to previously all-white jobs. Negro policemen were put
in uniform for the first time. The state fair was desegregated, and downtown eating places and hotels agreed to accept Negro patronage. 54
Until 1963, the main thrust of the civil rights movement was for
equal service rather than for equal employment. Since most northern,
many border, and even some southern businesses had extended equal
patronage privileges to blacks before 1960, the movement remained
mostly southern and oriented toward retail establishments. Because the
most important northern spokesmen for the business community were
outside of the civil rights area of activity, most businesses attacked for
not granting blacks equal service were left to work out their problems
without the support of the national business community.
Once southern blacks discovered they could successfu11y demand
equal service, they logica11y extended their demands to include equal
employment. 55 As early as 1961 observers in Houston reported that after
the city's schools and lunch counters were desegregated without overt
trouble "employers began to shown awareness of the problem of discrimination in employment," and when blacks boycotted a Houston supermarket it began to employ black checkers. 56 In January, 1963, close observers of the equal employment scene in Atlanta said they had found
"a significant change during the past year in objections raised in expressed
reluctance to embark upon a policy of employment on merit." Formerly
employers had said, "Atlanta is not ready yet," or "Personally I have no
objections, but I must think of my customers, my staff," etc. By 1963,
the observers reported, "We now more frequently hear, 'The Negroes
don't apply,' or 'where are qualified Negroes.' This to us at least, implies a change in attitude that is difficult to describe but nevertheless
apparent. " 57
Although most civil rights activists did not turn their attention to
employment in northern firms until 1963, an important vanguard of the
black equal employment movement emerged in the North during the
early 1960's at the same time most attention was focused on the South.
Early in 1961 a group of four hundred black ministers in Philadelphia
organized a boycott of the Sun Oil Company. 58 Operating under the
slogan "No more Sunoco till your preacher says so!" they drastically
cut back consumption of the company's gasoline in Negro areas. The
company had agreed to the Negro ministers' demand to hire thirty
thirty-day deadline which the ministers had imposed. The boycott ended
blacks in specific jobs but had been unable, or unwilling, to meet the

150

Black Meo and Businessmen

only after the company hired the requisite number of blacks in the designated jobs. s9
The Philadelphia boycott movement, or selective patronage program, was more or less led by the Rev. Leon Sullivan, who often acted
as its spokesman. The description "more or less" is appropriate because
participants feared legal retribution for taking part in a secondary boycott and, for safety, attempted to keep the leadership diffuse. 60 The boycott movement was astonishingly successful during the three years it
operated. The selective patronage program took formal action against
only two dozen firms, but it is difficult to estimate how many other
companies opened additional jobs when they heard they were already on
the ministers' list, or in an attempt to forego that dubious honor. The
ministers claimed, and businessmen agreed, that more than four thousand jobs which whites had traditionally held were opened to Negroes
as a direct result of the boycotts. 61
The Philadelphia boycott movement erased the requirement of the
American Creed that all applicants, white and black, receive absolutely
impartial consideration, but the movement did not disturb the demand of
the Capitalist Ethic that the employer need hire only men who met his
standards. Although the ministers' demands for a specific number of
new black workers in given jobs by a certain date were less flexible than
the demands of any previous equal employment group, the ministerial
alliance continued to accept one basic personnel concept-a company
should be required to hire only qualified men. By demanding that companies hire black men the Philadelphia movement forced employers to
give preference to qualified black men, but because the ministerial alliance accepted the premise that it could force employers to hire only
qualified men, the movement quickly foundered on the rocks which
emerged as business drained the shallow pool of qualified blacks.
By 1963 Sullivan had discovered that he could continu~ to force
firms into opening up jobs to black candidates, but he could not find potential black workers who qualified for the proffered jobs. Rather than
_demanding that business undertake the responsibility for training the
unemployables, simplify its jobs so less qualified people could work, or
reevaluate job requirements, as later protest leaders did, Sullivan took
upon himself the burden of supplying industry with appropriately trained
and motivated personnel, With money from foundations and equipment
donated by Philadelphia firms, including those which had been objects
of "selective patronage," Sullivan opened the Opportunities Industrialization Center (Ole) in late 1963. Essentially a private vocational school,
01c received enthusiastic support from the business community and from
government officials.
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Whatever its other merits, and they appear to have been considerable, 01c provided the Philadelphia business community with a perfect
"out. " 62 Since Philadelphia employers did not object to hiring qualified
blacks, and since the leader of the protest movement agreed that there
was a shortage of skilled Negro workers, the business community remained immune from attacks by the black community as long as employers supported me and hired its trained graduates. Not only did the
creation of me mark the end of the boycott movement, but Sullivan
proved to be a man of essentially conservative values who helped reinforce the businessmen's own traditional beliefs. He worked against big
government by operating independently of Washington, and to some extent in competition with established federal training programs. Nothing
could be more satisfying to ideologically conservative businessmen than
to help a "militant" leader who believed "that a man is like a balloon,
that it's not a man's color that determines how high he can rise, but what
he has inside of him. "63
As the selective patronage campaign was being phased out in favor
of 01c in Philadelphia, militant antibusiness activity began to appear in
other cities throughout the nation. 64 At first equal employment activism
followed the pattern set by the Philadelphia movement. The boycott
was the primary weapon which the pressure groups used, and their targets were those firms most susceptible to consumer buying habits. The
local nature of most of the boycotting organizations and their targets,
and the minimum of public commotion which attended them (to say
nothing of the reluctance of the press to publicize a boycott of their advertisers), make it impossible to know how many companies faced organized black consumer resistance. Although some poorly organized boycotts must have failed, businessmen appear to have met Negro demands
for more jobs in the overwhelming majority of cases.65
In the South, from its inception in 1960, the civil rights movement
had emphasized personal commitment and direct action. In the North,
on the other hand, consumer boycotts had required a minimum of personal involvement and a maximum of organization. In the spring of
1963 the movement combined the passive boycott with the active street
demonstration to demand more jobs for blacks and bring the Birmingham-style fair employment demon~ration to the North. The Detroit
Council for Human Relations held a "walk" in which more than a
hundred thousand people marched for better jobs. The council, an allblack organization which rejected whites as members because they
tended to be "gradualists," announced that it was going to conduct a
series of boycotts starting with the A&P supermarkets and working up
from there until they reached Detroit's pinnacle, General Motors. The
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leader of the council, the Rev. Albert B. Cleage, Jr., predicted that his
boycott movement would spread, and when sufficient regional groups
had been formed, he would institute nationwide boycotts. 66 Because of
its size, GM was a natural target for the new activist mood. GM responded
to the boycott threat by hiring additional blacks in all positions, but
with an emphasis on technical and professional jobs since black workers
already constituted between a quarter and a half of all GM production
workers. 67 The automobile giant never suffered a formal boycott. NAACP
led a day of nationwide demonstrations against the company in the
spring of 1964, but the attacks and counterattacks in the GM battle remained a war of words. 68
To a limited extent blacks continued the boycott movement after
1965, with a number of attempts to bring consumer pressure against
companies on both the local and national levels.69 However, the drama
of direct confrontation increasingly overshadowed the boycott movement during the late 1960's. In its mildest form the confrontation consisted merely of picketing the offending establishment. Washington,
D.C., ministerial groups had tried this technique against banks with
mixed success as early as the spring of 1961. 70 The incidence of confrontation increased sharply as the civil rights movement concentrated
more and more attention on the business community during the summer
of 1963. 71 While picketing had always been an effective weapon against
consumer-oriented firms, blacks discovered that even big industrial firms
did not like to have people marching around in front of their doors and
accusing them of discrimination. No matter what the public climate,
when a consumer-oriented firm suffered from a boycott it had at least
to weigh the costs of the boycott against possible public opposition. But
during the 1960's, when people expected the business community to
practice fair employment, picketing, even in the absence of a boycott,
could have a negative impact on a firm's image and ultimately on its
ability to do business. Even utility companies, which have both a monopoly and an inelastic product demand, nevertheless consulted with black
groups in a number of cities after NAACP picketing. Because their monopoly positions subjected them to regulation by public bodies and made
them particularly vulnerable to criticism, electrical, water, and gas companies throughout the nation agreed to review their hiring practices
and to make a concerted effort to employ more Negroes in nontraditional positions in return for clear front sidewalks. 72
Direct action against employers by black action groups reached a
kind of climax in San Francisco during the winter and spring of 1964. Boycotts, and boycotts with picketing, may have been effective in the hands
of large, widely respected groups such as NAACP or an ad hoc ministerial
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alliance, but the Congress of Racial Equality discovered that a small
group of dedicated activists could be just as effective as a large group.
Success demanded a new technique. Early in 1964, CORE decided to put
pressure on San Francisco stores and banks in order to get them to hire
more blacks. 73 In an alliance with the Baptist Union, an organization of
Negro ministers, the demonstrators entered Bay Area Lucky supermarkets, filled shopping carts, and then abandoned them at the checkout
counters. This form of harassment continued daily for more than two
weeks until bad publicity and disapproval from the Baptist ministers put
a stop to the "shop-ins." 74 Mayor John F. Shelley mediated peace talks
between CORE and Lucky which ended in an agreement to hire 45 to 75
additional black workers over a three-month period.75
A second wave of direct action occurred in San Francisco in March
when the Ad-Hoc Committee to End Discrimination, a biracial group
with some left-wing leadership, sat down in the lobby of the SheratonPalace Hotel. The group had been negotiating with the hotel for more
jobs for blacks since December and had held a number of minor demonstrations for which the hotel had filed a $50,000 damage suit. 76 The
hotel demonstrations reached their peak on March 6, when more than a
thousand protesters jammed into the hotel lobby and sat down.77 The
San Francisco Hotel Association, representing the Sheraton-Palace and
thirty-four other city hotels, met with the Ad-Hoc Committee in the
mayor's office and through his mediation worked out a two-year pact.
The hotels agreed that 15 to 20 percent of their new employees would
be from minority groups, that they would make monthly reports to the
civil rights group on their progress, and that they would not press
charges against sit-in participants (although prosecutions took place
nevertheless). 78
As the Ad-Hoc Committee signed the agreement with the hotel
association, NAACP began a new series of demonstrations in the city. On
March 9, it threw a picket line around the General Motors Cadillac
showroom on Van Ness Avenue to demand more jobs for blacks. 79
Five days later one hundred and ten protesters were arrested at a sit-in
there. 80 Although GM took a tough public stand, saying that "no good
purpose could be served by private discussion of allegations and unfounded charges made by unlawful demonstrators," 81 it apparently initiated secret talks with NAACP. 82 The talks dragged on for a month until
the protesters struck once again. On April 11, the police arrested more
than 200 people who disrupted normal activity at four major auto firms
oq Van Ness Avenue. 83 The dealers balked at NAACP demands that they
follow the lead of the hotel association and make periodic reports to the
civil rights group on their progress in hiring blacks.
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However, on April 17, one of the picketed dealers, not a member of
the Motor Car Dealers Association, signed an agreement with N AACP
which included a promise of a dealer-sponsored training program.84 The
next day the dealers' association announced it too had come to terms
with NAACP. The new agreement did not go as far as the pact with the
hotel association. The auto dealers acknowledged "the necessity for the
acceleration of employment opportunities of minority group persons,"
but made no numerical or percentage commitments for actual hiring.
Although the association promised to pursue a policy of minority recruitment and cooperation in training efforts, again the promises were
general rather than specific. Finally, the agreement was worded in such
a way that all commitments were made to the Mayor's Interim Committee on Human Rights, which was led by businessman and ex-Secretary
of Commerce James Mitchell, rather than to NAACP. It was the Mayor's
Committee which would receive " such data or information as may be
reasonably required to measure the fulfillment of all aspects of the foregoing pledge. " 85
In one sense all the activity of the winter and spring was preparation for the assault on the final symbol of business power in California,
the Bank of America. The nation's largest bank did not just sit and wait.
Although none of the three organizations, CORE, NAACP, or the Ad-Hoc
CommiHee, had approached the bank's executives, the bank ran a fullpage advertisement in California newspapers. Bank management felt
confident that it had a good record of hiring minorities and hoped to beat
the demonstrators to the punch by taking its case to the public. The
March 16, 1964, advertisement released the contents of a letter the bank
president had sent to the chairman of the California Fair Employment
Practice Commission.86 Tough talk at the beginning and the end of the
letter bracketed a number of voluntary concessions of major importance.
The letter stated that the bank would refuse "to sign agreements and
provide reports to non-government agencies such as the Ad-Hoc Committee to End Discrimination . . . ." R . A. Peterson, the bank president,
said that "as good Americans, we will not now or in the future capitulate
to illegal pressures of the type prominent in San Francisco over the
past weeks. . . . " 87 However, the Bank of America's public relations
director conceded that if the firm hoped to get public support it had to
"stand up and be counted on the urgent social problems posed by the
fermenting unrest in the Negro community. . . . " 88 While saying it
would never accede to the demands of race pressure groups, the bank
disclosed that it was voluntarily setting up a program that incorporated
all the points of the auto dealers' agreement and most of those of the
hotel association pact. The bank promised to actively seek out minority
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applications for positions. The bank said that "because our experience
has clearly shown that a large proportion of minority racial applicants
have not completed high school and cannot pass simple clerical tests," it
would not make any firm promises as to the numbers or percentage of
minority people it would hire. However, it did pledge to periodically
analyze the racial makeup of its employees and to report this information
to the state FEPC.89
CORE responded to the bank's move by asking for a meeting with
the bank management, to which it presented a list of demands. The
bank had already implemented most of them in one form or another.
The civil rights group did ask for more specifics in such areas as
affirmative recruiting, but CORE's major substantive point of disagreement
with the bank was the demand that CORE be designated the judge of the
bank's minority hiring program. CORE asked the bank to turn over all
statistics to it, that the bank clear all announcements with the civil rights
group, and that the bank regularly meet with CORE to review employment
progress. 90
CORE broke off meetings with the Bank of America in May, accusing the firm of refusing to negotiate in good faith because it would not
discuss CORE's demands that the bank turn over full statistics on minority
employment. 91 CORE then began three months of picketing branches of
the Bank of America all over California. CORE'S tactics included "nickle
and dime-ins" during which demonstrators clogged the bank's lines by
changing bills into coins and then returning the change for bills. CORE
refused offers of the governor to conciliate, and the bank refused CORE'S
offers to talk unless the civil rights group publicly announced it understood that the bank would not provide CORE with the information it
demanded. 92
In the meantime, the bank had been putting sharp pressure on all
its branches to increase minority hiring. During the three months of the
crisis the bank hired more than three hundred new black employees. 93
With this increase in nonwhite hiring safely in its pocket, the bank then
announced on June 1 that executives had signed a memorandum of
understanding with the California FEPC implementing the points of its
March 12 open letter.94 CORE continued to picket for the rest of the
summer, but the bank held firm and eventually the demonstrations
ceased.
The business community responded slowly but positively to the
employment demonstrations of 1963 and 1964. When a firm found itself
the object of public attack it almost invariably denied wrong doing, declared it would not be coerced, and then went ahead to meet the demands
of the demonstrators, thus giving the lie to its original protestations of
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innocence. The need for immediate action to remedy employment injustice was the message that came through, even to those not specifically
affected by the boycotts and demonstrations. Commenting on the San
Francisco demonstrations, Fortune magazine advised its readers, "To
achieve the kind of results Negroes are demanding business will have
to move swiftly and aggressively. " 95
The militant action offended much of the white public. Among
some employers there was enough fear of a white backlash to a strong
equal employment position that they attempted to minimize publicity
about any actions which they took to meet Negro demands. 96 _While
confrontation tactics may have offended much of the white public, consumers did not necessarily rally to the cause of a besieged firm . In the
. mid 1960's the public expected business to provide equal employment for
blacks and it hurt a businessman's image to be branded discriminatory,
which is why public relations firms were increasingly involved in business racial policies. 97 Moreover, businessmen recognized that the public
had come to expect fair employment. A progressive hiring policy was
good public relations, even if black pressure were the actual source of
the move to employ Negroes.
The upsurge of civil rights protests in 1963 and 1964 alerted businessmen to the black community's increasing concern with employment
problems, a concern which was burned into the minds of employers by
the three years of urban disorders which followed. Mass violence with
racial overtones is historically endemic in American cities. Until 1965,
however, most businessmen ignored urban violence because it did not
directly affect them. Only when the disorder approached the proportions
of a spontaneous revolution did businessmen take an active hand in trying
to deal with America's racism. Businessmen recognized immediately that
unequal employment patterns for blacks was one of the underlying
causes of the riots. 98
The business community had not been totally blind to the possibly
explosive consequences of unequal employment patterns. 99 With very
few exceptions before 1965, however, businessmen feared the adverse
effects of unequal employment would be political. For example, in 1964
William Miller, the president of Textron, warned, "Equal opportunity
may be the most important issue that this nation faces for many decades
.. . because the American system itself is being tested. Unless we assure
equal rights and equal justice for all, our form of government will be in
jeopardy." 100 In 1959 James C. Worthy, of Sears Roebuck, had suggested
that discrimination was sowing the seeds of revolutionary change in the
country. Worthy warned that if the Negro is "denied the white man's
opportunities he may seek to take some of the white man's power away
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from him." But Worthy was worried about political not violent revolution. His fear was the radical potential of legitimate black electoral
power tied "through heightened race consciousness, to demagogic appeals and boss control. "101
The riots were thus a more severe reaction than even the most
pessimistic businessmen had predicted. It was not political extremists
that the businessmen feared, but violent street revolution. "It is no
longer solely a matter of justice and the principles of democracy," said
Henry Ford II. "After the tragic events of the past few summers we
must finally recognize-if we did not do so before-that our very national unity and the peace of our cities are at stake." 102 W. P. Gullander,
president of the National Association of Manufacturers, declared, "The
problem of Watts is not a Negro problem, it is our problem as a nation,"
and he went on to point out that "the fundamental cause of the Watts
riot was lack of jobs for Negroes." 103 Executive after executive echoed
Gullander's contention that the riots were a national problem which
business could help solve. Many admitted that they were spurred to
increased efforts by the spreading violence, and not a few implicitly
condoned the violence, like the California industrialist who commented,
"Perhaps riots help more at some stages in the evolution of this
thing than they hurt. How the devil do you get 200 million people to
wake up?" 104
Three years of rioting left many businessmen with the belief that
the very foundations of society were under attack. It became manifestly clear, even to the most · conservative businessmen, that something
had to be done to reestablish domestic peace. Rioting upset plans, and
long-range planning is the heart of rational business management. Some
employers continued to use many of the preriot economic justifications
for actively hiring Negroes. They spoke of making the Negro a purchaser
of goods rather than a consumer of taxes. 105 But they did so with the
clear implication that an increase in purchasing power would also lead
to a decrease in the propensity to riot. Stanley Marcus, head of Dallas'
Neiman-Marcus department store, commented on his own feelings by
observing that fellow retailer Joseph Hudson was head of a business
action movement in Detroit. "Once a man sees his investment in a community going up in smoke," said Marcus, "he is going to act." 106
No man was more committed to the new cause than Henry Ford II.
Speaking to the Buffalo Area Chamber of Commerce, Ford remembered
that on a previous trip to Buffalo in 1950 "we were a complacent, selfsatisfied country . . .. Business executives and chamber officials in those
days were beginning to talk about social responsibilities or corporate
citizenship, but most of us had hardly begun to act." Ford sounded op-
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timistic, however, when he told his audience, "More and more businessmen are waking up to the fact that they must concern themselves in
deeds as well as in words with the needs of their country and its cities." 107
The riots climaxed six years of sharply increasing pressure on the
business community. Beginning with President Kennedy's Executive
Order 10925, businessmen had suffered a series of blows, the Civil Rights
Act, the civil rights movement, and finally the uprisings in the nation's
cities. There were businessmen who rebelled at the growing militancy in
the black community and who refused to join in the breastbeating contest which followed the riots. A West Coast chamber of commerce official
complained that despite "fundamental progress . .. in changing attitudes
of businessmen in our city in the past five years," employers were beginning to "conclude that there is little chance of overcoming the trend
toward anarchy in our major cities" and that it was "futile to seek an
integrated labor force. " 108 Most comment, however, was more along the
lines of an American Telephone and Telegraph report which declared
bluntly, "The question of whether or not a company participates in programs designed to provide job opportunities for Negroes is no longer
appropriate. The question today is how it should participate. " 109

10
Beyond Equal Employment: The Revolution
in Personnel Policy

Increased federal pressure and the actions of the civil rights movement produced a series of profound changes in the attitudes of American
businessmen toward Negro employment. Personnel policies which had
their roots deep in the American Creed and in the Capitalist Ethic were
torn up, and strange new doctrines were planted in their place. The ideal
of equal employment opportunity gave way to affirmative action and
compensatory practices. The law and the riots motivated businessmen
to institute radically new policies of recruitment, selection, and training
which went beyond anything even the most liberal fair employment supporter asked for in the 1950's. While the most extreme innovations were
limited to the nation's largest corporations, their abandonment of the
American Creed principle of color-blindness and of the Capitalist Ethic
principle of hiring the best man for the job marked a fundamental new
departure in employment attitudes.
In 1963 several hundred thousand demonstrators had marched on
Washington demanding "Jobs now!" but it was to take civil turmoil in
the nation's largest cities to actually get jobs now. The Watts riot of
1965 and the Chicago riot of 1966 gave rise to a handful of job programs, 1 but when more than two dozen cities experienced some sort of
racial disorder during the summer of 1967, the nascent employment organizations -engendered by the earlier troubles abandoned plans for slow,
careful development and sought instant maturity. Businessmen in Dade
County, Florida, for example, had joined with the government and
various social welfare agencies in 1967 to form the Dade County Equal
Employment Opportunity Task Force, which was to "conduct an effective action program to develop greater employment of minority group
members residing in Dade County." After its founding in May, 1967, it
took the task force almost two months to establish working committees.
But Miami's businessmen had second thoughts about their measured pace
on July 26-during the height of the Detroit riot. At an emergency
159
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meeting the organization's leaders decided they needed a crash program.
It took them only two days to create a new emergency plan, and within
the week they found two thousand jobs for minority group members. 2
The great crush to "do something" was on. By September the N ew York
Times could comment that a list of the companies actively engaged in
ghetto-oriented programs " would read much like a stock-market table and
run just about as long.'' 3
Demands made by civil rights organizations in the wake of the
riots found an extraordinarily receptive audience in the business community. Businessmen who were not dependent on consumer purchases could
afford to dicker over employing blacks when sit-ins, picketing, and boycotts were the ultimate weapons of the civil rights movement. But when
the crackle of the flames and the sound of gunfire still echoed in the
streets, civil rights groups could move businessmen, and move them fast ,
to hire immediately large numbers of Negroes who would have never
even made it past the factory gate in more peaceful times. The way in
which the black community in Rochester, New York, rioted and then
used the threat of renewed violence to force that city's business community to make concessions provides a case study of the business response to
the new black militancy.
The first postwar riot occurred in Harlem during the summer of 1964.
Harlem is the capital of black America and traditionally has been the
bellwether of the mood of black Americans. All the problems that beset
Negroes converged in Harlem. Overcrowding, poor.living conditions, high
prices, friction with the police, poor schools, and high unemployment
made the trouble in Harlem and in its sister ghetto, Bedford-Stuyvesant,
understandable. But when blacks rioted in Rochester in late July, 1964,
they shattered a number of illusions about the status of Negroes outside
of the nationally known urban concentrations. The demand for labor in
Rochester was high, but so was the unemployment rate among blacks.
Many Rochester firms had long traditions of equal employment, and most
of them also held government contracts. Rochester's leading industriesKodak, Xerox, Bausch & Lomb, General Motors, and General Dynamicsemployed black technical and professional personnel. But the very nature
of the work that made the employment of technically trained blacks possible meant that there were fewer jobs for the unskilled who made up the
bulk of Rochester's Negro population. 4
Immediate business response to the riot was unimpressive,5 but
Rochester's Council of Churches reacted to the riot by inviting Saul
Alinsky's Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) to come to the city to
organize the black community, and it was IAF that turned the riot into a
weapon for better jobs. Funded by a hundred thousand dollars in church
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money and directed by IAF, the black community organized under the
name FIGHT (Freedom, Integration, God, Honor-Today) in the spring of
1965. The Rev. Franklin Delano Roosevelt Florence (Minister Florence)
led FIGHT in an attack on slum-lords, the United Fund, the antipoverty
program, and local industry.6
FIGHT was successful in persuading the Xerox Corporation to expand
its training program.7 Then, in September, 1966, FIGHT turned its guns on
Rochester's most imporitant employer, the Eastman Kodak Company.
FIGHT asked Kodak to hire six hundred hard-core unemployed whom FIGHT
would recruit. Minister Florence said FIGHT wanted Kodak to train "the
down and out, the man crushed by this evil system, the man emasculated,
who can't make it on his own."8
Meetings between FIGHT and various representatives of Kodak continued for four months. FIGHT refused to back down on its figure of six
hundred and the company refused to bind itself to a specific number because "jobs aren't something you turn out of a machine." Nevertheless,
Kodak began to recruit blacks more actively and began to hire larger
numbers of unskilled blacks by lowering its employment standards and
undertaking a basic education program to equip new employees with
educational fundamentals.9
On December 1 Kodak's new negotiator, assistant vice president John
Mulder, signed an agreement commiting Kodak to hire the six hundred
men over a two-year period. The next day Kodak's top management met
and issued a statement declaring that Mulder had exceeded his instructions and nullified the agreement. 10 Minister Florence called Kodak "institutionally racist" for going back on its word and warned, "I see troubled
times, grave times for the total community because of the dishonesty of
Eastman Kodak." 11 FIGHT warned about a "long hot summer" and invited Stokely Carmichael to Rochester, where the militant black leader of
SNCC and founder of the "black power" movement promised, "We're going
to bring [Kodak] to their knees if it's the last thing we do. " 12
Fearing perhaps that their own creation had gotten away from them,
the Council of Churches began preliminary action to set up a new committee to respond to the needs of black citizens. Meetings first expanded
from Protestant church members to include other religious groups, then
the business community, and finally organizations representing the poor.
In April, 1967, these groups came together to form RocheS1ter Jobs, Inc.
(Rn) . 13 RJI said its purpose was to mobilize "the resources of the Rochester
area in order to develop a community-wide program that will make possible the hiring by participating business and industry of the unemployed
in the Rochester community and provide motivation, counseling and
training that will assist individuals in securing employment and remaining
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steadily on the job. " 14 The twenty-man board of directors had ten representatives from business, commerce, and industry, seven from organizations directly involved with the poor, and three clergymen, one Protestant,
one Catholic, and one Jew.ts
Although RJI declared itself neutral in the FIGHT-Kodak dispute, it
proposed a settlement that could give both sides a chance to settle their
differences without losing face. RJI recommended that the business community establish centers to train the unemployed to fill the needs of local
industry. RJI promised "to employ, educate and train fifteen hundred unemployed and under,employed, with emphasis on the hard oore unemployed over the next eighteen months," through the use of quotas for
participating firms. 16 Although Kodak had termed FIGHT's demands for
hiring a specific number of Negroes "morally, legally and economically
wrong," 17 the company's executives apparently felt that similar quotas
established by Rn were proper. Both FIGHT and Kodak agreed to work together under the umbrella of the new organization, 18 and the business
community agreed to raise more than three hundred thousand dollars to
finance the projected three-to-four-year program. 19
Under the leadership of executive director Edward S. Croft, RJI members began hiring unemployed and recrui,ting in inner-city neighborhoods. 20
In the six months from the time it began operation, RJI filled thirty percent
of its eighteen-month quota of fifteen hundred j·obs. 21 In addition to finding
jobs, RJI held an "educational seminar" in which it familiarized eight
hundred people, most of them first-line foremen, with "the emotions and
attitudes of the hard-core unemployed applicant and his plight to find and
retain suitable employment. " 22 RJI also helped finance two special programs: Teens on Patrol, a summer-time work program for unemployed
minority youth, and Advancement Through Clerical Training, an on-thejob clerical training program run by the Urban League. 23
Kodak not only supported the work of RJI but acted on its own to
find and employ marginal black workers. Minister Florence succinctly
summed up Kodak's motivation when he observed, "Kodak started its
programs because they were kicked in the face ." 24 Once kicked by the
forces of t1he black revolution , Kodak did two things done by virtua,Hy
every big company which tried to deal with the problem of militant black
unrest. First, the company joined with other businessmen in a voluntary
equal employment organization, and, second, it altered some of its fundamental approaches to personnel selection. It went from a simple policy of
granting equal employment opportunity to one of actively recruiting,
training, and hiring the marginal worker.
The civil rights movement created an atmosphere in which businessmen could act without serious fear of adverse public reaction. In fact,
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businessmen came to fear public disapproval for not having enough black
workers rather than for hiring too many. As pressure for more Negro
employment increased, the neat balance between the American Creed and
the Capitalist Ethic began to deteriorate. No longer was it enough to apply
the same criteria to both blacks and whites. Business had to make a positive and successful effort to get Negroes into the firm. The ideal of color
blindness was left behind after 1965, as numbers of leading businessmen
voluntarily initiated and participated in numerous affirmative-action programs in which they sought out, trained, and placed black workers.
The original impetus for affirmative action had come from the
federal government. Under severe pressure in the spring of 1961 to meet
the affirmative-action clause demanded by Executive Order 10925 in all
federal contracts, the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation initiated a "voluntary" Plan for Progress in which it agreed to seek Negro workers for jobs
at all levels and to promote employees without discrimination.25 Lockheed's affirmative-action plan had little impaot on companies without
major government contraots until 1963, when Whitney M. Young, Jr.,
executive director of the National Urban League, called for a domestic
Marshall Plan for Negroes. Young specifically denied that his plan was
"preferential treatment, indemnification, special consideration, [or] compensatory activity." Young wanted special effort,rnot special privilege. He
called for a "a planned effort to place qualified Negroes in all categories
of employment at all levels of responsibility. This would mean that employers would consciously seek to hire qualified Negro citizens and would
intensify apprenticeship and training programs to prepare new Negro employees and upgrade those already employed. " 26 While Young did not
ask for preferential treatment on the job, nor did he ask employers to
lower their job requirements, he admitted he was requesting preferential
hiring by suggesting that companies give "a time preference by actively
seeking Negro applicants a week before opening the doors to others." 27
Young's call for a special effort to hire Negroes was the formal
presentation by a recognized national black leader of what civil rights
groups had begun to demand through direct action. 28 In a widely discussed article, Fortune editor Charles E. Silberman used the Philadelphia
boycotts as an example of militant black organizations that were demanding "business firms hire Negroes not because they were qualified but because they are Negroes." When Silberman quoted Young, the essential
modifier "qualified" was nowhere to be seen. Silberman commended to
his business audience Young's observation that "they must go further than
fine impartiality. We must have, in fact, special consideration if we are to
compensate for the scars left by three hundred years of deprivation .. . ." 29
By ignoring the term "qualified," Silberman was in effect saying that the
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employer had a special obligation to absorb the additional cost of employing a substandard worker. In one sense he was returning to the arguments of the pioneering employers of the 1940's who had urged equal
employment even at the cost of alienating some employees or customers.
But whereas the earlier proponents of Negro employment had demanded
equal treatment for blacks and whites, Silberman was asking for "special
consideration."
Although the federal government had been demanding that federal
contractors actively recruit blacks since 1961, by 1963 the Labor Department had begun to encourage all employers, not only government contractors, to take affirmative action through personnel policy changes.
Speaking to the Urban League in 1963, Secretary of Commerce Luther H.
Hodges said that any company which wanted to make its equal employment opportunity program "truly effective" had to thoroughly reexamine
its personnel policies. Hodges said, "A responsible management official
personally commited to the program should supervise a review of seniority
lists, recall lists, job descriptions and classifications, prerequisites for hiring, application forms, employment tests, the sources of applicants, and
all aspects of employee recruiting. " 30
The Labor Department suggestions that nonfederal contractors consider policies of affirmative action took on new significance in 1964, when
the Civil Rights Act established the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) . EEOC had specific legislated power and could thus exert formal pressure for full fair employment on all employers. EEOC chairman, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Jr., said, "We are asking management
for more than fair hiring practices, we are suggesting creative recruitment
policies that actually seek out qualified employees among minority groups."
Although EEoc's concept of affirmative action still emphasized "qualified"
applicants, the commission recommended that affirmative-action programs
include: the adoption and communication of a strong fair employment
policy to all company personnel; a broadening of recruitment sources to
include those specifically designed to reach minority audiences; an active
solicitation of minority participation in training programs; an auditing of
skills of existing employees and promotion of those meriting it; and participation in community projects. 31 By 1967, state fair employment commissions and big city mayors had also begun to advocate affirmative action
programs similar to that of the federal EEoc. 32
Even in its mildest form, affirmative action required a special effort
to recruit qualified blacks. More frequently it also entailed either lowering
standards or bninging substandard recruits up to par. In any case, affirmative action required employers to undertake extra expenses in order to
employ Negroes. Such costs could not be justified by the Capitalist Ethic,
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and there is some question as to whether affirmative action did not also
violate the canons of the American Creed. It is ironic, but understandable,
that no sooner had the business community accepted the American Creed
as a guide for employment policy thari external forces demanded that
business move beyond equal employment into a program of compensatory
action.
Until the late sixties, hiring the best man for the job had been a fundamental maxim of the selection and placement procedure. During the
forties and fifties, most businesses based their objections to hiring Negroes
on the assumption that while blacks might be technically able to perform
the job, they had certain social liabilities which made them less than the
best qualified candidate. Once pioneer placements had demonstrated that
blacks could perform successfully, businessmen usually accepted the
American Creed philosophy of impartiality expressed by Ivan Willis, the
vice president of industrial relations for International Harvester and one
of the early leaders in the field of equal employment. In 1952 Willis told
a congressional committee, "We say that our policy is non-discrimination.
To us that means not only 'no discrimination against' but also means 'no
discrimination for.' We do not refuse to hire a man just because he is a
Negro. Neither will we hire him just because he is a Negro." 33 By 1958
virtually all the employers interviewed in a study of Negro employment
advocated a situation in which "Negro applicants are considered as a
matter of course and Negro employees are given no additional attention or
special consideration over other employees . .. ." 34 Thus by the late fifties
and early sixties the business community had come to accept the ideal of
equal employment. In thought at least, if not always in practice, the equal
opportunity imperative of the American Creed had become a reality.
The demands for affirmative action during the mid-sixties presented
the business community with a crisis of conscience. For years the business
community had gone to great lengths to justify its failure to live up to the
American Creed. Having finally accepted the ideal of fair employment,
employers were reluotant to abandon so widely held a value for the apparently problack demands of affirmative action. Businessmen frequently
voiced their resentment at what they considered governmental or civil
rights pressure for " reverse discrimination. " 35 Some employers claimed
"the forces of free enterprise won't allow these special costs" of preferential treatment, 36 while others refused to engage in any compensatory
effort because they "earnestly believed . in the principle and practice of
equal opportunity. " 37
While one segment of the business community was struggling to defend its so recently acquired principles of equal employment opportunity,
a number of particularly progressive employers moved to accept the idea
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of affirmative action and to justify its supposedly undemocratic implications. In 1964, a vice president of American Airlines approvingly quoted
Anatole France's remark, "The law in its majestic equality forbids both
the rich and the poor to sleep under bridges," and went on to warn against
falling "under the illusion that people are treated equally when no recognition is given to three hundred years of deprivation of opportunity. " 38
This statement was remarkable not only for its candid support of compensatory action, but because it came from an airline official. Airlines had
been among the most conservative of the service industries in their resistence to employing blacks in jobs in which they would have contact with
the public.
The evolution of the racial personnel policies of Pitney-Bowes, manufacturers of postage meters and other office machines, provides an excellent example of the way in which business thought responded to changing public expectations. At any given time in the postwar period the Negro
employment policy of Pitney-Bowes was representative of the most progressive thinking in the business community. The management of the
company had a long tradition of community involvement, but like so many
other firms, it was not until World War II that the company became concerned about discriminatory employment. As a regional director of the
War Production Board, Walter H. Wheeler, Jr., Pitney-Bowes' chairman
of the board, became acutely aware of the manpower shortage. Wheeler
recognized that the black community represented an untapped labor
source, and he ordered his personnel men to hire Negroes until blacks represented the same proportion of employees as they did in the company's
home city of Stamford, Connecticut. 39 Company success with Negro production workers during the war encouraged the management to begin
hiring black secretarial help in the postwar years. 40
The firm began its Negro employment policy by skimming the cream
off the black manpower pool. Although Wheeler expressed an initial desire
to see that his company employed a percentage quota of the minority
people in the community, a more "realistic" course prevailed during the
late forties. Because Pitney-Bowes was a pioneering company in the field
of minority employment, it took advantage of its position by selecting the
few best qualified Negroes rather than hiring blacks widely. Not only did
the early Negro employees have to pass the company's standard battery of
preemployment tests, but they also had to have "intelligence, tact and
diplomacy of a high degree." It was not enough that the black worker be
able to perform his task. The company had to be sure "that each new
employee was very well qualified from all standpoints and would create
the highest possible impression of the race itself. " 41 Once the pioneer
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placements were completed in the late forties, however, the firm pursued
a straight, evenhanded equal employment policy.
Company spokesmen continued to be outspoken advocates of Negro
employment through the 1950's,42 but it was not until the mid-sixties
that Pitney-Bowes took the next step forward. Whereas it had previously
been color-blind, after an initial period of hiring overqualified blacks,
starting in 1964 the firm began to seek out qualifiable Negroes and
train them for available jobs. Pitney-Bowes president, John 0. Nicklis,
explained, "Equal opportunity is a fine principle, but it does not recognize
the inability of many Negroes to compete equally, because of past
discrimination in employment and education." The firm claimed that
it trained blacks only for jobs for which there were no qualified white
workers. "As long as we have to train someone, we'll train the Negro,"
said the director of employee and public relations, James Turrentine.
Turrentine even implied that despite company statements, blacks were
given actual preference over whites at lower job levels. He denied, however, that Negroes got any special consideration for management positions. "You cannot settle for a manager who is 20% less qualified for
a task," Turrentine said, "but below the management level, we believe
that we can justify the employment of persons who have a handicapcolor-and who lack experience because of that handicap." 43
Pitney-Bowes attempted to reconcile its hiring program with the
traditional concept of fair play by explaining that because no whites
were available, no qualified white worker was being cheated out of a
job. But even if qualified white workers were available, there were some
businessmen who advocated training and employing hard-core unemployed Negroes. Crown Zellerbach's senior vice president James P. Mitchell called upon businessmen to "hire what I would call 'qualifiable'
Negroes and train them for jobs.'' 44 However, hiring "qualifiable" blacks
when already qualified whites were available presented the businessman
with an awkward problem for ideological justification.
During the forties and fifties employers with a strong personal
commitment to solving the problems of Negroes placed their faith in
the American Creed. They linked their own religious or ethical values
to the American Creed and believed that evenhanded treatment of
blacks and whites was the best solution to employment discrimination.
It was clear by the late sixties, however, that color blindness had not
significantly reduced black underemployment. It could be argued that
the success of the American Creed could hardly be evaluated since the
business community had accepted it for less than a decade, and then
in an essentially token manner. But neither the government nor the
black masses were willing to wait, and those employers whose commit-
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ment to the needs of the black people was preeminent had to begin to
apply the concept of equal opportunity collectively rather than individually. Whereas traditionally concerned employers had applied the American Creed to individuals, by the late sixties they began to speak of
equal opportunity for blacks as a group. Because historically whites had
discriminated against blacks collectively, this new interpretation of equal
opportunity discarded the American Creed and replaced it with an
obligation to assist all blacks in achieving a better economic position.
Since there could be no reason in the American Creed for discriminating against the more qualified white, and since such a choice
was clearly not in the immediate best economic interests of the firm,
explanations for such action were usually based on personal values or
long-run benefits. Employers who pointed to the black burden of three
hundred years of discrimin ation to justify hiring blacks were in fact
admitting they would shoulder the guilt and pay for the misdeeds of their
fathers. On the other hand , busi nessmen who pointed to the riots were
implying that the immediate costs of affirmative action were a form of
insurance against the continued costs of social disorder- and that was an
explanation which squared with the Capitalist Ethic. When the former
president of the National Association of Manufacturers, H. C. McClellan,
told the California Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riots
that he was opposed to lowering the employment standards because
"that, in itself, would be discrimination," 45 he was taking a classical
American Creed position. But when he said Negroes "should be given,
perhaps, a bit of a priority in Watts because, in that area, un employment presently is about four times that which prevails throughout the
country," 46 he was alluding to both a special obligation for reducing
Negro un employment and to a desire to prevent future riots.
The management of Owens-Illinois publicly and repeatedly took
the final step in the philosophical justification for giving extra help to
Negroes. The company's director of personnel, Harold S. Mayfield, told
a meeting of insurance executives that while they might not have been
able to cross the Delaware with George Washington , climb Mt. Everest,
or go to the moon , "you are in the fo refront of the fight to settle America's
greatest internal problem of the Twentieth Century." Fairness was not
enough, said Mayfield. Blacks were not starting off on a par with whites
and could not be treated as though they were : "They need an extra boost
because they have been injured." Mayfield admitted that he was calling
for preferential treatment and for discrimination in reverse. For Mayfield expectations of fairness could be met by not discriminating against
whites already employed by the firm . He pointed out that none of the
employer's current employees would be hurt by a policy of recruiting
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and training unqualified Negroes, as long as they were fully trained.
Implicit in Mayfield's argument was the understanding that a special
training program for blacks might well be unfair to white job seekers, but
that cost was necessary to compensate for generations of discrimination.47
By the mid-sixties many firms in the North, but not in the South,
had developed a series of rather elaborate philosophical justifications for
their departure from the narrow path of strict equal employment. Although not all firms that did so were willing to admit it, many companies
had begun to give extra help to black applicants as pressure from the
federal government and from the black community increased. 48 Most
employers, however, were reluctant to go beyond a policy of "equal
treatment regardless of race," and southern firms interviewed in a 1966
survey would not even profess simple nondiscrimination. Almost threequarters of the southern businessmen stated they would "employ only
enough Negroes to satisfy the government and the civil rights groups." 49
Whether an employer was motivated to take affirmative action out
of personal conviction or merely wanted to avoid governmental sanctions,
he had to come to grips with the implications for personnel policy raised
by the demands for affirmative action. The social and legal push for more
black employment forced employers to reevaluate three areas of personnel management: recruiting, selection, and training.
Those firms which accepted the idea of affirmative action most
commonly practiced it by giving extra attention to recruiting black
workers. Until the beginnings of the civil rights revolution few if any
firms included black-oriented sources, such as Negro colleges, in their
regular recruiting activities. When an occasional employer conducted a
special search for black workers in the forties and fifties he usually
went to the Negro civil rights and welfare agencies, which, in the words
of a personnel specialist of the late 1950's, "were of valuable assistance
during the initial stages of Negro employment, for they generally referred
the best qualified Negro applicants available." 50
The legal and social pressure of the civil rights movement caused
firms to change their recruiting policies for both high- and low-level
jobs. At the upper end, the black colleges were the most obvious sources
for black technical and professional workers. Southern black schools
suddenly became regular stops in the corporation recruiter's rounds.. 51
For lower-level jobs businessmen at first attempted to find black workers
through traditional sources. Companies contacted the Negro civil rights
and welfare organizations, advertised in the Negro press, and informed
public and private employment agencies that the firm wanted black
employees. 52 Recruiting through established channels may not have
turned up many candidates, but, equally important from a public relations

Beyond Equal Employment: The Revolution in Personnel Policy

171

Houston businessmen who planned a fair to get summer jobs for minority young people in 1967 discovered that two days before the opening
they had 312 job openings for an estimated 7,000 young people who
would attend the fair. Desperate last-minute pressure by civic and business leaders managed to raise that figure to a thousand-an achievement
widely applauded by the press and federal government. But the fact
remains that more than 80 percent of those who came to the highly
publicized fair went away as unemployed as they had arrived. 58
A number of job clearinghouses or placement centers supported
by voluntary groups were both more permanent than the transitory job
fairs and somewhat more successful in finding places for Negro jobseekers.59 Job placement centers, which employers operated outside of
regular private employment agencies or state employment services,
existed in numerous cities including Boston, Omaha, St. Paul, Newark,
and Columbus. 60 Some of them provided a place where businessmen
could find qualified job applicants-in other words doing what the Urban
League had been doing for many years. Others concentrated on finding
work for the so-called hard-core unemployed, whom the traditional
placement services would normally screen out.
Until the riots in the years after 1965, job placement centers usually
concentrated on finding and placing qualified blacks. However, the
numerous job placement centers which employers created in the wake
of the riots sought work for the unskilled hard-core unemployed who
were assumed to be the major component among the rioters. Unlike
most of the previous recruiting efforts, the employment drives in 196768 were geared toward giving the maximum number of jobs to the
maximum number of blacks, even if this meant lowering employment
sta,ndards. The National Alliance of Businessmen (NAB) organized
much of the postriot wave of recruiting which sought the hard-core
unemployed. 61 The genuine depth of the initial business commitment to
hire the hard-core unemployed expressed itself in the willingness of some
big corporations to forego the safety of the herd and strike out into the
ghettos on their own. Instead of joining collective efforts to find the
hard-core unemployed, the companies sent their own recruiters into the
inner city or, in some cases, set up employment offices in black neighborhoods.62 Most major firms, however, were reluctant to recruit the
hard-core unemployed. Only twenty-five of four hundred companies contacted by the White House in 1968 agreed to participate in NAB's hardcore recruitment program.63
The Ford Motor Company ran the most publicized and probably the
most successful of the recruiting programs which aggressively sought out
the hard-core unemployed. Chairman of the board Henry Ford II was
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the head of NAB and a leader in the New Detroit Committee, two business
organizations which business leaders had formed in response to the riots
of 1967. Declaring that " management should be willing to go directly
into the city, to seek out the unemployed, to make sure that hiring
standards are not unnecessarily or unrealistically restrictive," Ford directed his company to open inner-city recruiting offices which hired
men who met minimum physical standards for employment regardless
of police records and other normally disqualifying factors. 64 In one year
Ford claimed to have hired five thousand hard-core unemployed.65
The extent to which an employer would modify his recruitment
policies depended on whether or not he believed affirmative action required him to lower employment standards. Those firms sticking closest
to the traditional interpretation of the American Creed took affirmative
action by merely seeking blacks without altering their standards. For
example, a southern-oriented textile journal advocated recruitment of
black workers, but cautioned employers against relaxing standards which
" would damage the best interests of both the employer and the minority
group." The journal even suggested raising standards in order to select
Negroes with potential for advancement. 66 More unorthodox were managers like Alcoa's employment director, R. C. Becker, who recommended
against lowering standards but who qualified his position by calling for
a review of the standards with a conscious attempt to get away from
" middle class bias. " 67 Most removed from the American Creed were
those special programs designed to get jobs for the so-called hard-core
unemployed which asked employers to "waive all normal standards"
including high school diplomas, police records, and aptitude tests.68
Even employers who agreed that standards should be lowered for
black applicants disagreed on the actual method by which they would ease
entry for the Negro worker. Employers could reevaluate job requirements
to eliminate those not germane to actual job performance. They could
lower standards and hire applicants with deficiencies which the worker
would remedy in a training program. Or the employer could, and this was
never advocated although it was occasionally practiced, lower his employment standards so that blacks who were not up to par with available
white workers would be hired and retained.
Traditionally companies had set standards higher for the black applicant than for the white. In the late l 940's, a Negro personnel assistant said,
"I am very careful in the selection of our girls. It is generally agreed that
the Negro girls working here are of a higher type than the white girls. " 69
Superselectivity continued in varying degrees through the mid-1960's. 70 It
remained particularly prominent as a feature of pioneer placement, and as
long as there were large numbers of firms which had not hired their first
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black employees, overqualified applicants continued to be in demand.
Demand for higher qualifications for blacks was particularly evident
in the South. In 1964 the management of the Atlanta branch of a national
mail order house with less than a glowing reputation as an equal opportunity employer had to have its executives pull a number out of a hat to
determine who would get the company's first Negro secretary. Even though
this was a southern branch of a go-slow firm, all the executives wanted the
new black secretary because they knew she would have to be superior to
the average white girl. 71 But management's overcautious approach to
pioneer placement and extreme, if not discriminatory, care in selecting
subsequent Negro employees could not withstand the pressure for increased black employment of the late 1960's. Clearly an employer could
not maintain traditional standards and at the same time hire the hardcore unemployed.
The demands for aggressive recruitment had a profound impact on
one of the personnel officer's most cherished selection devices, the test.
Scientifically rational, and free from the prejudices of personality, equal
employment proponents had long advocated objective testing procedures
as a way of complying with the American Creed and of eliminating racial
discrimination in employment. 72
The legitimacy of tests as a selection device remained unchallenged
until the early 1960's. Even then many, probably most, employers continued to depend on tests to protect themselves from accusations of discrimination. A 1967 survey of seventy-four Los Angeles firms found that
85 percent of them used employment tests, and 78 percent of the using
group observed the same cut-off scores for both Negro and white applicants.73 If the Los Angeles employers counted on the tests to prove their
fair employment practice, they were on solid legal ground. During the war
and up through the 1950's, government agencies advocated testing as a
means of insuring unbiased selection. 74 As late as 1966, the vice chairman
of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission told southern businessmen, "The commission doesn't intend-or want-to lower employment standards .... Testing programs which help determine a qualified
employee are permissible under the law. " 75
The discriminatory nature of employment testing was not widely
recognized until 1964, when an examiner of the Illinois Fair Employment
Practices found the Motorola company guilty of an unfair practice for
refusing to hire a Negro applicant who had "failed" a short general intelligence test. Late the same year, the examiner ordered Motorola to hire
the applicant and to cease using the test. The examiner was partially overruled by the full commission. While the commission did not demand the
employment of the complainant or ban the further use of the employment
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test, it confused the issue by ordering Motorola to pay the complainant a
thousand dollars for the expense and embarrassment which the incident
had caused him, and it ordered the company to cease unfair practices. A
court subsequently threw out the award but sustained the ban on unfair
practices. Because of legal technicalities dealing with the way charges
were brought against the company, neither the courts nor the commission
ruled directly on the propriety of preemployment testing, but they succeeded in opening up a wide-ranging debate that forced employers to question both selection methods and selection criteria. 76
Because the federal EEOC deferred to state commissions, businessmen
had to worry about state FEPC interpretations of employment testing such
as that in the Motorola case, but as far as the federal commission was concerned business fears were unfounded. Section 703 (h) of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 specifically permitted the use of "any professionally developed
ability test provided that such test, its administration or action upon the
results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race,
color, religion, sex or national origin." As a matter of fact evidence indicates that many firms interpreted this section of the act to mean that valid
employment tests could be used as a defense against charges of discrimination and thus began using them for the first time.77 While the federal
commission accepted the concept of testing, it cautioned employers to be
sure that their tests did not inadvertently discriminate. In 1966, USEEOC
issued a set of guidelines to help management develop acceptable test
procedures. The commission suggested six steps, all of which boiled down
to insuring that the tests were valid. If a firm could demonstrate that its
objectively administered tests differentiated between applicants who would
succeed on a given job and those who would fail, it was operating within
the law. 78
Legally, no employer was obligated to give special treatment to Negro
test takers; in fact, however, some did. In a number of firms the acceptable
passing scores were lowered in order to include larger numbers of blacks in
the work force,79 and in other companies the cut-off point for black applicants was set below that for whites.80 When the KLH corporation discovered that no one without a high school education could pass the
Wonderlic test (a standard, short general intelligence test), the company
attempted to validate the test by administering it to some of the firm's
best Negro supervisors. When they failed to pass, KLH eliminated the high
school education requirement and the use of the test. 81
Some highly progressive firms like KLH said, "The hell with the
Wonderlic," 82 but by and large employers were reluctant to do away with
employment tests that were a "product of at least a half century of exploring and disproving alternative approaches." 83 However, all employers
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seemed willing to accept, at least in theory, the need for more rigorous attention to the validity of testing. Large numbers of companies began to reevaluate both their job requirements and their tests.84 Having determined
the actual minimum skill necessary to perform a given task, business began
to look for tests which measured only those skills and did "not depend
upon the applicants having been born and raised in a particular cultural
environment and having been exposed to a specified educational system." 85
The impact of the civil rights revolution affected each firm's selection
procedure differently. Some companies introduced employment testing for
the first time, others threw out testing for some jobs, and still others attempted to find out what their tests were testing and whether it was relevant to the job. Although the techniques adopted could be diametrically
opposed, the purpose was actually the same: to increase the number of
Negro employees until there were "enough," but how many was that?
In the halcyon days before 1960, the equal employment opportunity
movement never seriously considered the idea of quotas except as objectionable devices contrary to the spirit of the American Creed used by employers to limit the number of minority workers in their firms. Arguing in
favor of FEPC in 1945, Malcolm Ross called the idea that FEPC would require positive quotas "obvious nonsense. The whole idea of quotas indicates discrimination." He continued, "FEPC has repeatedly condemned
racial quotas, and insists merely that employers shall hire the best qualified person for a specific job. " 86 American Friends Service Committee
field workers told employers in 1950 not to pay attention to quotas or
percentages but merely to hire and promote the best qualified people. 87
When employers did maintain quotas they used them for the most part as
devices to prevent Negroes from becoming overrepresented in any job
category, including that of janitor. But while quotas set a maximum number of black employees, they seldom set a minimum and so could only work
against black job seekers. 88
Prior to 1960 quotas were regarded as restrictive devices (although
the Urban League occasionally advocated them as a way to insure a minimum number of jobs for blacks) that fair employment forces opposed, not
only for practical reasons, but because they believed hiring blacks in proportion to their percentage in the population was "discriminatory, since
it is based not on the individual's particular capacities but on his ethnic
group identity. " 89 But when in the 1960's militant black leaders began advocating benign quotas, it was the businessmen who appealed to the
classic fair employment ideal of employing the best man for the job as a
reason for not hiring specific numbers of black workers. In its equal employment policy the Babcock and Wilcox Company stated that it would
not "foster unsound practices such as: .. . offering of employment oppor-
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tunities without regard to individual classifications of ability, for the purpose of achieving correlation between the company's employee population
and the population of the community on a racial, religious, or other
basis. " 90
Section 703 (j) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 clearly stated that the
law could not be interpreted to require hiring to correct "an imbalance
which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons
of any race .... " Thus employers were entirely within their legal rights
to reject calls for quotas. But reality was more complex than the letter
of the law. President Johnson's Secretary of Labor, Willard Wirtz, continually reiterated the government's position that "there will be neither
passing nor acceptance of the idea of quotas as far as the administration
and government is concerned, and as far as the President's Committee is
concerned and as far as Plans for Progress is concerned. " 91 But Wirtz's ·
pious adherence to the fair-play ideal of the American Creed did not
square with the observations of more impartial students of the black employment scene. In 1965 Ray Marshall said, "Federal agencies sometimes
have [implicitly] sanctioned quota systems and have at least left the impression that Government contractors are expected to give preferential
treatment to minorities. " 92 According to one account, affirmative action
as called for by Executive Order 10925 required the employer to have
"minority representation ... [that] is significantly representative of the
population ratio of white to minority in the community location of the
facility." This proportional representation was to be carried out "in all
divisions of the work force'' and in the income of minority employees. 93
In part as a response to the demands of .the civil rights groups and of
the government, and in part because they wanted some guideline to insure
fair employment, firms began to accept the idea of establishing racial
quotas. In some cases, the quota was seen as a minimum. For example,
two northern companies stated that their Negro employment goals were
"to employ at least one Negro sales clerk at all times," and "to hire
Negroes in all major job categories." 94 The Bekins Van and Storage Company placed the minimum in strict percentage terms. It told its district
managers, "Our goal is a minimum of ten percent this year. Any office with
ten or more salaried personnel should have at least one. Operations crews
should have a minimum of ten percent. " 95 Some of the more outspoken advocates of black employment defended this kind of strict minimum quota
system. Although they acknowledged its inherently undemocratic nature,
they contended it was the only way of insuring fair employment. 96
In most instances businessmen rejected strict numbers or percentages, but were willing to accept the idea of a guideline or hiring target. A
personnel director whose department split over the question of a numeri-
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cal target "decided that no specific number should be spelled out-it might
be misconstrued as another form of discrimination-but, informally, we
are reviewing exactly how many Negroes are in how many jobs, which
jobs, and at what pay, and are stressing the necessity for getting closer
to racial balance. "97
The civil rights revolution forced new methods of recruitment and
selection on the business community. Where such affirmative action was
limited to finding additional qualified biack workers, the employer faced
no new problem in placing black workers on the job. Where, however,
standards were altered or relaxed in order to increase the number of acceptable Negro applicants, companies had to alter their training methods
in order to accommodate the new employees.
One of the main thrusts of the new interest in training Negroes was
an increased business concern with the quality of vocational education
available to blacks. When blacks served only in menial capacities, businessmen paid little attention to Negro schooling, 98 but as circumstances forced
them to begin hiring more blacks at higher levels, the business community
began to pay increasing attention to the public school system. Inland
Steel's vice president William Caples thought that industry's first job was
to "convince Negro youth that business is a realizable, satisfying and rewarding career." Once having motivated young blacks, Caples urged that
business "take a continuing interest and involve itself in public education,
general, technical and vocational at the primary and secondary level. " 99
Businessmen had a long history of involvement with some aspects of
public vocational training, particularly through participation in "cooperative education" programs which enabled students to work part-time during
school hours in order to give them experience and to demonstrate to them
the applicability of academic subjects. Once employers began hiring
Negroes into the kind of jobs taught in high school vocational classes, it
was logical to extend cooperative education programs to minority students. While the traditional cooperative programs enriched the regular
school curriculum of the average student, the new programs directed their
attention to the drop-out or potential drop-out. The antidrop-out cooperative programs were not limited to Negro students, but they included large
numbers of minorities since minorities constituted a disproportionately
large segment of drop-outs.
The nature of the plans varied widely. Some were actually counseling or tutoring programs, not strictly cooperative programs. Rather than
giving the students jobs, managerial personnel donated their time as bigbrothers who would give advice about vocational, educational, and personal problems. Most plans, however, followed the pattern of Carson Pirie
Scott and Company's "Double E" program. Carson's had been one of the

178

Black Men and Businessmen

first of the major Chicago department stores to hire minority workers, and
store president C. Virgil M a rtin admitted that he was thus able to hire the
best black workers available. Carson's created the Double E program to
help what Martin called " the 'other· Negroes-those who, because of
youth and lack of education and training and cultural deprivation , were
hardly equipped to compete for any job," 100 In the name of morality and
good business, M artin demanded that businessmen stop "skimming the
crea m of high school and college graduates . . . allowing the underprivileged and med iocre to find what th ey can. " 101 Carson Pirie Scott began its Double E (Educat ion and Employment) program in August, 1961.
With money fro m the Ford Foundation (for the initial experiment) and
with teachers from the Chicago school system, Carson's provided classroom space and jobs for high school drop-outs who wanted another
chance. 102
Businessmen also helped school systems by assisting them in their
vocational ed ucation programs. Because acting as an adviser required less
commitment than participati ng in a cooperative program, the advisory
approach to helping schools was extremely popular among businessmen . In
some cases a school and a particular firm had an understanding tha t the
school could call on the company for information about jobs, for speakers,
and for career guidance conferences with th e students. As early as 1963
General Electric had such an arrangement with Benjamin Franklin H igh
School in Philadelphia. 103 The use of employers as vocational program
advisers spread, and after the riots of 1967, a number of firms in Michigan "adopted" schools to which they gave time, manpower, and material
aid in order to strengthen the schools' programs. 104
The most widely adopted business-school plans were the vocational
guidance programs which industry ran for high school counselors. While
such programs existed prior to the establishment of the Plans for Progress, 105 it was not until Plans for Progress introduced its Vocational
Guidance Institutes that the idea became widespread. The first institute
was held at Wayne State University in Detroit in the summer of 1964. According to the official description, the three-week institute for high school
guidance counselors was designed to "increase the counselor's knowledge
about changing employment conditions and opportunities for Negro and
other minority groups." The institute's Jlanners also hoped to set up continuing communication between schools and businesses; to educate the
counselors about the "attitudes which disadvantaged youth s have toward
such matters as employment, education, family life, their place in society,
and the world beyond their experience" ; and "to provide opportunities for
youth by making employers and schools aware of matching potential to
job demands. " 106
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The wide acceptance of the institutes by counselors, spurred no doubt
by the academic credits and stipends which some early participants received, led to a proliferation of institutes during the summers of 1967 and
1968. Both the business participants themselves and outside evaluators
agreed that the Vocational Guidance Institutes performed a valuable service. Hugh L. Gordon of Lockheed believed the most important thing
businessmen learned from the institutes was "how uninformed are the
counselors of these young people as to business opportunities, and how the
public school systems in general are so unprepared to provide career counseling to our youth and how much they need the assistance of the business
community." 107 Theo Volsky, who evaluated the first institutes, concluded
that "no other organized segment of society has the kind of commitment
and organizational ability that business has to lend to education in its
efforts to prepare youth to enter into society and the job market. " 108
But, just as businessmen had never depended totally on the public
schools to train their white workers, they did not limit their educational
activity to public education when it came to training black workers. As
firms began to desegregate their job classifications, they also stopped discriminating against blacks in company job training programs. In training,
as in recruitment and selection, merely granting blacks equal access was
not enough. Members of the Plans for Progress were expected to take
affirmative action in the area of training primarily by encouraging minority
employees to take advantage of company training and apprentice programs.109
Special training programs for adult minority workers do not appear
to have been at all widespread until after the urban disorders of 1967 and
the creation of the National Alliance of Businessmen. 110 Until the riots
most companies were preoccupied with taking affirmative action in recruiting. Bus,inessmen were busy finding the qualified black worker or, at
most modifying· job requirements so that they could hire the black candidates they found. In either case Negroes did not need special training programs. Firms could place the new black employees in the same training
programs in which they placed new white employees.
Through the early 196O's special training programs for Negroes were
usually ad hoc courses designed to bring a particular individual up to par
so the company could hire him. Such programs were used only by firms
which wanted to increase their black work force but which could not find
qualified blacks. 111 But for the most part, unless a company made a practice of hiring large numbers of unskilled Negroes, companies had no
special training programs for blacks.
Secretarial training was the one area in which there was a concerted
business effort to prepare unqualified blacks for employment. Business
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suffered from a chronic shortage of secretarial help, and special programs
for the training of minority women appeared to be th e solution for a number of firms . Some companies, like Aetna Life & Casualty, operated their
own courses which taught typing, shorthand, and remedial English. 112 New
York University ran a similar course with the support of several large New
York City firms. The companies recruited for the training sessions through
the Urban League, and in at least one case partial funding came from an
outside foundation. 113 Although these courses successfull y trained competent secretaries, they also proved to be expensive, and similar programs
for other skills did not appear until the riots, government pressure, and
government financing of 1967.
The civil rights revolution of the 1960's had a profound impact on
management personnel policies in the area of Negro employment. Pressure
from the government and from the streets forced business to abandon its
recently achieved ideological integrity. For a few years in the late fifties
the business community could be true to both the American Creed and
the Capitalist Ethic, but an integrated philosophical system was a far cry
from an integrated economic system, and employers bent to the demands
for increased Negro employment even if it meant renewed ideological inconsistency. Businessmen were most willing to accept affirmative action
in the area of recruiting already qualified blacks. They were more reluctant, however, to modify their overall employment standards, to modify
their standards ·for Negroes in particular, or to give time, effort, and
money to bring substandard workers up to an employable level. Although
the number of blacks employed as a result of the growing acceptance of
affirmative action was still not enough to significantly diminish the vast
sea of underemployed blacks, the change was, nevertheless, a revolution
in management's thinking and even a revolution in management's action
when compared to the inactivity of the 1950's.

11
Voluntarism as a Rear-Guard Action

During the early 1950's businessmen in several cities formed voluntary equal employment councils in order to head off state FEPC legislation. Employers reasoned that if they could practice fair employment
without legal compulsion the legislators might spare them the burden
of an additional regulatory law, while at the same time the business
community would be demonstrating its commitment to the American
Creed. 1 The voluntarist approach to the Negro employment problem
remained popular through the Eisenhower years, although businessmen
did not organize and coordinate their individual efforts into councils
until the Kennedy administration. Like the voluntary fair employment
councils of the 1950's, the voluntary efforts of the 1960's were a response
to the threat of legislative sanctions, but unlike the earlier period, the
voluntary equal employment activity of the 1960's came after, not
before, the enactment of compulsory legislation. In addition, the extralegal inducement of urban racial violence spurred the formation of voluntary merit employment councils during the mid-sixties.
As Ray Marshall has observed, "There is something about the threat
of prosecution that seems to make voluntary programs work much
better." 2 The threat of prosecution began in 1961 with President Kennedy's Executive Order 10925, which demanded affirmative action from
government contractors, and the threat increased sharply after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The number of voluntary programs
increased steadily through the 1960's to reach a climax with the establishment of the National Alliance of Businessmen (NAB) in late 1967.
NAB, a national voluntary organization of businessmen, was the ultimate
voluntary response to the ultimate act of pressure-rioting.
A variety of factors influenced the growth of voluntary fair employment efforts during the Kennedy administration. In addition to the
pressure from the government and the civil rights movement, business
organizations began to urge employers to help solve the problems be181
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setting society. The business community acted partly in the spirit of
the New Frontier, doing what it could for its country, but also out of
the more traditional fear of what its government might do instead.
Both the National Association of Manufacturers and the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States lent their support to the voluntary equal
employment effort. NAM president W. P. Gullander warned that business
was "letting government take too big a role in leadership." NAM believed
that thirty years of federal action had failed to solve social and employment problems, but "in hundreds of communities throughout America
those same 'unsolvable problems' have been effectively and successfully
solved by local action groups dealing with probler.i.s of local dimensicns. " 3
In 1964, NAM began to act as a clearinghouse for local voluntary programs
that dealt with problems of high school drop-outs, training, and emplcyment. NAM called its program Solutions to Employment Problems (STEP)
and published more than seventy studies of successful local voluntary
efforts to solve employment problems and distributed hundreds of thousands of copies to interested businessmen. 4
Although numerous firms responded to the growing demands for
more black employment by individually adopting affirmative-action personnel policies, the dominant trend during the 1960's was tcward collective action. Rather than merely acting alone, businessmen organized
councils through which they could pool their resources (or, at least, behind
which they could hide their individual responsibility) to work to improve
the eccnomic conditions of blacks. In 1966, the Task Force on Economic
Growth and Opportunity of the Chamber of Commerce of the United
States issued a report which, among other things, recommended that
"local chambers of commerce and individual businessmen should initiate
full employment programs tailored to the needs of their ccmmunities. " 5
The report gave no rationale for this suggestion other than a classical
Capitalist Ethic call for an "effective use of all our resources," 6 but an
earlier report by the New York Chamber of Commerce shed additicnal
light on the thinking of organized business groups. The New York report
noted that legal redress through FEPC had reached the point of diminishing
returns, which explained why black groups were exerting pressure directly
on the business community. The report concluded that businessmen
could not escape the problem of black employment. But neither should
businessmen want to escape because the business community could "best
organize and administer job training programs designed to qualify Negroes
for better jobs. The business community can set the tone and style of a
new acceptance of the Negro on all levels of life."7
The composition and activity of voluntary equal employment associations which grew up after 1961 varied widely. Some were composed only
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of businessmen, and, within this group, some only of federal contractors.
Others were more community-oriented and contained representatives
from labor and civil rights organizations in addition to employers.
The history of the Milwaukee Voluntary Equal Employment Opportunity Council ( MVEEOC) provides an excellent case study of the activity
and motivation of local voluntary fair employment groups prior to Plans
for Progress becoming a national organization in 1966. "We Milwaukeeans"-an informal group of white businessmen and Negro community
leaders formed to facilitate intergroup communications-first discussed
the idea of a voluntary council in 1963. 8 Although many of MVEEoc's
charter firms were individual members of Plans for Progress and held
government contracts, government pressure does not appear to have
provided the primary impetus for the council's formation. 9 In both private
correspondence and public announcements MVEEoc's founders justified
their organization as good for the economy and excellent for continued
civic peace. Emphasizing the element of the Capitalist Ethic which stressed
long-run rather than immediate benefits, MVEEOC argued that employing
blacks would save the urban taxpayer money. "It is a fact," said R. A.
Burns, one of MVEEoc's founding fathers, "that a low economic status of
seven percent of cur population tends to lower the strength of the entire
community, reflects a higher than necessary cost for unemployment
compensation, welfare costs and social agencies. " 10 Burns noted that cities
experiencing racial incidents had their "public and industrial images"
adversely affected. 11 "In many locations," he continued, "prearranged
major industrial installations have been cancelled because the sponsor
believed he could not wittingly become part of a community which could
not, or would not, take affirmative control of its civil rights responsibilities." Burns congratulated the city for avoiding incidents but warned,
"Fires are smoldering."t2
Although a desire to prevent racial demonstrations apparently motivated some of MVEEoc's founders , the council's official pronouncements
never cited black activism as one of the reasons for its existence. Even a
comprehensive discussion of business attitudes by a MVEEOC founder,
which included virtually every other possible reason for creating a voluntary council from manpower utilization and morality to Plans for
Progress and "the world-wide ideological struggle," failed to mention
threats or demonstrations or riots. 13 No single event precipitated the
formation of MVEEOC in December, 1963, but there can be little doubt
that the civil rights movement which had moved north and begun to focus
its guns on business was a major contributing factor. Businessmen formed
the council in response to a changing national mood. It represented the
business sector's participation in the spirit of the New Frontier, a spirit
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which dictated understanding rather than opposition to the black
revolution.
In its first official prospectus MVEE0C listed five objectives: 1) to eliminate employment discrimination, 2) to persuade employers to affirm this
purpose and openly support it, 3) to communicate this policy to the Negro
community, 4) to encourage Negroes to get education and training in
order to qualify for jobs, and 5) to gather statistical data to measure the
progress of the first four objectives. 14 By becoming a member of MVEE0C
a company agreed to subscribe to the council's objectives and to take
several steps toward implementing them. All MVEEOC members were to
adopt a formal written policy of nondiscrimination and to "impress upon
employment and supervisory personnel the responsibility of insuring
compliance. . . ." Members agreed to advertise as "equal opportunity
employers" and to use black media and organizations for recruitment
of minority personnel. In a final catch-all promise, member firms agreed
to "participate in other programs and activities designed to promote
minority group knowledge of the Milwaukee business community and
employment opportunities-such as plant tours, school career days, school
co-op, and summer employment programs.15 It is clear that tv.!VEEOC knew
what attitudes individual members should have, and generally what actions
they should take to implement them, but was rather hazy about what
its own role as an organization should be.
Two months after its founding, MVEEOC moved to establish its first
practical program. It set up a one-day seminar for industrial relations
and personnel directors. Assuming that the personnel men might be
reluctant to take even the first step toward integrating, the workshop
sought to convince them that voluntary equal employment was a good
idea. In his introductory remarks Elmer Winter, president of Manpower,
Inc., and chairman of the MVEE0C governing board, urged the participants
to "put up the 'Welcome' sign" and tell Negro applicants, "\Ve will work
with you on upgrading your skills and qualifications so that you may
be better prepared to meet the challenges of the future." And Winter
reminded the executives that they had an opportunity to say to Congress, "We do not need the sanctions of Federal legislation to force us
into fair employment practices. We are prepared to meet our responsibilities fairly and with dignity. " 16
Speaking at the same meeting Peter G. Scotese, a vice president
of Federated Department Stores ( the Boston Store) and a mainstay of
MVEE0C, urged businessmen to support MVEE0C as a way of countering
radical black politics. Scotese observed that the "distinctions between
'morals' and 'economics' " were becoming blurred, and that what once
had been do-good humanitarianism was now essential for maintenance of
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the system. Scotese pointed out that "within 10 years the dominant group
in most large American cities will be Negro." The one-man one-vote
ruling of the Supreme Court meant that "the largest single bloc of votes
in the House will be controlled by the Negro voter." Scotese observed that
this bloc had been so alienated, so deprived, that "relying on the common
ground of mutual interest with mutual goodwill that has tended to unite
us in even the most violent political arguments will be risky." Having
raised the specter of black consciousness, Scotese went on to explain
how it could be destroyed. This "potentially dangerous bloc" had to be
prevented from "developing either physically or psychologically." This
could be done by the "combination of economic opportunity and physical
mobility that broke up the other ethnic blocs which have from time to
time exerted a powerful force on America politically." Integration was
no longer a humanitarian ideal; it had become an essential act of
sociopolitical co-option. With perhaps more prescience than he realized
in that year before Watts and "black power," Scotese warned his
audience, "In order to have the free enterprise system, opportunities for
the Negro citizen must be found, so that this 10% of our population will
not oppose the system he cannot participate in. " 17
MVEEOC concentrated much of its early energy on black education
problems. Although the council rejected recommendations that it establish
scholarships to assist poor minority students, it did develop several other
educational programs. Council leaders recognized that city high schools
aimed their "career days" at middle-class white students and that these
vocational programs had little meaning for black students. An investigating committee recommended that members of the council and the
school board meet to plan a wholly new program of career information
and motivation as well as to explore all other work-related aspects of
academic and vocational education. 18 But before they could plan for
activities for the school year of 1965, a number of MVEEOC members felt
that the council should face the challenge of unemployment for ghetto
youth during the summer of 1964. Winter suggested that council members
offer jobs that would give black students an opportunity to experience
meaningful, interesting work. 19 The advisory committee sent letters to all
MVEEOC members requesting summer positions for disadvantaged students.
This was the first real test of member commitment. The committee asked
council members to voluntarily participate in a program that would serve
the dual purpose of giving students jobs and an insight into the business
world and of showing the Milwaukee community that the business sector
was willing to help the problems of the black unemployed. Of the more
than one hundred members of MVEEOC only ten companies offered any
jobs. In all, companies offered fewer than one hundred jobs, more than
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half of which were in the telephone company. Given the unwillingness
of MVEEOC members to participate in the council's job program, it is not
surprising that when the publisher of the Milwaukee Journal began a
general campaign to find summer work for Milwaukee youth, the advisory
committee refused to support the drive because it did not "fall within
the scope of the activities of the MVEEOC since it is not directed at the
problem of racial discrimination in employment. " 20
Unable to get any support from the council advisory committee for a
summer employment program, Elmer Winter launched his own venture.
Winter's company, Manpower, Inc., created and sponsored Youthpower,
Inc. to find jobs for black young people. Volunteers staffed the Youthpower offices, which successfully served as special employment centers
for students seeking summer work. Manpower, Inc., offices in many other
cities copied the Milwaukee Youthpower idea, frequently with the support
and cosponsorship of other organizations. 21
Aside from two seminars (a second seminar was held on May 9,
1964) and an active speakers bureau, MVEEOC entered its first summer, and
seventh month, with very little to show beyond its press clippings. 22 By
generating wide publicity and expectations, and at the same time doing
nothing concrete, MVEEOC was setting itself up for a nasty fall. Without
programs in the community which blacks could see and appreciate,
MVEEOC was taking on the appearance of a publicity stunt. As one MVEEOC
leader noted, "The council has received much favorable publicity for
its activities, and this in itself has stimulated many questions as to the
impact on minority employment. Ultimately we will have to measure our
performance or lose our effectiveness in the Negro community. " 23
The original charter called for gathering information to measure
effective progress, but the advisory council had been reluctant to ask
its members for a minority head count. Their reluctance was based upon
the fear that member companies would refuse to cooperate, first because
divulging such information would be in violation of company sovereignty
and second because if such information fell into their hands, civil rights
groups might use it against the individual firm. The advisory committee
devised a plan that avoided these pitfalls by having members report
statistics to an independent auditor who released only cumulative figures.
The survey was supposed to demonstrate progress in black hiring, and
"for companies plagued by demands for employment information from
militant civil rights groups, participation in this program will offer an
additional reason to not comply. " 24 Despite advisory committee support
and guaranteed anonymity, the membership responded very slowly to the
request for information. Only ten of the more than one hundred members
reported figures for 1964. 25 The refusal of council members to cooperate
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voluntarily with the advisory committee prevented the council from
gathering the statistics it would need when the organization was attacked
as ineffectual.
Although in March, 1964, the advisory committee had stated,
"[Education] should not be a significant function of this committee," 26
within a year MVEEOC expanded its educational activity well beyond the
original intentions of its founders. Beginning in the summer of 1964,
council members cooperated with the Milwaukee public schools in a
work-study program which gave sixty students on-the-job experience
during school time. 27 In early 1965, the heads of MVEEOC's advisory subcommittee met with principals and guidance counselors to determine how
the business community could participate in career guidance. 28 The
council and the school board established a "buddy" system between
executives and vocational counselors at inner-core schools. Each executive
"agreed to work with the counselors at two schools on a regular and
continuing basis for the purpose of assisting counselors in doing a more
realistic and effective job and to be available to these individuals when
they wish to discuss their plans, problems and programs with the industry
representative. "29
MVEEOC found the buddy system of counselor advising so successful
that when Plans for Progress approached Milwaukee Plans for Progress
members to set up vocational guidance institutes, the advisory committee
turned down the idea as unnecessary. Of course, the fact that Plans for
Progress seminars would have cost members five hundred to a thousand
dollars each and the buddy system cost practically nothing might have
had something to do with the decision, but monetary considerations aside,
the council believed it was getting an equal product for a lower price. 30
Besides the two personnel seminars and the school counselor program,
MVEEOC was the sponsor of only one other project, the "man-marketing
clinic." The genesis of the clinics is unclear, particularly in light of the
insistence of many council founders that training was not properly
within the council's purview. The idea probably came originally from the
"man-marketing clinics" that had been held in New York City since 1933
to assist unemployed executives find new jobs, 31 but why MVEEOC tried
to use a management device for blue-collar workers remains a mystery.
The clinics did not train an individual in a new skill, but taught him how
best to utilize the skills he had-how to market himself. Volunteer instructors from fifteen member companies conducted the council clinics.
Both MVEEOC and the instructors considered the clinics a success, and
they were continued through 1966 as the "How to Get a Job Program." 32
However, there was never any objective measurement of the usefulness
of the sessions. 33
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During 1965, MVEE0C moved the clinics into the core-area schools.
Having already established close contact with the school counselors, participating companies were able to integrate the How to Get a Job Program and the counselor-adviser program into a total approach to vocational information and motivation. Like the original clinics, the school
How to Get a Job Program contained two sessions. The first meeting
consisted of an assembly presentation during which businessmen gave the
students tips on how to dress and act during an employment interview.
The second part of the program took place in the classroom, where the
businessmen distributed sample applications, explained how to use the
classified ads, and answered any questions the students had. 34 Originated
in five core-area schools, the program proved so popular with school administrators that in the spring of 1966 MVEE0C expanded it to twelve
other schools, including a number of predominantly white schools.35
While the council basked in the glory of such an obviously successful
program, none of its members mentioned that holding such programs in
white schools certainly exceeded the original purposes of the council.
MVEEoc's glory was not merely local. The Wisconsin Industrial Commission lauded "this educative, information, direct action program .... "
A federal commissioner from the United States Equal Employment Op:
portunity Council reported MVEE0C was doing "the outstanding job in
the country." The plan received national press coverage, and Winter
presented the Milwaukee program to six hundred members of the Plans
for Progress. Although he obviously realized its shortcomings, Elmer
Winter was not reticent about describing the program and its accomplishments. He traveled to Washington several times to collect official
accolades and to explain the council's program to businessmen from
across the nation. 36 Toward the end of 1965, Winter apparently began to
have second thoughts about the extensive publicity. At a meeting of the
advisory committee he "reported the MVEE0C is receiving nationwide
recognition, perhaps to a greater extent than deserved." But his doubts
were not strong enough to prevent his continued proselytizing. 37
There were signs that the black community was getting fed up with
what appeared to be MVEE0C's meaningless and self-serving projects. Privately, Negro leaders told the advisory committee that MVEE0C responded
only when the government brought pressure, and that blacks were tired
of programs like the man-marketing clinic which were all talk. Such
projects did not provide jobs and they did not bring money into empty
pockets. 38 Finally on January 15, 1966, Negro resentment broke into the
open. The Milwaukee Star, a black newspaper, printed an article by
Walter Jones which observed that the emperor's clothes were not nearly
as resplendent as the reports out of Washington would lead one to be-
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lieve. The paper noted that all the pledges and clinics and educational
programs were so much "ballyhoo" without producing jobs. Jones accused MVEEOC employers of continuing to discriminate against blacks by
saying that they were not qualified for the available jobs. The paper
pointed out that the job openings advertised in its pages were for technicians, keypunch operators, auditors, programmers, statisticians, etc.,
jobs for which most blacks had no training. Jones demanded that council
members move beyond simple equal opportunity and begin to practice
affirmative action. "The real solution," said Jones, "is to seek out the
unemployed and the unemployable Negro and to teach him a skill." The
paper then called for programs of vocational training, remedial education, job counseling, realistic employment standards, and more entrance
jobs.39
Much to the council's discomfort, the state Industrial Commission,
which had previously praised MVEEOC, decided that maybe the council
was not so great after all. Joseph C. Fagan, chairman of the state commission, accused some members of the council of hiding behind the
announced policy of the organization. As a result of a survey of minority
employment conducted by the Industrial Commission, Fagan concluded
that some council members "have been sitting on their haunches . . .
because they joined they feel they don't have any more duties or obligations. "40
MVEEOC responded to these attacks with less than total candor. The
chairman of the advisory committee called the Industrial Commission
report inaccurate and inconclusive and refused to comment further on
the charges. 41 Internal reaction, however, was both more forceful and
more honest. The chairman reported to Winter that while there were
statistical problems with the commission's report, "unless some startling
corrections occur we definitely will not look very good as an organization." He concluded that MVEEOC was on a "hot spot which requires
some prompt and effective concrete action on our part. " 42 The chairman noted that the Wisconsin State Employment Service and the Urban
League had over a thousand names of unemployed men in their files,
most of whom could not qualify for existing openings. He suggested a
crash employment program, with all members of MVEEOC pledging to
hire at least one unqualified man for on-the-job training. Employers
would hire blacks on the spot at an inner-core location. The chairman
believed that he could obtain "a substantial number of commitments
from employers," and the resulting employment would redeem MVEEoc's
tarnished reputation. 43
At the same time Milwaukee CORE charged the council with hypoc
risy for running a How to Get a Job Program and then having no
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jobs to get. CORE called MVEEoc's approach ten years too late and said it
was time for the business council "to put up or shut up." Disturbed by
these attacks, Winter wrote a circular letter strongly urging member
companies to examine their personnel practices to insure that they fairly
recruited, hired, and promoted minority workers. However, lest they
feel too guilty about their role in the employment problem, Winter assured the executives that he had talked "to many Milwaukee Negroes
who tell me to disregard the complaints of the few." Thus, Winter implied, by not ignoring the complaints of the "few" the businessmen could
once more demonstrate their progressive and humanitarian concern. 44
The adverse publicity the council suffered as a result of the Star
article did not produce any significant changes in council activity.
Rather it forced council members to recognize that MVEEOC was not the
final answer to racial employment problems in Milwaukee. The black
community was dissatisfied, and if MVEEOC could not be the great black
hope, it could not be the great white hope either. But rather than spurring increased activity, the criticism merely generated a brief surge of
good intentions which died in the planning stages.
'
During the summer of 1966, Plans for Progress companies throughout the country began to join local employers' councils designed to coordinate the activities of member concerns. The employers' councils also
planned to participate in community programs of training, motivation,
and placement. In other words, national Plans for Progress councils said
they would embark on the trail MVEEOC had blazed, but MVEEOC was at
the point of admitting that it had lost its way in the woods.
MVEEOC modified its purely voluntary nature somewhat when members hired a permanent staff in the spring of 1967-about the same time
that Father James Groppi and the NAACP Youth Council were beginning
to stir things up in Milwaukee with their demonstrations. When Milwaukee civic leaders became aware of widespread unrest during the
early part of the summer, they initiated a program to employ inner-city
youth for the month of August. While in 1965, MVEEOC had refused to
cooperate with a general drive for summer jobs and had responded
weakly to a spring 1967 drive for employment of inner-core youth, now
under the pressure of daily marches, the members of MVEEOC not only
came up with as many jobs in July as they had during the earlier drive
(which took place during the period of regular summer hiring) , but
companies which no longer had openings donated almost seven thousand
dollars to pay the wages of youths to work for the city. 4S
By the end of 1967 MVEEOC had settled down into a fairly unobtrusive position. Although it continued to participate in various programs
initiated by CORE, the Board of Education, and the Milwaukee Chamber
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of Commerce, the pioneering spirit which had permeated MVEEOC in its
early days could not be revived even by Milwaukee's first riot. The proliferation of problems simply overwhelmed this precursor of voluntary
collective business action, and the growth of similar councils throughout
the nation stole MVEEoc's thunder.
Two other business councils, the Business and Industrial Coordinating Committee of Newark, New Jersey, and the Association of Huntsville Area Companies of Huntsville, Alabama, began in almost the same
month as MVEEOC and demonstrate the diverse nature of voluntary business organizations, both geographically and in terms of their structures
and programs. During the summer of 1963, civil rights groups in Newark
picketed the building site of the city's new $5,000,000 Barringer High
School. The complaints about discrimination at the high school sparked
general dissatisfaction, and the civil rights groups began to discuss picketing downtown department stores-which were not directly related in any
way to the construction project. The senior vice president of Bamberger's, one of the department stores, recalled that "while there had been
no violence up to this point, there was a belief that the Negro community
could erupt at any time." He was afraid that a failure to "proceed along
the road of an open door policy of hiring nonwhites . . . would probably
'bring economic and social chaos to the city. " 46
Led by the department stores, the business community of Newark
formed the Business and Industrial Coordinating Committee (BICC) in
the fall of 1963. Membership was open to civil rights groups, government agencies, private welfare agencies, and labor unions as well as to
businesses. Perhaps because they previously had been so out of touch
with the problems of the black community, the businessmen seemed
most impressed by the communications aspect of the new organization.
The first objective of BICC was "to take positive action in a forum where
open communications will be available at all times between business,
industry, labor and civil rights organizations to openly discuss problems
of mutual interest." 47 In a more immediately practical vein BICC also
pledged to train, place, and promote unemployed and underemployed
Negroes and Puerto Ricans.4 8
Member firms began to list job openings with the Urban League
and actively recruit minority applicants.49 BICC placed approximately five
thousand applicants in full-time jobs during its first four years.50 However, four thousand of these applicants received their jobs during the
first year. 51 The radical drop-off in the placement rate may have resulted
from either a declining interest in the program 52 or from a quick drying
up of the underutilized skilled manpower pool. Prior to the BICC drive
underutilization of black skills may very well have been widespread.
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Western Electric, for example, reported that it found "Negroes with
college degrees were working at menial jobs; many others were underemployed and over-qualified for the jobs they held" in its Newark operation.53
During its first year, BICC members adhered to a strict Capitalist
Ethic interpretation of the American Creed and turned away applicants
who failed "to meet specific job requirements because of educational deficiencies, environmental background gaps, inadequacies in vocational
training and possible discrimination." 54 Subsequently, BICC took a more
affirmative-action approach and launched projects to get members to
reevaluate their testing procedures and job requirements and sponsored
a number of crash courses to help marginal workers bring their skills up
to an employable level. Industry financed thirteen training courses and
mcc cooperated with federal agencies to finance other programs to
train minority workers. 55
Late in 1966, one of mcc's founders, Charles Garrison, attributed
the falling off of Negro attendance at mcc's monthly meetings partly to
the improved job situation for blacks. "With more and more Negroes
finding full time employment," said Garrison, "their concern and free
time for civil rights activity is lessening. " 56 But all the Bicc's programs
were a pathetically small gesture when contrasted to the widespread
unemployment and other kinds of economic, social, and political exploitation suffered by Newark's black community. In the summer of
1967, the "economic and social chaos" that the founders of BICC were
trying to head off erupted in Newark. Fear of riots and the threat of
picketing had been enough to get the business community moving, but
a job placement rate of fewer than a thousand people a year in a city
with more than two hundred thousand black people could not stem the
angry tide.
Voluntary groups in Rochester, Milwaukee, and Newark all grew up
independently of the forces of the federal government. They were responses
to direct or indirect pressures from the civil rights movement. Their
purposes and programs, while uninspired, were local in origin and designed to meet what the business community in each city saw as its unique
problems. During the fall of 1963, at the same time that the Milwaukee
Voluntary Equal Employment Opportunity Council and Newark's Business
and Industry Coordinating Committee were emerging, the business community in Huntsville, Alabama, created a third association which was to
have the widest impact on the national scene.
Sixteen federal contractors formed the Association of Huntsville Area
Contractors (AHAC-the final word was later changed to "companies")
in the Alabama missile town which had grown from thirty thousand to
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one hundred and fifty thousand population in fewer than twenty years.
Firms such as Chrysler, IBM, Lockheed, General Dynamics, Douglas,
Boeing, Sperry Rand, and Xerox joined together to bring pressure on the
community to improve the environment so that they in turn could benefit
from larger numbers of qualified black workers. All of the companies held
government contracts, were members of Plans for Progress, and claimed
they did not discriminate against Negroes. However, they were located in
the heart of the Deep South and they were under federal pressure to show
an increase in minority employment. Qualified Negroes from the other
parts of the country were Jess than enthusiastic about moving to Alabama,
and local facilities had not been geared toward producing highly trained
black workers. 57
AHAC referred to itself as a "community resources development association" and in this respect departed somewhat from the standard business
council concerned solely with Negro employment. Most of AHAc's efforts
were directed at' various training and educational programs which would
directly contribute to the alleviation of the manpower shortage, although
the association also became involved in improving Negro housing, in
working to end discrimination and segregation in public facilities , and
in improving social welfare. AHAC itself actually ran very few programs.
It called itself a "catalyst for community action for the disadvantaged"
and either relied on existing local agencies, private and governmental, or,
if such agencies did not exist, tried to see to it that the community created
them.58 Since AHAC sought to be a coordinator and initiator rather than
implementer, it is difficult to judge the association's effect. AHAC appears
to have spent most of its time "cooperating with" or "assisting" local, state,
and federal programs to improve education, housing, and employment for
blacks. 59 However, given the importance of AHAC's members to the Huntsville area, it seems safe to assume that their expressed interest in a particular program was of considerable help to its eventual success.
More so than most employer groups, AHAC had objectives directed
at the basic needs of the community. In no uncertain or equivocating
terms, it proposed to act for the "relief of the poor, the distressed and
the underprivileged; to improve the housing and standard of living of
disadvantaged groups ; to lessen neighborhood tensions, to eliminate prejudice and discrimination; to promote the availability of public and community facilities for disadvantaged groups; and [to advance] education, job
training and apprenticeship programs for disadvantaged groups." 60
The federal contractors in Huntsville formed their first Plans for
Progress community council in 1963, during the period when the civil
rights movement was beginning to turn its attention to the problem of
employment discrimination against blacks, but the idea did not spread
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to other cities until 1966, when the national Plans for Progress Advisory
Council began encouraging the formation of community "merit employment
councils." The national Plans for Progress Advisory Council assumed
that the nature of local unemployment differed widely from area to area,
and that local, rather than national, direction would be most effective in
coping with the problems of unemployment among minorities. In 1966,
there were seventeen local councils affiliated with Plans for Progress; by
early 1968 this number had grown to more than eighty. 61 Although Plans
for Progress advocated local councils as a way of introducing a flexible
response to unique local employment problems, in fact most of the councils
appear to have been little more than paper organizations created along
lines laid out by the national Plans for Progress.
As the first local council composed of Plans for Progress companies,
newly formed Plans for Progress groups frequently looked to AHAC for
guidance in establishing structure and programs, and AHAC was more than
pleased to assist. As a result of its paramount position AHAC's philosophy
dominated numerous local councils, many of which adopted whole-cloth
a "Suggested Constitution and Bylaws" that the Huntsville association
published. As the local council's first objective the "suggested constitution"
called for an "organized, orderly and reasoned approach" to "achieve a
community climate necessary for growth and development," which would
be headed by business leaders who were "uniquely equipped to assist
citizens in a community in an enlightened approach to community progress." Having tied fair employment to economic development and to the
aggrandizement of business leadership, the suggested constitution went
on to explain what the council would do to achieve these worthy ends.
It would support training and recruiting of "bypassed disadvantaged"
people on the nondiscriminatory basis of "individual qualifications and
merit." Not only would the council work with community groups but it
would also communicate to the community the "willingness and sincerity"
of the businessmen to live up to the objectives of the council. 62
Most Plans for Progress councils elected not to adopt AHAc's suggested rationale, although they did accept its five basic objectives. It
would seem that after 1966, outside of the Deep South, the ideal of
economic equality for Negroes was widely enough accepted not to require
an apologia. The basic objectives of the standard voluntary council were
to:63
1. Make certain that there is no employment discrimination in the
community on account of race, color, religion, or national origin.
2. Persuade all area employers to affirm this purpose and to openly
support the principle and practice of nondiscriminatory hiring, promotion,
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training, and compensation of employees on the basis of individual qualification and merit.
3. Convincingly communicate to the Negro community and other
minority groups the willingness of employers to hire quaiified Negro and
other minority group applicants and the availability of jobs, and thus
establish a community knowledge that attaining of essential qualifications
leads directly to equal employment opportunity.
4. Directly encourage Negroes and members of other minority groups
to obtain necessary education and training to qualify for existing and
future jobs and to aspire to upgraded employment status.
5. Establish a systematic method of assembling and disseminating
data and information among area employers relating to minority group
employment and progress made in achieving plan objectives. Encourage
individual employees to evaluate, on a continuing basis, the level of minority group employment within their own firms in order to ascertain whether
the aims of the plan are being met.
The failure of most merit employment councils to develop either
original rationales or original programs was symptomatic of both the basic
lack of commitment on the part of most employers and of the powerful
influence of the "fad" mentality which gripped the business community
searching for an answer to the racial upheaval of the late 1960's. One
observer noted that community programs were more likely to succeed
than individual plans because "employers feel freer to take affirmative
action when they are part of a concerted movement. No employer feels he
is taking an individual risk." 64 Businessmen believed that merit employment councils impressed the minority community and involved no individual risk, which is another way to say they involved no individual
responsibility.
The mushroom growth of merit employment councils attested to the
business community's sensitivity to the demands of society. The black
community, the white community (the press), and the government all
expected businessmen to demonstrate their commitment to the problem
of urban black unemployment. Membership in merit employment councils
admirably served that purpose. The lack of meaningful activity on the
part of most firms and councils indicated the shallowness of the business
commitment and the hope that the councils could talk the problem away.
Reluctance to accept individual responsibility for solving black employment problems could on occasion take extreme forms. In 1965, Cincinnati
businessmen along with representatives of local civil rights groups formed
a Committee of 28. Its members included the heads of the city's most
important businesses. No one could accuse the Cincinnati business community of producing publicity instead of jobs, for the Committee of 28
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created neither. It met in secret for two and a half years without doing
anything. When black leaders asked for jobs an~ training programs for
the unemployed, a committee member responded in pure Capitalist Ethic
terms by saying, "Business is not going to create temporary jobs for those
who are unqualified, and business is not going to lower its standards; if
anyone does that it will have to be government on a WPA basis." 65 According to another businessman the purpose of the committee was not to
take action, "but to change attitudes"-of the Negroes. 66
The Chicago Association of Commerce and Industry ran a merit employment program which went a step beyond the Cincinnati approach.
Like Cincinnati the Chicago group did not attempt to do anything, but
unlike the Committee of 28, the Chicago Merit Employment Committee
prided itself on its efforts. In 1964 the Chicago Association of Commerce
and Industry's Committee on Full Employment was in charge of the
association's equal employment activity. The Committee on Full Employment published a "Merit Employment Manual" and conducted a voluntary
survey of its members to ascertain the state of black employment in
Chicago. 67 The survey disclosed that "as a laggard in providing job opportunities for the Negro" the nation's Second City was second to none. 68
To meet the challenge of Negro underemployment the association
formed the Chicago Merit Employment Committee (CMEC) in June, 1965.
CMEC took over the task of equal employment action from the Committee
on Full Employment. CMEC met the challenge of black underemployment
squarely by denying that it existed. CMEC claimed, "Most businessmen are
convinced that merit employment is good business-and are practicing it."
Having thus disposed of the major obstacle to full fair employment the
committee defined its job as having "to communicate this knowledge to
minority groups to motivate them to prepare themselves." 69 Perceiving its
job as propaganda production, CMEC bent its efforts to telling the black
community-through newspaper features, radio spots, a school Youth
Motivation Program, and lectures to black service organizations-about
the success of Negroes employed by CMEC members. The depth of business
commitment to the program was best summed up in CMEC's own words,
"There are no required dues or other costs for Merit Committee members.
Nor is any personal or company involvement in Committee activities
required." 70
John D. deButts, chairman of CMEC and president of Illinois Bell
Telephone Co., explained that while CMEC members did not have to do
anything, membership had some definite advantages. Members signed a
Statement of Merit Employment which deButts said was "considered a
sign of good faith by minority group leaders. Government agencies too
have taken the position that if an employer is on record for equal oppor-
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tunity employment, they will assume that he is as he represents himself
to be."71
The Chicago Association of Commerce and Industry believed that its
.Merit Employment Committee "made gigantic strides in meeting the needs
of the unemployed and the under-employed among the city's minority
groups." It received awards from the Chicago Commission on Human
Relations, Plans for Progress, and the Federal Equal Employment Opportunities Commission, which "cited the Committee's work as the outstanding local voluntary program in the nation." 72 That CMEC should receive
these accolades was indicative of the uninspired nature of the programs
sponsored by most other local voluntary merit employment councils.
Just as most local councils accepted a standard set of objectives, they
also stuck pretty closely to the prepackaged, low-risk, easy-to-present programs, most of which came from national Plans for Progress advisory committee. The key words in most councils' statements of objectives were "persuade," "communicate," and "encourage." In other words, Plans for
Progress councils were talkers rather than doers. Responsibility for specific
action rested with the individual company, while the council usually limited
its activities to seminars, conferences, institutes, and motivation programs,
all of which may have proved valuable in educating both management and
minority youth but did not directly provide employment for anyone. In the
following summary of the different kinds of programs Plans for Progress
councils sponsored in 1968, only 2, 3, 11, and 18 placed blacks in jobs,
and the vast majority of councils concentrated their efforts on the other
fifteen kinds of programs. 73
1. Vocational Guidance Institutes-instruction of high school guidance
counselors in the needs of business.
2. Work-study and co-op programs for high school students in which
they worked part-time and went to school part-time.
3. Job fairs-mostly for graduating seniors.
4. Liaison with high school teachers to let them know what industry
expected from students.
5. Coordination of minority employment programs in the community.
6. Speakers' bureaus.
7. Career days to introduce high school students to the kinds of work
available in industry.
8. Youth motivation programs- including speakers, panels, skits, and
instruction in how to apply for and keep a job.
9. Scholarships for minority students going on to college or advanced
vocational training.
10. Publicizing available training opportunities conducted by both private and public agencies.
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11. Jobs Now program-a placement program for the hard-core unemployed originated by the National Alliance of Businessmen.
12. Local research on community problems.
13. Sponsoring local chapters of the Opportunities Industrialization
Center, the vocational training program started in Philadelphia by the
Rev. Leon Sullivan.
14. Developing a roster of organizations which offer services to
minorities.
15. Preschool kindergarten programs (run with Ford Foundatio~
funds) to allow black women to work.
16. Open forums to allow minority groups to present grievances to
the government and the business community.
17. Veterans' transition program.
18. Placement of graduates from local training programs.
19. Adopting schools with disadvantaged students.
The Greater Cleveland Plans for Progress Council was fairly typical
of Plans for Progress councils in its emphasis on propaganda rather than
on job placement. 74 Formed in September, 1965, the Cleveland council
pioneered in a student motivation program in which black employees of
council member firms spoke to assemblies in city high schools. These talks
tied in with a national Plans for Progress advertising campaign based on
the theme, "Things are changing." The speakers explained their jobs and
encouraged students to stay in school so that they too could succeed. In
addition the Cleveland council supplied speakers to individual classes,
civic groups, churches, and other organizations which asked for them.
With similar emphasis on talk rather than action, the Cleveland council held a ''manpower development seminar" to "inform employers of the
various federally assisted educational and training programs to help disadvantaged persons to prepare for jobs." And, like many other councils,
the Cleveland group sponsored vocational guidance institutes to inform high
school teachers and counselors about the availability and nature of jobs
open to black students. It was only after the Hough riot of 1966 that the
council directly participated in a program to find jobs for blacks. It sponsored an emergency job hiring center in the riot area. Thirty-one companies
interviewed applicants for jobs in this one-shot response to the trouble.75
There were, of course, scores of councils, and in specific cases some
of them, especially non-Plans for Progress councils, deviated from the
general pattern of talk rather than job placement. Indianapolis, for example,
had a unique program in which businessmen not only found jobs for the
unemployed but went door to door looking for them. The Indianapolis
business community also provided individual counselors for new black
employees for several months to help work out personal and job-related
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problems which might otherwise have led to a high job turnover among
program participants. 76 The Businessmen's Interracial Committee on Community Affairs in Cleveland also went beyond the ordinary. It procured
special federal and private foundation grants to prepare and place the
hard-core unemployed, worked closely with the local school system on a
number of problems, and became involved in the area of minority housing. 77
Although the Plans for Progress councils all declared that the elimination of discrimination in hiring was one of their major objectives, very few
of them actually became directly involved in recruiting or placing black
workers. Employment is a highly individual process, and the voluntary
nature of the merit employment councils meant that they were not in a
position to dictate employment policy to member firms. Those councils
which were created in response to a riot in the local community were
usually much more sensitive to employment problems than were those
which merely jumped on the Plans for Progress bandwagon. Black activism
played a major role in persuading merit employment councils in Rochester
and Newark to begin to find jobs for blacks. Black pressure also played a
significant role in getting jobs, rather than propaganda, from the councils
in Cleveland and Miami, and the "threat of a flare-up over a police incident" in Buffalo, New York, in 1966 transformed that city's Job Opportunities Council from a do-nothing group into a catalyst and coordinator
of federally financed training projects for a thousand jobs offered by
Buffalo firms. 78 Similarly in Los Angeles before 1965 a number of businessmen had been discussing the value of coordinating efforts for fair employment, but it took the Watts riot of August, 1965, •to transform a number
of loosely organized groups into a single Los Angeles Management Council
for Merit Employment, Training and Research. 79 Originally the Plans for
Progress section of the council had run a standard educational rather than
action program. 80 But after the riot, under the leadership of H. C. McClellan LAMEC placed unusual emphasis on the employment and job-training
aspects of the program and, according to one report, placed almost five
thousand blacks on jobs in the six months following the Watts riot. 81
Having died out after an initial attempt to stop state FEPC legislation
in the 1950's, voluntary employment councils reemerged in the 1960's in
response to the pressures of the civil rights movement, government contract requirements for affirmative action, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
With only a few exceptions, however, the councils were mainly propaganda
agencies which allowed members to avoid individual responsibility by
hiding in the collective security of the community council. Whereas the
voluntary councils of the 1950's had attempted to blunt the impact of the
fair employment movement by seeking to prevent FEPC legislation, the
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voluntary business efforts of the 1960's sought to blunt the impact of the
FEPC legislation once it had passed and to cool the anger of the black
community once it had been aroused.

12
Voluntarism: Centralization and Doubt

The changing attitudes, policies, and actions of the business community during the 1960's produced a proliferation of voluntary plans and
associations designed to assist businessmen in coping with growing demands of the government and the civil rights organizations. As one
voluntary employers' organization observed in its "General Statement,"
"Management, as well as the entire country, has been made more aware
of the problem by government decree and by concerted action from those
victims of the problem. " 1 The heavy hand of federal coercion was behind
practically every step the business community took to improve employment opportunities for blacks. The federal government forced Lockheed
to develop the first Plan for Progress in 1961, which set the pattern for
company affirmative-action personnel policy for a decade. The federal
government encouraged its other contractors to draft their own Plans for
Progress and then suggested that Plans for Progress firms combine
locally into Plans for Progress councils. Finally, the federal government
created the National Alliance of Businessmen to coordinate business
urban reform activity after the riots of 1967. A nationwide voluntary
organization of socially concerned businessmen, NAB was the culmination
of organized business response to the needs of black workers.
Since businessmen created almost all of the voluntary associations of
the 1960's in order to facilitate compliance with the demands of the
government, there is a sadly comic aspect to that small school of businessmen who insisted on maintaining the fiction that voluntarism was
good because it was a way to preclude government interference in business affairs. It might have made some sense for Sara Southall to warn in
1950, "If organized business is unwilling to provide economic opportunity for qualified individuals, it cannot expect freedom from government interference. " 2 But Executive Order 10925 in 1961 and the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 should have put an end to exaggerated warnings
201
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about the threats of government interference and the saving grace of
voluntary business action. Employers continued to praise voluntarism as
an alternative to government control, however, because voluntarism
provided a valuable theoretical vehicle with which businessmen could
justify their participation in such dubiously "voluntary" programs as the
Plans for Progress, the Plans for Progress councils, and NAB. Thus, even
after the passage of the Civil Rights Act, G. A. McLellan, administrative
director of the Advisory Council of Plans for Progress, could say, "There
is the feeling that solutions can be found better by private enterprise
than by government. " 3
Plans for Progress (PFP) was the program behind all the publicity,
and some of the progress, in equal employment prior to the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. PFP saved a billion dollar contract for the Lockheed corporation and became the prototype of voluntary compliance plans for all
government contractors. At the beginning of World War II Lockheed
employed no Negroes in its California production facilities. "Not that
the late chairman or his brother . . . had any prejudice against using
Negro workmen," as one writer delicately put it, "it was simply that
aircraft building had never been on a mass production basis and that the
skill requirements were far beyond the ability and training of the few
Negro applicants." 4 Either because of streamlined mass production techniques or because of Roosevelt's wartime FEPC, the firm did begin to
employ black workers after 1941.5
In 1951 the Lockheed corporation opened a gigantic facility in
Marietta, Georgia. Whatever its employment policies in California,
Lockheed had no intentions of upsetting local customs in Georgia. Lockheed's director of industrial relations, E. G. Mattison, explained, "If we
were not careful in gaining community acceptance, we might have some
unpleasant incidents and unfavorable publicity with which to contend."
With unwarranted moderation Mattison noted, "We went about [integration] very quietly and slowly; not timidly, but wisely. " 6 Presumably as
part of this "wise" policy, J. P. Lydon, director of administration, said
in 1957, "We just don't feel we can push Negroes into higher jobs just for
the sake of doing it. I dread sudden moves, particularly now when emotional tension is so high throughout the community." 7 Apparently there
was some token hiring of blacks in nontraditional positions before 1961,8
but according to NAACP meaningful num~ers of blacks were hired only
in unskilled and semiskilled positions. In addition, Lockheed barred
blacks from the firm's apprenticeship program, blacks were made to use
separate rest rooms and dining rooms, and blacks were members of a
segregated union.9
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Although Negroes had filed complaints against Lockheed since 1956,
investigations by the Nixon Committee "found the company to be complying with existing regulations. " 10 One week after President Kennedy
issued Executive Order 10925, despite Lockheed's segregated facilities,
segregated union, and long history of charges of employment discrimination, the Defense Department announced it was awarding a billion
dollar contract to the firm to build the C-141 cargo plane.11 On the day
the Executive Order took effect, April 7, 1961, NAACP filed a complaint
with the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity
charging Lockheed with flagrant violations of the executive order. Jerry
R . Holleman, vice chairman of PCEEO told NAACP that if, after investigation, the company were found in violation of the executive order the
committee would recommend cancellation of the contract. 12
This was the situation which prompted the company to introduce
what a Lockheed executive later called "a voluntary program" rather
than to submit to "forced" integration under the executive order.13
This, of course, was an inaccurate interpretation on the part of the
company official since the committee had no power to force the firm to
do anything but could merely recommend cancellation of the contract
if the company failed to live up to its contractual obligations, one of
which was complying with Executive Order 10925. On May 25 Lockheed
announced that it had signed an agreement with the government, the
first Plan for Progress, in which it promised to undertake a "companywide program to expand and strengthen its efforts to promote equal
employment opportunity." 14 As a start the company eliminated its segregated facilities. On some, like the rest rooms, it removed the signs. On
others, like the cafeterias and the drinking fountains, Lockheed eliminated the segregation by eliminating the facility. Mobile hot food carts
were substituted for the cafeterias, and the company replaced the fountains with taps and paper cups-according to one report at the rate of
63,000 cups a day.1s
In addition to eliminating the gross forms of discrimination Lockheed agreed to:
I) disseminate its policy widely and emphasize the need for implementing it at all levels,
2) "aggressively seek out more qualified minority group candidates"
and make sure that its sources of manpower were informed of its nondiscriminatory policy,
3) "re-analyze its openings for salaried jobs to be certain that all
eligible minority group employees have been considered for placement
and upgrading" and attempt to hire more minority teachers for summer
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jobs and otherwise inform the school system of the opportunities for
blacks in the firm,
4) "support," "secure," "encourage," and "make certain" that
minority workers participated in the company's various training programs at all levels,
5) desegregate all facilities and institute periodic checks to insure
that the policy was being implemented. 16
The impact of the Plan for Progress on Lockheed's hiring appears
to have been significant. Segregation in the plant disappeared. Negroes
were actively recruited and promoted, and the company extended its
activity into the community, working closely with local black secondary
schools and colleges. But the immediate implementation of the Plan for
Progress in Lockheed plants was not nearly as important as the impact
the Plan for Progress had on the business community in general. By
pressing other federal contractors to establish Plans for Progress, the
Kennedy administration was able to enhance its image in the black
community. At the same time, the "voluntary" nature of the Plans for
Progress strengthened the administration's position with the business
community as being reasonable and not antibusiness. For the participating
businessmen, the Plans for Progress had the admirable quality of giving
them a glowing equal employment image, with reams of free publicity,
while legally not binding them to do anything.
In the six months following Lockheed's Plan for Progress, four more
aerospace contractors, Boeing, North American, Douglas, and Martin,
plus the Radio Corporation of America, all signed Plans for Progress. 17
Then, in February, 1962, Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson announced
that an additional thirty-one defense contractors would come to the
White House to participate in a mass signing of Plans for Progress. Only
one contractor demurred from the public baptism, indicating that he
preferred to "avoid the hoopla. " 18 The number of companies that joined
Plans for Progress continued to grow. In 1963 Plans for Progress formed
an advisory council to coordinate individual efforts, and the advisory
council promoted the formation of local voluntary community councils.
By the end of 1967, there were more than four hundred member firms.19
While some company plans, like that of General Electric, were "unspecific and little more than a polite response to the panel's invitation to
cooperate," 20 most adhered to the form of Lockheed's original plan. 21
The 1963 Plans for Progress formal statement of purpose neatly
summed up all the justifications that businessmen had used to defend equal
employment for the previous twenty years:
1) morality: "Enriching our free society by advancing human rights,"
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2) the American Creed: "Providing equal job rights for all Americans,"
3) long-run economic benefits: "Developing the full potential of our
nation's human resources,"
"Reducing the costs to the nation of unemployment, underdevelopment, health and welfare programs, increasing crime and delinquency
rates, and deterioration of urban areas,"
"Improving the economic conditions necessary for continuing prosperity, thus increasing the gross national product by many billions of dollars
and raising the standard of living,"
4) community citizenship: "Promoting better community conditions
in order to provide an environment for dignity and tranquility in our daily
lives,"
5) voluntary action: "Contributing through private endeavors toward solutions of a major national problem."22
Significantly the simple Capitalist Ethic justification of the short-run
economic benefits is missing from the list. In 1963 most businessmen were
not about to admit they wanted to make a buck on black employmentbut perhaps more to the point, there was no way such an argument could
be formulated. While it may have been great public relations, hiring blacks
was not necesarily good economics. Joining Plans for Progress, however,
allowed firms to have their cake and eat it too. Through membership in
PFP employers could reap the rewards of being socially conscious while
actually doing nothing. H. W. Wittenborn, personnel vice president of
Cook Electric Co., urged members of the American Management Association to become members of Plans for Progress. He contended that industry
had been willing to let the "sleeping dog" of economic discrimination "lie
while the community customs remained static or changed slowly. But now,"
he warned his listeners, "community customs are changing and changing
fast. The business executive is faced with a dilemma. More and more he
is feeling the squeeze between the external pressures ( the government,
racial groups, interracial groups, and the community) demanding change
and internal structured customs within his organization demanding status
quo." According to Wittenborn one way to resolve the conflict was to
"seize the initiative" and join the Plans for Progress as "evidence of their
affirmative action."2 3
The business community enjoyed taking the credit for participating in
PFP and for the great advances in black employment that businessmen
claimed would result from PFP activity. A Lockheed official commented
that Plans for Progress was a "public declaration by the heads of companies who are not accustomed to failing or half-heartedly pursuing their
objectives. " 24 In fact, however, many businessmen appeared much more
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interested in posturing for the press than in actively participating in the
program. Most firms viewed the plan as protection against the President's
Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity which enforced Executive
Order 10925. A contemporary observer suggested that "the signing o.f the
Plans by the president or the chief executive officer usually received enough
publicity in national, state, local, and company press to make it abundantly
clear that the organization's executives were fully committed." 25 Although
PFP firms were supposed to periodically review their progress and all
government contractors had to report to the PCEEO, there is evidence that
many firms viewed joining Plans for Progress as an end in itself. A majority
of steel companies interviewed by one student of industrial racial policies
believed that simply by joining PFP they had instituted an effective equal
employment policy and had proven they were not discriminating. 26 Another
study found that companies which claimed they had taken affirmative
action to assist blacks, including joining Plans for P.rogress, were actually
attempting "to give an impression of having more employment integration
than actually existed."27 Thus it is not surprising that companies which had
signed Plans for Progress used them as a defense against black protest
groups who demanded increased minority employment. 28
There is no reason to assume that black protest groups were impressed
by a firm's membership in Plans for Progress, since Negro groups had been
suspicious of the program from the beginning. Initially blacks feared that
the government was using Plans for Progress as a substitute for a strong
civil rights bill. 29 Herbert Hill, NAACP labor secretary and the most persistent critic of the Plans for Progress, charged that PFP companies were
more interested in "publicity than progress," and that many companies that
signed the plans regarded them as "a way of securing immunity from real
compliance with the anti-discrimination provisions of their Government
contracts." 30 Hill condemned Plans for Progress as "simply a euphemism
for what a previous Administration called voluntary compliance." 31
Robert A. Troutman, an Atlanta lawyer, friend of President Kennedy,
member of PCEEO, and the man credited with originating the idea of Plans
for Progress, was a special target of critics of the program. Hill claimed that
Troutman was "an avowed Southern segregationist" and was very closely
involved with "two of the leading racists in the United States Senate,"
Richard B. Russell and Herman E. Talmadge, both from Troutman's home
state of Georgia. 32 Troutman was head of a PCEEO subcommittee concerned with Plans for Progress, and his strong emphasis on the voluntary
nature of Plans for Progress did nothing to enhance his reputation with
the critics. 33 Because most members of Plans for Progress were government contractors, although others were permitted to join, they were under
pressure not only to give their word, but to live up to it. Perhaps to elimi-
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nate even this subtle form of compulsion, Troutman recommended that
the Plans for Progress be "severed from the committee [PCEEO] and
operated as a private organization supported by private funds." 34
There was a running debate on the actual effectiveness of the Plans
for Progress. Its supporters were able to prdouce figures of individual PFP
companies that showed significant increases in the proportional representation of Negroes in their work forces after signing a plan. 35 On a national
basis there was an impressive increase in the number of white-collar
Negroes employed by all Plans for Progress companies, and a corresponding _decrease in the proportional number of blacks being hired into
traditional black jobs between May, 1961, and January, 1963. 36
In fact, some firms hired substantially more Negroes in nontraditional
positions than the Plans for Progress cumulative figures indicated because
southern Plans for Progress companies virtually ignored their commitment.
A survey of PFP companies in the Atlanta area undertaken by the Southern
Regional Council in 1962 found that of twenty-four member firms only
seven had taken affirmative action and of these only three, Lockheed,
Western Electric, and Goodyear, demonstrated what the council called "a
vigorous desire to create job opportunities." 37 Most of the Atlanta-based
managers who were even aware that their firms had signed Plans for Progress believed that the sales and service offices that they ran were exempt
from the Plan's provisions. It was their understanding that the Plan was
designed for production facilities only. Implicit in this was the belief that
integration was acceptable only in low-status, blue-collar production jobs. 38
For example, at the Atlanta office of PFP member Continental Motors, an
official assured investigators that they allowed "no discrimination whatsoever." He went on to explain that three of his twenty-six employees were
black. "Back in the back, where we work these three Negroes, there are
eight whites," said the official. He then went on to describe the firm's nondiscriminatory practices: "One of the Negroes is a porter and general
helper.... The other two are engine teardown and cleanup men. We term
them 'mechanic's helpers.' Their restroom is called the 'janitor's room.'
They're not told to go anywhere; they just go where they want to go.'' 39
A follow-up of the Southern Regional Council report by the contracting agencies, the Army, Navy, and Air Force, did not support the
council's full findings. The armed services investigators claimed that there
were no companies unaware of their obligations under Plans for Progress
(perhaps because they all had been previously visited by the council), and
furthermore that those that were in violation of the agreement were usually deficient on technicalities such as posting equal employment signs. 40
The armed forces report did not significantly undercut the council findings
since the definition of affirmative action was somewhat open to interpreta-
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tion and the armed forces did find that the firms were ignoring black community resources for recruiting workers. Moreover, the council had taken
the companies to task for not living up to the Plans for Progress, while the
government was merely investigating compliance with the executive order,
a less demanding document.
The Plans for Progress, Eisenhoweresque emphasis on voluntarism,
education, and cooperation between government and business not only continued the discredited philosophy of the Nixon Committee but conditioned
both business and government to expect conciliation rather than forced
compliance from the Civil Rights Act of 1964. While Plans for Progress
continued to add firms to its list of members, it ceased to be a central element in the federal fair employment enforcement scene after the passage
of the Civil Rights Act. Since many businessmen had viewed their membership in Plans for Progress as a way of softening the impact of Executive
Order 10925, which had required affirmative action from government contractors, one corporate vice president concluded that once "the Civil Rights
Act had been passed, he didn't see any need for the Plans for Progress
Program." 41
Between the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 and the riots of
the summer of 1967 the business community took no significant national
action to further the employment of black workers. However, the riots of
1967 set off a chain of business and government responses leading to the
formation of the National Alliance of Businessmen, which marked the culmination of formal business involvement in minority employment problems
during the postwar period. Somewhat paradoxically, the riots also gave
rise to the Urban Coalition, an organization with strong business support,
which called for increased government intervention in the problems of the
cities, the first such concerted business support for federal action in twenty
years.
The Detroit riot of late July, 1967, prompted Detroit businessmen to
found the New Detroit Committee (NDC). But rather than remain merely
another local merit employment council, NDC provided the model and
leadership for a national merit employment council, the National Alliance
of Businessmen. To a large extent industry in Detroit meant automobiles,
and with the exception of Ford, auto employment policies were less
than enlightened prior to 1967. 42 Because many other major cities had
riots prior to 1967 while Detroit remained calm, some of its business
leaders were a little too quick to praise their own limited equal employment
activity. In 1964, Richard E. Cross, chairman of the board of American
Motors, said Detroit had avoided racial disorders because top management had taken an affirmative attitude toward the problem of Negro
employment and had maintained good communications with the black
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community. 43 Arjay Miller, president of Ford, echoed these sentiments the
following year, praising Detroit for the (unspecified) steps it had taken
and lauding the federal government for its war on poverty. However Miller
covered himself by warning that past peace was no guarantee of future
calm. 44 Douglas Fraser, head of the United Auto Workers' Chrysler department, said after the July, 1967, riot, "Everybody was so cocky, including myself, that a riot could not happen here, because we had probably
done more than other cities." 45
As had been the case in cities where blacks had rioted previously,
Detroit responded to the violence by creating a community council. Despairing of additional federal help, Governor George Romney and Mayor
Jerome P. Cavanagh appointed a citizens' committee "to mobilize the public and private resources" of Detroit. 46 Along with fourteen businessmen
the New Detroit Committee consisted of labor leaders and representatives
from the black community, including three strong black nationalists.47
Neither NDC nor its program was radically different from the merit
employment councils that had sprung up around the country during the
previous four years, except that Noc followed one of the worst of the
urban riots and contained some of the most powerful industrial leaders in
the country, including the heads of the three major automobile companies.
Similar to the Association of Huntsville Area Companies, Noc did not
intend to operate any programs itself but rather was "oriented to helping
the community utilize its existing agencies more effectively in both the
private and the public sector." 48 The committee believed that action was
needed to improve communications, to improve community service including health, welfare, and police protection, to improve education, employment and job training, to clean up after the riot, and to build new housing
for Negroes. 49 The most immediately successful of the programs was Noe's
plan to find ten thousand jobs for the hard-core unemployed in two months.
Working with the Greater Detroit Board of Commerce, NDC persuaded
many employers, especially the automobile companies, to lower, or virtually
eliminate, normal hiring standards and to actively recruit in the inner city. 50
By the beginning of 1968, General Motors and Ford together had hited
almost ten thousand Negroes, many of them, according to the companies,
hard-core unemployed. 51 Their success was temporary and, even then,
unique in all the nation.
Within half a year of its founding, dissension was tearing NDC apart.
First, moderate Negro members of the committee complained that NDC
leader Joseph Hudson was working too closely with the radicals, and they
threatened to boycott his department store. 52 Then the black nationalists
pulled out of the group and accused the businessmen of not allowing them
to formulate their own programs. 53 An evaluation report in the spring of
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1968 concluded that the committee's achievements, except in the field of
employment, were "woefully inadequate" to meet the city's needs. 54 For
all the good they did, the businessmen concluded that the private sector
could not cope with the manifold problems of the cities, and that "unless
vast sums of money are made available to the cities by the federal government, which alone possesses the necessary taxing and distributive power,
and unless central planning and guidance are provided to assure consistency
and to prevent offsetting effects, there is little hope for arresting the growth
of inner city hopelessness and despair." 55
The idea that the government should assist business in assisting the
blacks became an increasingly common contrapuntal theme to the standard
business contention that private voluntary activity was the best way to
solve black employment problems. As long as employing blacks was a
problem that had to be settled between the businessman and government
agencies, or between businessmen and local black protest groups, the business community could afford to insist that the problem might be solved
through voluntary action. But when the riots demonstrated that unemployment was merely one symptom of the complex syndrome of urban decay,
and that to solve even that one problem would require truly extensive
employer commitment, the business community began to moderate its
grandiose claims about the power of voluntary action and looked to government for support.
After the riots businessmen recognized that solving the black employment problem meant hiring large numbers of hard-core unemployed. This
meant increased costs, which in tum meant lower profits, and very few
employers were willing to commit themselves to a program which would
eat into their profits. 56 Thus, when they were confronted with the full
economic implications of relieving the economic plight of black workers,
the Capitalist Ethic once more stopped businessman from hiring blacks.
Unlike the forties and fifties, when costs due to racism were the source of
rejection, the economic bar to blacks during the sixties lay with the inability
of many blacks to meet traditional employment standards. As they had
during the Great Depression, businessmen began to tum to the government to rescue them from the trap of their own making. William G. Caples,
vice president of Inland Steel, believed that industry would "accept some
of the hard-core burdens," but he felt it was "naive to expect that industry
can accept large numbers of individuals for hard-core employment without subsidy and incentive when the responsibility of business management
is to wisely use capital and produce profit." 57
During 1967, the federal government launched two programs which
took tentative steps toward meeting these demands. Through the Concentrated Employment Program (CEP) the government attempted to cen-
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tralize the various federal programs that dealt with the hard-core unemployed. CEP spent most of its first year trying to decide who the hard-core
unemployed were and where and how they lived. 58 The second program
was an experimental one designed to encourage business to move into the
ghetto and to provide training for the "seriously disadvantaged." By making
it easier for such firms to land government contracts and by assuming the
full cost of training and bonding hard-core employees, the experimental
program hoped to mitigate some of the economic disadvantages associated
with inner-city operations. 59 But, as the New York Times pointed out editorially, the program merely made it easier to do a difficult job. It did not
guarantee a profit. For the long term, the Times called for "substantial tax
incentives. " 60
Other representatives of the business community continued to call for
making social responsibility more profitable and therefore compatible with
the Capitalist Ethic. Fortune magazine not only suggested tax incentives
but in effect called for a kind of new National Recovery Administration by
which the government would suspend antitrust action against all companies
"engaged in 'public service operations' from the same competitive base." 61
The Advisory Panel on Private Enterprise to the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorder picked up and elaborated the tax incentive idea.
The advisory panel, which was made up of the heads of Litton Industries,
North American Rockwell, General Mills, the Bank of America, and the
National Industrial Conference Board, declared that statements supporting
business involvement with urban problems were "more than mere rhetoric."
If for no other reason, the panel believed that business would voluntarily
enter the fields of job training and employment, housing, economic development, Negro enterpreneurship, education, and attitudinal change "because
they recognized that the price of inaction may well be continued tension
and disorder and the ultimate breakdown of the tranquility which underlies
our entire social fabric and economic growth." 62 The panel's justification
was the long-run benefit interpretation of the Capitalist Ethic, which held
that what was good for society was good for business. Becoming somewhat
more realistic, however, the panel added, "But we believe that a truly
massive number of companies could be induced to participate only if
appropriate monetary incentives are provided by the federal government
to defray the unusual costs of participation."63 The panel then went on to
detail the kind of income tax write-off that it thought would best help both
business and the hard-core unemployed. 64
On January 24, 1968, President Lyndon Johnson delivered a special
message to Congress which proposed legislation to combine monetary incentives and the voluntary programs that the Plans for Progress companies
had developed. The President called for an increase in the scope of the
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Concentrated Employment Program, but more importantly he announced
that Henry Ford II had agreed to head a new National Alliance of Businessmen (NAB). NAB was to administer a program known as JOBS (Job
Opportunities in the Business Sector), which would attempt to persuade
companies to employ 100,000 hard-core unemployed by June, 1969, and
500,000 by June, 1971.
Based on a successful experiment the government conducted in five
cities in 1967, the President believed that business would participate in the
NAB-JOBS program, given certain economic encouragement. The President
foresaw business and government working in a partnership in which "the
Government will identify and locate the unemployed. The company will
train them, and offer them jobs. The company will bear the normal cost
of training, as it would for any of its new employees. " 65 The economic
incentive came with the government's agreement to compensate business
for the cost differential between the normal expenses of training and the
additional effort required for the hard-core unemployed.66
In each of the fifty cities where NAB chapters were initially established,
local firms loaned managerial staff who worked with Department of Labor
personnel to find jobs for the hard-core unemployed. 67 Once NAB obtained
business commitments the Labor Department was supposed to find job
seekers vocationally unqualified enough to be eligible for the special programs which would be financed by federal funds. 68
The JOBS program fell between two stools. It did not provide a genuine profit incentive which would attract large numbers of business participants, and it placed enough restrictions on its reimbursements to alienate
employers who feared government scrutiny. The payment for extra costs
incurred did not meet the demands of those businessmen who believed that
real commitment would come only with guaranteed profit. 69 If the NAB
program could not provide positive incentives for hiring and training the
hard core, it at least tried to assure business that it would not suffer any
unusual financial burden by working for black economic equality, but
businessmen did not participate in the reimbursement program. Only between 20 and 25 percent of the companies which hired hard-core unemployed under the JOBS program signed contracts with the federal government for reimbursement of training costs. Some employers steered away
from federal involvement because they feared government interference.
According to one NAB official, "Employers do not like the rigid guidelines
of a Government contract or do not want people looking over their
shoulders, or do not like filling out government forms." 70 The JOBS program employers may not have wanted anyone looking over their shoulders,
however they may also have been shy about accepting money because
many of them were training busboys, porters, maids, parking lot attendants,
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housekeepers, laborers, and baggagemen, jobs which, contrary to the purpose of the program, did not offer much promise of promotion. 71
Nevertheless, private efforts at training the hard-core unemployed did
increase after the formation of NAB. By late 1969, more than seventeen
thousand companies had signed training contracts with the Labor Department. Coupled with firms which trained hard-core unemployed without a
contract, this represented a degree of business participation well above preriot proportions. 72
Although the idea for NAB had originated with the federal government
and impetus had come from the riots, many businessmen tended to see
the JOBS program as an abdication of government responsibility and an
example of their own leadership ability. 73 William F. Raven, vice president
of Pan American World Airways and chairman of the JOBS program in
Miami, Florida, observed, "The government tried to do the job but with
no spectacular success. So President Johnson, in effect tossed the ball to
the private sector of business." 74 To some businessmen the spectacle of
government coming to industry for help looked like a last chance for the
business community to retain control over minority employment. Gerald
L. Phillippe, chairman of the board of General Electric, told the National
Association of Manufacturers that "the price of not acting now in this crisis,
of not contributing in concert all of the business skills we can muster, will
be to abdicate our position as leaders." 75
The actual success of the NAB-JOBS program was open to question even
before the 1970 recession , when firms openly stopped hiring the hard-core
unemployed. 76 Because NAB wished the JOBS program to appear successful,
the alliance placed great emphasis on numerical goals in hiring the hardcore unemployed. "It's a numbers game we all play," said one NAB official.
"We play it because that's what bw~inessmen understand more so than
talking to them about social problems or reminding them of their social
responsibilities." 77 The fact that local NAB groups established quotas, albeit
voluntary quotas, apparently had a negative effect on some businessmen
who adhered to the American Creed, calling quotas "antithetical to the
ideal of equal employment." 78 The stress on numerical goals led to the
counting of normal hiring of blacks as "hard-core," multiple counting in
high turnover positions, and other statistical devices which rendered NAB's
figures unreliable. 19
While the extent of hiring-policy change brought about by the JOBS
program may not have been very great, the fact that hundreds of firms
from all over the country were willing publicly to commit themselves to
hiring the hard-core unemployed demonstrates that positive action in favor
of Negroes had become the acceptable norm. As a national voluntary program dedicated to finding and hiring people whom businessmen had tradi-
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tionally viewed as unemployable, the NAB-JOBS program climaxed the postwar fair employment movement. Whereas in the late forties businessmen
feared public reaction if they hired any blacks at all, by the late sixties
employers sought public acclaim by joining a nationwide movement which
required businessmen to break with the Capitalist Ethic by hiring the least
qualified workers, and to break with the American Creed by giving those
workers special consideration.
The National Alliance of Businessmen's drive to hire the hard-core unemployed represented the business community's new attitude toward the
employment of blacks. But NAB was the result of twenty years of mounting
pressure for more black employment that had finally exploded in the riots
of 1967. The riots exposed not only the extent of the black unemployment
problem, but also the multitude of other economic and social diseases
afflicting the inner city. The business community responded to the nonemployment urban problems by supporting the Urban Coalition (uc), a
national organization which sought to mobilize both the public and private
sectors to fight the deterioration of city life.
uc both lacked a clear rationale and a consistent method of operation,
which was indicative of the businessman's own loss of bearings in the late
1960's. For twenty years employers had claimed that economic problems
could be best solved by allowing the private sector to handle things in its
own way. Even when moved to act by government pressure, employers
argued that the actual technique of working out a problem was best left
to businessmen. The riots, however, undermined the business community's
faith in the absolute efficacy of voluntarism; yet employers were not sure
they were willing to leave the field of social action entirely to the government. The ambiguity of the business position emerged clearly in the comments of Henry Ford II, who was a founder of both NAB and uc. At the
same time Ford seemed to feel both that businessmen could save the country and that only increased government action could solve urban problems.
When Henry Ford II introduced the NAB program he said that business
would have to take the burden of "bringing these disadvantaged people out
of the ghettos and into the mainstream of the American economy." 80 However, Ford was contradicting a stand he had taken just five months earlier.
As one of the members of a thirty-two-man steering committee which formulated uc's "Statement of Principles," Ford had presumably committed
himself to the concept that "when the private sector is unable to provide
employment to those who are both able and willing to work, then in a free
society the government must of necessity assume the responsibility and act
as the employer of last resort or must assure adequate income levels for
those who are unable to work." 81
Except for a kind of interlocking directorate typified by Ford's
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membership in both groups, uc and NAB were independent organizations.
An emergency coalition of mayors and business, labor, church, and civil
rights leaders created uc in August, 1967. Whereas NAB limited its membership to businessmen and dealt exclusively with the problems of minority hard-core unemployment, local uc units had a broader base and were
supposed to be concerned with the whole spectrum of urban ills. In addition to attacking unemployment, UC called upon the nation "to provide
a decent home and suitable living environment for every American
family with guarantees of equal access to all housing, new and existing,"
and to "create educational programs that will equip all young Americans
for full and productive participation in our society to the full potential
of their abilities. " 82
Given the increasingly favorable public attitude toward business
social responsibility, especially in regard to minority employment, uc
was almost a reflex reaction to the riots of 1967. It extended to the national
level the kind of local coalitions that had begun to appear in individual
communities over the previous five years. The coalition was new only in
the sense that it represented the first such national-level coalition of
"liberal" business, government, and private groups since the National
Civic Federation of the Progressive Era.
The uc was formed explicitly in response to the rioting of the
summer of 1967. Its statement of principles started with a litany of the
urban violence since 1965 (with the usual condemnations). It went on to
advocate action "directed to the deep-rooted and historic problems of
the cities." 83 The first uc chairman, John W. Gardner, expressed the
underlying fears of the men who founded the coalition when he said,
"We believe that the private sector of America must directly and vigorously involve itself in the crisis of the cities by a commitment to investment, job training, and hiring, and all that is necessary to the full enjoyment of the free enterprise system and also its survival. " 84
Gardner's comments accentuated the dichotomy which permeated the
voluntary action movement in the business community in the late 1960's.
The original "Statement of Principles'' adopted by the emergency coalition had placed its major stress on a call for the federal government to
act. It seemed to call for more and bigger programs along the lines of
President Johnson's "Great Society." 85 On the other hand, as chairman,
Gardner appeared to place increased emphasis on the voluntary element
of the program. The New York Times commented that many of the
coalition's staff members, like Gardner himself, were ex-public officials
who had "transferred their hope for a better society from the public to
the private sector." 86 Gardner did not officially abandon the idea that
the federal government should deal with the problem. He outlined the
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three purposes of the coalition as: 1) lobbying, 2) problem solving, that
is, generating new ideas to solve urban problems, and 3) familiarizing the
businessmen with the needs of the city because, Gardner said, "The closer
business people get to the problem the more they see the need for new
and more effective federal legislation. " 87
The original "Statement of Principles" of the emergency coalition
also reflected the tension between what the government and the private
sector should do. The first section called upon the government to provide
an emergency work program to give socially useful jobs to everyone who
wanted to work. The statement also called for government-financed
training programs to insure upward mobility among the margin ally skilled.
It then outlined the action corporations should take to help solve urban
problems. Some of the suggestions amounted to asking industry to
participate in proposed new government programs. Others were a reiteration of the kinds of affirmative action that Plans for Progress companies
had presumably been taking for seven years and which would subsequently be reemphasized by NAB. These included recruiting in the inner
cities, youth motivation, special training, and development of blackowned businesses. 88
Because many of the uc local units were actually preexisting councils of one kind or another, the activities which they undertook tended to
emphasize the local voluntary effort rather than the grandiose federal
programs envisioned in the original meeting. 89 The New York Coalition,
for example, by applying for Internal Revenue Service tax-exempt status,
which legally precluded lobbying, explicitly rejected the national uc's
call for the business community to exercise its political influence.90
The formation of the National Alliance of Businessmen and the
Urban Coalition were the culmination of twenty years of slowly developing commitment to the problems of the black worker. Both organizations
emphasized voluntarism as a means of solving the problems so forcefully
spotlighted by the riots. Their voluntarism was consistent with the conservative antigovernment ideology traditionally held by American businessmen . The fact remains however that the National Allian ce of Businessmen was created in response to government pressure, and the Urban
Coalition, although born within the business community, called upon the
government to participate more actively in solving social problems. The
two organizations were a somewhat unsuccessful attempt to salvage the
businessman's image of himself as a leader by tying the voluntarist form s
of the past to the obvious need for government action in the future.

13
Conclusion

Business attitudes toward the employment of Negroes underwent a
revolution in the twenty-five years which followed World War II. At the
beginning of the war Negroes received only dangerous, arduous, or
unpleasant unskilled jobs no matter what their education, training, or
ability- when businessmen would employ them at all. By the end of the
1960's employers were actively recruiting and hiring blacks who were
unqualified for employment by traditional standards.
Like all human beings, businessmen have a fundamental need to
maintain a degree of consistency between what they do and what they
believe. When circumstances force an individual to alter his actions,
he must absorb his new activity into his established set of reasons for
doing things- his values. He could, of course, reject his traditional
values and adopt a new ideological framework in which to operate, but
such a revolution in personal beliefs is infinitely more difficult than
trying somehow to fit the new actions into the old values. The explanations which employers used to justify their radical change in black
employment policy are an illustration of the rationalization process
which men go through to reconcile their values with their actions.
The American businessman operates under two theoretically complementary set of values, the American Creed and the Capitalist Ethic.
The American Creed promises the individual equality of opportunity. It
is the fundamental belief that all Americans are entitled to "life, liberty,
ano the pursuit of happiness," unencumbered by artificial barriers. The
idea of individual freedom contained in the American Creed directly
contributes to the Capitalist Ethic. In the Capitalist Ethic the idea of
individual freedom is translated into entrepreneurial freedom. With
"happiness" economically defined as long-run profitability, the businessman is able to cite the American Creed as justification in his pursuit of
long-run profits.
But however complementary the American Creed and the Capitalist
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Ethic are in theory, they have not always been mutually inclusive in
practice. There were three distinct sets of business attitudes toward the
employment of blacks after World War II, and the two value systems
were compatible in only one of them. In the first period, between the
war and 1954, aversion to black workers was so strong that businessmen
did not dare apply the American Creed to employment practices. They
feared that the costs to their businesses would be too high, and the
Capitalist Ethic, i.e., profitability, took precedence over the American
Creed. During the second period, 1954 to 1963, public acceptance of
blacks in nontraditional positions had moderated sufficiently to allow
businessmen to begin employing Negroes in token numbers. Moreover,
there were enough well qualified black workers in the labor pool to make
this change in employment policy profitable for the firm . Thus there
was no necessary conflict between the American Creed and the Capitalist
Ethic during this period. Finally, after 1963 pressure from the civil rights
movement and the government forced employers once more to abandon
the American Creed, but this time in the direction of actively assisting
black job seekers rather than in the direction of discriminating against
them. In particular the riots of the mid-sixties convinced the business
community that it must act to save the system. In this instance the
Capitalist Ethic demanded that business absorb certain short-run costs
of hiring the hard-core unemployed rather than risk the long-run dangers
of economic and social upheaval.
To say that businessmen became increasingly willing to hire blacks
in the postwar period is to say that Negro employment became an
accepted form of social responsibility. Although rejected by some ideological conservatives, throughout American history businessmen have
widely accepted the concept of social responsibility. The idea that businessmen should accept some responsibility for the general welfare of society
reflected four needs felt by most businessmen: first, businessmen wished
to be leaders; second, they wanted to exercise power; third, they wanted
society to accept them; and fourth , they wanted to do what was morally
right. Social responsibility was thus a process through which the businessman achieved status in the community, and by definition acts which were
contrary to popular expectations could not be socially responsible.
Until 1954 progress in hiring blacks in nontraditional jobs was
slow and limited to rare instances of tokenism. In the period before the
Eisenhower administration, the Capitalist Ethic worked against the
employment of Negroes. Businessmen believed that the risks of employing blacks were so high that sound business practice required discrimination against Negroes. Many employers were personally biased
against blacks and accepted stereotypes which characterized Negroes as
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racially incapable of succeeding in nontraditional jobs. Even those employers who did not harbor personal racism believed that their white
employees and their customers would object to Negro workers and,
therefore, they could hire blacks only at the cost of harmonious personnel
relations and sales.
The unwillingness of most businessmen to assume leadership in
the employment of blacks before 1954 reflected the generally negative
attitude which the public held toward black employees. Obviously
businessmen could not have led in the field of Negro employment until
there were people willing to follow- followers are what separate leaders
from eccentrics. But when we discuss the followers of businessmen we
are talking about two distinct groups, the general community and the
business community. At no point in the postwar era were businessmen
leading society in general. Broad social expectations, as reflected in governmental action, always preceded business activity in the field of fair
employment. However, there had to be some businessmen who led the
way in employing blacks within the business community, and these men
were in a very real, if limited, sense leaders of their peers.
Although the drive for a permanent federal fair employment practice
law failed after the end of World War II, several states and cities did
pass such legislation. These early successes in the equal employment
movement, while they did not represent a flood tide of popular support
for black employment, did indicate that some change in public sentiment
had taken place. These straws in the winds of change were enough to
prompt a few pioneering businessmen to hire their first black workers
in nontraditional jobs. Those businessmen who participated in voluntary
fair employment programs to forestall state or local FEPC action hired
blacks not out of a sense of leadership but rather to prevent the government from eroding their power to employ whom they pleased. However,
some pioneering businessmen were motivated by a desire to do good.
The business community was not the employers' sole point of reference.
For many pioneering businessmen their roles as church members were
as important as their membership in the business community. Religiously
committed employers found that the combination of their belief in a
religious code of ethics and in the American Creed was stronger than
the Capitalist Ethic which dictated no Negro employment when there
might be extraordinary costs to the firm. It should, however, be remembered that religious morality did not widely influence business practice
until the public had begun to show preliminary signs of accepting fair
employment practice.
The level of pioneer placement increased after 1954 as the Eisenhower administration lent its support to voluntary fair employment
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policies. The Nixon Committee's emphasis on educating businessmen
and the public in the values of equal employment made it easier for
businessmen to begin to accept black employment as a form of social
responsibility. With the imprimatur of a conservative Republican administration, businessmen could pursue voluntary equal employment
with a fair certainty that their efforts would be rewarded with public
acceptance. And since, during at least the mid-fifties, there was an
available supply of qualified blacks, the American Creed and the Capitalist Ethic combined into a fully integrated set of values.
President Kennedy's Executive Order 10925 accelerated the rate
of Negro employment that had begun voluntarily during the Eisenhower
administration. The Kennedy order called upon government contractors
to go beyond mere equal employment. The federal government asked
them to take affirmative action to find and employ black workers. Although it asked employers to look for black workers, the government did
not demand that businessmen lower their employment standards for
Negroes. This request may have bent the equal opportunity meaning of
the American Creed but it did not break it. Numerous voluntary fair
employment practice councils sprang up in the wake of the federal action
and the beginnings of the civil rights movement. These groups did help
place blacks in pioneering positions, particularly in technical, professional, and managerial jobs. However, the voluntary fair employment
councils mostly produced propaganda. That in itself was a clear sign
that black employment had become a totally accepted form of social
responsibility. Whatever their actual employment practices, businessmen
worked actively and collectively to convince the public that they were
equal opportunity employers.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the formation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission sanctified with law the concept of
fair employment which the business community had come to accept over
the previous decade. But beginning in 1963 and continuing through 1967,
the black community began pushing for a more radical interpretation of
fair employment. Sound personnel policy and the Capitalist Ethic demanded that the employer hire only the best qualified workers and this
rule was not seriously challenged until mid-decade. The combination of
the Capitalist Ethic and the American Creed which prompted some
businessmen to start hiring Negroes in the late fifties had the ironic
effect of giving other employers an excuse not to hire blacks during the
early sixties. Whereas before 1954 employers simply ignored the American
Creed when they excluded blacks from their firms, by the sixties they could
claim that the American Creed demanded equal treatment for all applicants, and since most blacks were unqualified by traditional standards,

Conclusion

221

they could not be hired. Recognizing that businessmen were using the
concept of equal employment opportunity to reject unqualified black
workers, the civil rights movement put pressure on employers to hire
the so-called unemployables. Blacks, and to some extent the federal
government, called upon business to move beyond the American Creed
by changing the nature of jobs, lowering standards, or providing training
for unqualified blacks.
Aside from a handful of unusually dedicated individuals, businessmen rejected the demands for unequal treatment of black and white
applicants. Employers may have been willing to go out and look for
black workers, but they were unwilling to lower their standards to hire
them. Not only were black demands a clear violation of the American
Creed, but the costs involved were in direct conflict with the Capitalist
Ethic. The riots of the mid-sixties provided the impetus necessary to
move the business community to an acceptance of extra help for the
hard-core unemployed. The National Alliance of Businessmen and the
Urban Coalition both advocated going the extra mile. Employing the
hard-core unemployed would burden the firm with additional costs, and
normally these expenses would have been considered a violation of the
Capitalist Ethic. Businessmen, however, suddenly recognized that unless
they were willing to assume some short-run costs, they might find themselves in a long-run period of social and economic chaos that would be
far more expensive. The American Creed was forgotten once again, but
this time in order to employ rather than reject blacks.
For all their hopeful statements about the way business would solve
the urban crisis, NAB and uc began to see that voluntarism was not going
to cure the problem. Businessmen found in NAB and uc all the elements
which defined social responsibility-leadership, power, acceptance, and
morality-but no solution to the problem of Negro unemployment. In
twenty years voluntarism had come full circle. In the 1940's businessmen
had attempted to prevent FEPC laws by forming organizations which
would voluntarily provide jobs for Negroes. Those groups served only
to demonstrate the real need for legislation. In the 1960's businessmen
formed organizations to provide jobs for unemployed blacks. Like their
predecessors the latest groups proved unable to deal with the f:;.~ •..: ...... .;11tal
problem and served primarily to highlight the need for a legislative
remedy.
The creation of NAB and uc was the climax of twenty-five years of
postwar business thinking. The end of the sixties not only witnessed the
bankruptcy of voluntarism as a solution to the black employment problem, but it also saw the end of economic expansion, escalating black
pressure, and 9rowing federal fair employment activity. The election of
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Richard Nixon in 1968, the reduction of black violence after the riots
of 1968, and the beginning of a recession the following year all contributed
to a relaxation of pressure for increased black employment. Although
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and other federal agencies continued their affirmative action policies of the 1960's, the sense
of immediacy was gone, and the economic downturn which lasted
through 1972 made it increasingly difficult to hire hard-core unemployed
blacks while regular workers were laid off. In the end the Capitalist Ethic
remained the dominant force in determining personnel policy.
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